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ABSTRACT 
In 2006, a coalition intelligence report was writing off portions of Iraq as being lost to the 
control of the U.S.-led coalition and the government of Iraq.  Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—a 
local manifestation of a transnational movement—was at its peak, while the U.S.-led 
coalition was attempting to remove itself from the Hobbesian violence raging throughout 
the country in the forms of a civil war and an insurgency.  Yet, within a year, AQI was a 
mere shadow of its former self, rejected by the Sunni population and on the run, hounded 
by coalition forces. 
This thesis analyzes the many factors that contributed to AQI’s demise.  
Beginning with the premise that Iraq’s Sunnis and AQI developed along two distinctly 
different paths, this thesis traces AQI’s demise to disparate cultural and ideological 
differences.  With this rift in place, additional factors widened the gap between the Sunni 
and AQI, further accelerating the group’s decline.  This thesis then goes on to develop a 
theory on insurgent/popular alignment, offering insights into how insurgents build 
support with the population and how the U.S. Special Forces community can build 
popular support for Unconventional Warfare efforts as a third party to an insurgency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. Fortunate is he who can 
understand the causes of things. 
—Virgil, Georgics, no 2, 1 490 
To be a successful soldier you must know history.1 
—General George S. Patton 
In late 2007, the levels of violent activity in Iraq declined precipitously.   
Compared to an average of 1200 significant events per week in December 2006, 
insurgent activity had dropped to less than half of that a year later.2 During that same 
period, the Iraqi insurgency had waned.  The Shi’a insurgent group Jaish al-Mahdi had 
declared a unilateral cease fire preferring to utilize the ballot box for change.  Al Qaeda 
in Iraq was on the run, hounded by both indigenous Sunni insurgents and the Sunni 
population at large.  The vexing issue for academic, policy, and military circles is not so 
much in acknowledging that this phenomenon occurred, as much as in establishing how it 
occurred, given that this outcome was not foreseen in January 2007 when President Bush 
announced his “new way forward,” deciding to send additional ground forces to Iraq in 
order to rein in the escalating levels of violence seen in 2006.  To account for this, a 
number of theories have been offered, ranging from what could be considered the “surge 
theory” to the “Awakening theory.” 
From the standpoint of the military practitioner, this polarization is rather 
irksome, nagging at the subconscious. The burden of his profession requires that the he—
more so than other professions—must see history in a realist way: as it occurred, not as 
he wishes to see it.  This means he must widen the scope of his inquiry of an event, 
extracting the event in question from its black box, and gain an understanding of how that 
 
1 George S. Patton in Andrew Carroll, War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American 
Wars (New York: Scribner, 2001), 240. 
2 United States. Dept. of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress, 
March 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2007), 19, http://www.defense.gov/home/pdf/ 
9010_March_2007_Final_Signed.pdf (accessed March 30, 2009).   
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event arrived in time, its position in the human and physical environment, and 
personalities involved.  In doing so, he allows history to fulfill the promise of imparting 
wisdom applicable to future situations; faced with a situation analogous to one in the 
past, we can utilize an understanding of previous outcomes to provide potential avenues 
to grappling with the problem ahead of us.3  For example, the Zeitgeist of 2009–2010 is 
to apply U.S.-centric lessons from Iraq directly to the Afghan War, most notably in the 
form of “surging” ground forces and utilizing population-centric counterinsurgency 
techniques.4   But have these “lessons” of Iraq been hastily applied to Afghanistan before 
complete digestion? As evidenced by some comments designed to temper public 
expectations, the decision to “surge” in Afghanistan in an effort to replicate the effects of 
efforts in Iraq may be an example of instant history at its worst in the face of a resurgent 
Taliban.5  
Understanding the practitioner’s need to have a holistic view, what then were the 
causes of the decline in Iraq’s Sunni insurgency, and more specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), in 2007?  As alluded previously, one side of the debate maintains that the surge of 
troops with its concomitant change in strategy led to the decline of AQI and the Iraqi 
insurgency.  In contrast, alternate hypotheses place the primacy of the revolt of the Sunni 
tribes as the root cause, highlighting the Anbar Awakening as the origin of AQI’s decline.  
Still others seek to highlight the adaptation of the U.S. military to the nuances of 
counterinsurgency operations over time.  But what if there are other explanations?  Were 
other factors and unplanned events responsible as well?  This thesis seeks to cast the net 
 
3 Here, historian Michael Howard offers this warning in our attempt to make use of the past: “Like the 
statesman, the soldier has to steer between the dangers of repeating the errors of the past because he is 
ignorant that they have been made, and the danger of remaining bound by theories deduced from past 
history although changes in conditions have rendered these theories obsolete.” Michael Howard, "The Uses 
and Abuses of Military History," Parameters XI, no. 1 (March, 1981), 13. 
4 See John J. Kruzel, "Iraq Counterinsurgency Lessons Apply to Afghanistan, Petraeus Says," 
Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54746 (accessed February 22, 
2010).; Thom Shanker and Richard A. Oppel Jr., "In Tactical Shift, Troops Will Hold Afghan Ground 
After Clearing it," The New York Times, sec. A, July 3, 2009. 
5 Clarifying comments he previously gave in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies on January 21, 2010, General Petraeus remarked that, “What I was trying to say, at the least, is that 
[we] shouldn't expect to see the kind of rapid turnaround in the security situation in Afghanistan as was the 
case following the surge in Iraq.”  David Petraeus as quoted in Josh Rogin, "What Petraeus Meant to Say..." 
Foreign Policy, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/21/what_petraeus_meant_to_say (accessed 
January 21, 2010). 
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ever wider, promoting not only a more holistic view in line with the complexities of 
human interaction, but also seeks to determine the degree to which various factors 
influenced the decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency.  To accomplish this explanation, 
I intend to build off of the existing literature and utilize my own operational experience 
as a guide to analyzing the demise of AQI in 2007.6 
A. THE DECLINE OF THE AQI AND THE SUNNI INSURGENCY: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Since late 2007, scholars have offered a multitude of explanations for the decline 
of violence and the abatement of AQI.  As this debate has played out over time, the 
positions have largely gelled into two distinct positions—those actions that originated 
with the U.S-led coalition and those actions that originated indigenously.  By looking at 
the literature from a broader perspective, we can see similar causes that leap out in 
explaining the demise of AQI and can be roughly classified as belonging in either one of 
these two positions.   In an attempt to clarify the cacophony of voices attempting to 
determine the root cause of the decline in Iraq’s insurgency and to alleviate an ad tedium 
explanation of the literature, I have summarized and coded a variety of theories for ease 
of comparison in Table 1.  One of the important reasons for looking at the literature in 
this fashion is to sort out each author’s position to see from what perspective they are 
coming from.  E.H. Carr admonishes us to understand the background of the author.7  
Like blind men each describing one part of the elephant, the literature provides a partisan 
account of events.8  
 
 
6 During early 2007, I was a company-grade officer serving as the assistant operations officer for the 
Special Operations Task Force-North, which was charged with conducting special operations across 
northern Iraq.  From that vantage point, I was involved with daily operations across Northern Iraq.  Later, I 
moved to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula to serve as the current 
operations officer where my aperture was widened to include the entire country.  From that position, I was 
able to observe not only the vast majority of special operations in Iraq, but also to observe the events as 
reported to Multinational Corps-Iraq interacting with them operationally on a daily basis.  
7 E. H. Carr, What is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961), 48. 
8 While my positioning in regard to the events may offer more insight in explaining the demise of AQI 
and the decline of the Sunni insurgency, I cannot escape the military background inherent with my position 
as a Special Forces officer, which holds that indigenous ways may often be better than our own.  It is 
because of this that I tend to favor placing more causal weight onto indigenous factors.  
 4
Author U.S.-centric Actions Indigenous Actions 
Dr. Stephen Biddle   Anbar model of bottoms up 
Shawn Brimley  COIN strategy  Population control measures (i.e. walls) 
 Sunni Awakening 
Dr. Juan Cole 
 COIN TTPs (population control measures i.e. 
walls) 
 Tribal feuding with AQI 
 Results of ethnic cleansing 
 SOI initiative to form local militias 
Dr. Stephen Hadley  Surge  
Dr. Kimberly Kagan   Surge  Leadership changes in US forces 
 
Colin Kahl  &  
LTG (Ret.) William Odom 
 Surge  
 Decisions to reconcile with marginal 
insurgents 
 Sunni Awakening 
 Segregation of sects due to ethnic cleansing 
LTG John F. Kelly  MNF-W Command Philosophy   Sunni tribe cooperation with U.S. forces 
David Kilcullen  COIN strategy   Decisions to reconcile with marginal insurgents 
 
Lawrence Korb  Surge  Sunni Awakening 
LTC (Ret.) John Nagl  COIN Strategy   Long-term development of ISF 
 Sunni Awakening 
Michael O’Hanlon  Surge  
GEN Raymond Odierno  Change in strategy and employment of Surge forces 
 
Andrew Phillips 
  AQI’s ideological inflexibility and 
unwillingness to adapt local sensitivities and 
interests to their ideology 
 AQI’s use of indiscriminant violence 
Linda Robinson  GEN Petraeus’ leadership  COIN strategy 
 Sunni rejection of AQI 
Bing West 
 COIN strategy  




 Surge  
 Counter-leadership targeting of insurgents by 
SOF 
 Anbar Awakening 
Table 1.   Hypotheses of Iraq’s Declining Insurgency.9 
                                                 
9 Stephen Biddle as quoted in United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq 
After the Surge: Political Prospects, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., 2008, http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/ 
2008/hrg080402p.html (accessed June 26, 2009); Shawn Brimley, Juan Cole, Lawrence Korb, John Nagl, 
and Michael O’Hanlon as quoted in Dylan Matthews and Ezra Klein, "How Important was the Surge?" The 
American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=how_important_was_the_surge (accessed 
July 22, 2009); Stephen J. Hadley, "Statement by National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley," The White 
House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080905-5.html (accessed 
July 22, 2009); Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 197; 
Colin H. Kahl and William E. Odom, "When to Leave Iraq: Today, Tomorrow, Or Yesterday?" Foreign 
Affairs 87, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2008), 151; John F. Kelly in Timothy S. McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler, 
eds., Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume I: American Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 
2004-2009 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009), ix; David J. Kilcullen, The Accidental 
Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
184-5; Raymond Odierno as quoted in Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, 196; William E. Odom as 
quoted in United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq After the Surge: Military 
Prospects, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., 2008, http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2008/hrg080402a.html 
(accessed June 26, 2009); A. Phillips, "How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq," Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 63, no. 1 (Mar, 2009), 64; Linda Robinson, Tell Me How this Ends: General David Petraeus and 
the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 345–360; Francis J. West, The 
Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), 364–66; Bob 
Woodward, "Why did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge." The Washington Post, Sep 8, 2008. 
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The first camp—and perhaps the loudest voice in the current debate—advocate 
what can be considered a U.S.-centric argument.  Here, the locus of the origin of the 
decline of the Sunni insurgency lay in the actions of the U.S. and its coalition.  
Proponents claim that it was  a series of military factors such as the surge in American 
ground forces, coupled with a near simultaneous change in counterinsurgency strategy 
that led to the deflation of high levels of violence.  Fredrick Kagan—widely considered 
the architect of the surge strategy—notes “the surge of forces in 2007 and the change of 
strategy that accompanied it did what the targeted counter-terrorism approach could not 
do: it drove the terrorists out of their sanctuaries and rallied the support of the Iraqi 
people against them.”10  Likewise, the operational commander of Coalition forces in Iraq 
remarked that— 
It’s tempting for those of us personally connected to the events to 
exaggerate the effects of the Surge.  By the same token, it’s a gross 
oversimplification to say, as some commentators have, that the positive 
trends we’re observing have come about because we pair off the Sunni 
insurgents because of Muqtadah al Sadr simply decided to announce a 
cease-fire.  These assertions ignore the key variable in the equation—the 
Coalition’s change in strategy and our employment of the Surge forces. 
[emphasis added]11 
This U.S.-centric viewpoint includes lesser actions that help buttress the surge theory, 
further enhancing its dominance—counter-leadership targeting of AQI leadership by 
special operations forces, decisions to reconcile with lower-level insurgents, and various 
counterinsurgency tactics.12   
In terms of applicability, this school of thought believes that lessons of the surge 
are universally applicable and have expanded the idea that increasing counterinsurgent 
 
10 United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Counterinsurgency and Irregular 
Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned, 111th Congress, 1st sess., 2009, 5, http://armedservices.house.gov/ 
pdfs/TUTC050709/Kagan_Testimony050709.pdf (accessed June 26, 2009). 
11 Raymond Odierno as quoted in Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, 196. 
12 For counter-leadership targeting of AQI leadership by special operations forces, see Bob 
Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2008), 487.  For decisions to reconcile with lower-level insurgents, see Kilcullen, The Accidental 
Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, 184-5.  For increased efficacy and application of 
counterinsurgency procedures, see John Nagl as quoted in Matthews and Klein, How Important was the 
Surge? 
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forces will lead to the demise of the insurgency to a near absolute in counterinsurgent 
doctrine, essentially elevating population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine in such a 
way as to deify it, establishing, in effect, what could be considered the First Law of 
Counterinsurgency—protect the population.13 Thus, the narrative of the surge’s success 
serves as “social proof” that the concepts in FM 3-24—the Army’s capstone COIN 
manual—and President Bush’s increase of troops are applicable to all insurgencies.14  
From this standpoint, not only do the Army’s COIN efforts in Iraq re-establish the 
Army’s track record by excising the ghosts of Vietnam, but it also shows that the force 
itself does not need to change.15   
The second camp claims that the roots of the reduction in the Sunni insurgency lie 
in indigenous factors.  One of the key tenets of this school of thought is the claim that a 
tribal revolt by Anbaris led the way to decreased violence due to AQI’s use of heavy-
handed tactics and coercion.16  However, emerging literature makes note of the rejection 
 
13 Celeste Ward, "Countering the Military's Latest Mantra," The Washington Post, sec. B, May 17, 
2009. 
14 In a recent editorial, Fredrick and Kimberly Kagan argue that increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan 
to secure the population will serve to reduce violence and prevent the Afghan government from losing 
legitimacy. Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "In Afghanistan, Real Leverage Starts with More 
Troops," The Washington Post, sec. A, November 27, 2009.  On the concept of social proof see Chapter 4 
in Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. (New York: Morrow, 1993).  
15 This is an important subtheme to the debate.  If the Army in its newfound (and more adaptive) 
modularity can conduct counter-insurgency with its current forces structure, then the principle of a modular 
“one-size fits all” force stands as valid, with no need to bifurcate the force as advocated by Krepinevich for 
a more modern national security environment. Likewise, in spite of calls for the institutionalization of an 
“Advisor Corps” within the Army, the Army has not moved to make any force structure created for Iraq 
and Afghanistan permanent.  For a summary of the debate on the Army’s future, see Paul McLeary, "U.S. 
Army Future Follows New Doctrine," Aviation Week & Space Technology, http://www.aviationweek.com/ 
aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/COMP100909.xml (accessed February 22, 
2010). For the bifurcation of the Army, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, An Army at the Crossroads 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), http://www.csbaonline.org/ 
4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.An_Army_At_The_Cro/R.20081117.An_Army_At_The_Cro.pdf 
(accessed September 3, 2009).  On the Advisor Corps see, John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s 
Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 
2007), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf (accessed 
January 23, 2010). 
16 For an example of this perspective, see John A. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of 
Incentives," The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1 (January, 2009), 47–49. 
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of AQI’s ideology as a causal factor.17  Other indigenous factors contributing to the 
decline of the insurgency include the Sunni’s willingness to side with Coalition forces 
due to the perception that U.S. forces would soon leave Iraq after the 2006 Congressional 
elections.18   
Further reviewing the literature, two things appear that are important for the 
research question at hand.  First, throughout the literature there is a lack of causal 
linkages to a breadth and depth that provides a satisfying explanation of the decline in the 
Iraqi insurgency.  Regarding the breadth of explanation, because of the polarization of the 
debate, little has been done to link all credible factors together to provide an explanation 
that is both necessary and sufficient; none provide a comprehensive narrative of what 
factors contributed to the decline of the Sunni insurgency and how significant they were 
in this effort.  The U.S.-centric view provides a necessary, but insufficient, explanation 
for the cause of the decline of Iraq’s insurgency at best.19  Although the factors 
advocated by the indigenous camp should take on greater importance in explaining the 
decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency, even they provide an insufficient causal 
explanation of the decline of the insurgency by themselves.20  In terms of depth, the most 
 
17 Recent work by Long puts forth the notion that due to ideological differences, AQI’s coercion was 
used to force the Sunnis back into alignment, thus the coercion should be seen as an effect of the 
differences between AQI and the Sunni.  Likewise, Andrew Phillips makes the case that the root of split 
between AQI and the Sunni occurred over ideological differences. Austin G. Long, "The Anbar 
Awakening," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 2 (2008), 77–78; Phillips, How Al Qaeda Lost 
Iraq, 64.  Interestingly, captured AQI and Islamic State of Iraq documents reinforce this assertion. See 
Harmony Document NMEC-2007-612449, Analysis of the State of ISI, 11. 
18 Neil Smith and Sean MacFarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," Military Review 
LXXXVIII, no. 2 (March/April, 2008), 52. 
19 In an attempt to advocate increased numbers of U.S. security forces in Afghanistan, Frederick and 
Kimberly Kagan refrain from mentioning major events like the Anbar Awakening, insisting that the bulk of 
the work done to reduce violence in Iraq was done by U.S. forces.  “The implementation of a fully 
resourced counterinsurgency strategy—enabled by the deployment of nearly six additional U.S. combat 
brigades—transformed Iraq's government within 18 months.” Additionally, their argument fails to consider 
the sequential nature of events.  In Iraq, the Awakening occurred before the introduction of additional U.S. 
forces; once delinked from the insurgency, the Iraqi government became a more attractive option for 
Anbaris to support.  Applying this logic to Afghanistan, the sequence of events is likely to be reversed (i.e. 
increased government legitimacy prior to an insurgent/popular cleavage) and the results drastically 
different than those seen in Iraq.  Kagan and Kagan, In Afghanistan, Real Leverage Starts with More 
Troops, 23. 
20 Descriptions of the Awakening movement reveal that numerous attempts occurred prior to the 
Ramadi Awakening in September 2006.  What most fail to explain is why the Ramadi uprising stood fast 
while the others crumbled.  Similarly, tribal engagement efforts by Coalition forces occurred as early as the 
spring of 2004, but it wasn’t until late 2006 that these efforts bore any fruit. 
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glaring problem with the literature is that, on the whole, it lacks a level of granularity in 
depicting the micro-level causal linkages needed to buttress their conclu
Secondly, the common narrative as espoused by the literature is missing the 
perspective of all parties involved.  Most of the literature describes the event in question 
through U.S. eyes; even the side of the debate that argues the primacy of indigenous 
factors lacks a Sunni or AQI perspective in assembling and justifying its explanation.   
Any explanation of the decline of Iraq’s insurgency must incorporate the perspective of 
all three agents: the state, the insurgent, and the population.  With the dominant U.S.-
centric explanations for the insurgency’s demise, the inherent solipsistic lens prevents an 
understanding of other equally important perspectives.  The mere fact that the U.S. was a 
third party to the Iraqi insurgency, albeit as an adjunct of the government of Iraq, should 
bestow less causal weight to U.S.-centric actions.  Without understanding AQI’s actions 
and the reasons behind them from their perspective, we are missing one third of the story, 
and thus important explanations that factor on the decline of the AQI.22  Similarly, any 
examination of the decline of the Sunni insurgency should examine the battleground of 
the insurgency—the Sunni population.23  
B. MISALIGNMENT: A THEORY OF AQI’S DECLINE 
Like many historical events, the events of 2007 defy simple mechanistic 
explanation.  Causal chains here are extraordinary complex, crossing through multiple 
generations.  Each individual, organization, and nation brought with it its own historical 
 
21 For example, the surge theory cannot explain why violence plummeted in provinces in the environs 
of Baghdad, where the vast majority of surge brigades were assigned.  The surge theory fails to explain the 
reduction of insurgent activity in other Sunni provinces north of Baghdad.  
22 However, recent scholarship has further developed the perspective of AQI based on captured 
documents, insurgent communiqués and works on insurgent Internet forums.  For example, see Phillips, 
How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq, 64.; Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-
Qa'ida in Iraq (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/ 
pdf/DD_FINAL_FINAL.pdf (accessed April 26, 2009); Evan F. Kohlmann, State of the Sunni Insurgency 
in Iraq: August 2007 (New York: The NEFA Foundation, 2007), http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/ 
iraqreport0807.pdf (accessed December 15, 2009). 
23 Interestingly, only 4% of Iraqis surveyed in a February 2008 poll believe that U.S. forces deserve 
credit for increased security following the Surge.  Gary Langer, ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll - Iraq Five 
Years Later: Where Things Stand (New York: ABC News, 2008), http://www.abcnews.go.com/images/ 
PollingUnit/1060a1IraqWhereThingsStand.pdf (accessed August 3, 2009). 
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baggage.  The U.S. brought the experience of its previous military campaigns, and was 
haunted by the ghosts of Vietnam when faced with counterinsurgency redux in Iraq.  The 
Sunni brought their own fears and past as well.  With visions of Sunni exceptionalism 
embedded deeply within their psyche, the sudden disappearance of the Ba’ath state on 
April 9, 2003 reminded them of their precarious position in Iraqi society and increased 
the nagging worry that their past actions toward the Kurds and Shi’a would be 
reciprocated.  Likewise, AQI and other transnational Jihadi Salafis brought memories of a 
vision of the golden age of jihad to Iraq, with dreams of defeating a second superpower 
that had strayed into the land of the caliph.   
As an insurgency is a battle over political space and the population, the character 
of an insurgency is largely determined by the society wherein this phenomenon takes 
place, becoming what should be the key perspective in explaining an insurgency’s origins 
and evolution.  Looking at the evidence at hand, it appears that the Sunni revolt against 
AQI was at its heart a reaction to protect local identity from being subsumed by an 
outside group.  As much as the demonization of Sunni identity by the U.S. and its Iraqi 
quislings created the insurgency in 2003–2004, the perceived belief by the Sunnis that 
AQI would destroy their identity caused AQI’s demise.  The Sunni attempted to resist 
this imposition of new identity on numerous occasions, only to see each attempt quickly 
suppressed by AQI, and it was not until the Ramadi-based Anbar Salvation Council in 
late 2006 that the Sunni resistance to AQI actually stood firm. With this perspective in 
mind, it stands that the decline of violence in Iraq stems from AQI’s original sin—those 
“fundamental errors in the initial design of an insurgency”24—in that the organization 
failed to gain ideological and cultural alignment and could not become socially embedded 
with the Sunni population.25  This misalignment between the AQI and the Sunnis over a 
 
24 Lincoln B. Krause, "Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes," Parameters XXXIX, no. 3 
(Autumn, 2009), 50. 
25 This hypothesis is based on the notion that people prefer to be around others like them.  Parsing this 
out even further, I maintain that ideological divisions, based on differing views of how the population 
should be governed, between insurgents and a target population will lead to the decline of an insurgent 
movement due to disparate worldviews—the greater gap between the two agents, the less probability for 
insurgent growth and thus the decline of an insurgent group. Likewise, cultural divisions would likely lead 
to a divergence between insurgents and a target population.  If these factors diverge from the norms held by 
the population, then the resultant misalignment will create a schism which cannot be bridged by the 
insurgent and thus it is a matter of time before the insurgency breathes its last breath. 
vision of Iraq’s future, AQI’s interference with indigenous authority structures and AQI’s 
failure to understand Sunni social norms and beliefs are likely the most proximate causes 
of the decline of AQI and their portion of the Sunni insurgency.  AQI’s violence toward 
the Sunni was, as others have argued, a means to force the Sunni back into alignment and 
under their control. 
Nevertheless, while necessary, AQI’s flaws are insufficient to explain such a 
rapid decline in the activity of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq in 2007.  The burgeoning 
capacity and increased legitimacy of the central government in Baghdad appears to be a 
crucial factor in explaining why the Ramadi Awakening took hold when previous 
attempts did not.  The timing of the government’s capacity and U.S. efforts to adapt to 
the nuances of counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level seem to be the factors 
that helped to widen the gap between the Sunni and AQI. Other factors—the surge, 
improved counterinsurgency doctrine, tactical adaptation of the U.S. military to 
counterinsurgency, counter-leadership targeting, new strategic and operational leadership, 
the increasing capacity of the Iraqi government to govern, and the acquiescence of Jaish 
al-Mahdi (JAM)—accelerated the widening of the schism between AQI and the Sunni, 
reinforcing the divide.  Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of this chain of events, and 
makes note of the highly sequential nature of my assertion. 
 
Figure 1.   Hypothesized Causal Sequence 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The complications arise in the moving this assertion from one that is plausible to 
one that is probable, by establishing a direct linkage between each causal factor and 
another to show an acceptable degree of cause and effect.  To assist in this effort, I have 
utilized a number of methodological techniques to demonstrate both the external and 
internal validity of this assertion.  To demonstrate the overall fit of the assertion that 
misalignment is the prime cause of the decline of AQI, I utilize the technique of 
congruence procedure.  In essence, “the essential characteristic of the congruence method 
is that the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to 
explain or predict the outcome of a particular case.”26  With this method, we can assume 
that if the outcome of the case and the theory’s prediction are consistent, then there is a 
high likelihood that a causal relationship exists between the independent and dependent 
variables.  The standard for determining the degree of congruence is to observe 
“similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized causes and observed 
effects.”27   
Although these similarities can provide a great deal of support for the theory, they 
could lead to erroneous or spurious causal explanations.  To prevent this, we must 
strengthen the internal validity of the assertion through a separate technique, known as 
process-tracing.  This technique offers the ability to utilize historical narratives and 
convert them into an analytical causal explanation.  Process-tracing can help expand the 
proposed causal mechanism in this case and to extract variance in the independent 
variables. This technique “attempt[s] to identify a causal path (the causal chain) that 
depicts how the independent variable leads to the outcome of the dependent variable,” 
making it a useful tool to explain changes over time.28  Because learning and adaptation 
between actors takes place in a chronological fashion, and we should expect to see 
longitudinal variance in both the independent and dependent variables in each causal 
 
26 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 181. 
27 Ibid., 183. 
28 Ibid., 
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argument, thus allowing the investigator to “test whether the observed processes among 
variables in a case match those predicted or implied by the theory.”29  
While these techniques are very useful in explaining the overall fit of the assertion 
and the internal strength of each factor, something must be done to tie these disparate 
causal strands together.  As there exist a number of causal chains that  each contribute at 
varying times and intensities to the decline of AQI, the investigator must consider them 
as a whole, rather than attempting to make one or two causal factors stand on their own as 
the greater debate would have it.  This can be accomplished through the use of the 
historian’s technique of “convergent colligation,” wherein different causal mechanisms 
converge to explain a single event.30  This allows us to “perceive a unity within an 
indefinite number of facts,”31 notes Roberts, allowing us to include other independent 
events that converge with the prime causal chain.  By pulling together all of these causal 
chains, we can create a level of “closure” that can satisfactorily explain the causes of the 
decline in the insurgency.32   
The data used to validate the assertion of this thesis come from a wide variety of 
sources, all of which can be ranked in order of preference, utility and veracity.  First in 
order of reliability, are those sources that record the conversations of participants.  These 
are drawn from published interviews and transcripts.  This first person perspective offers 
the ability to see the events unfold through the eyes of the participants.   Likewise, 
military reports, captured enemy documents, and jihadi Web sites fall into this 
category.33  These documents offer individual and organizational interpretations of the 
events in question.  Second in order of historical reliability are newspapers and other 
 
29 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 217. 
30 Clayton Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1996), 112–118. 
31 Ibid., 19. 
32 For a broader explanation of closure, including methods to create vertical and horizontal closure, 
see Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation, 114–115.  
33 For this, I have chosen to use only declassified enemy documents readily available to the general 
public in order to allow the explanation in this thesis to reach a broader audience. Further declassification 
of documents, including unit operational records will be invaluable in constructing a definitive history of 
the insurgency.  Many of these enemy documents and unit operational documents are classified at the 
Secret level and as such maintain a 10 to 25-year period until declassification and release. 
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media journalistic reports.  Here, media reports offer what are often considered mundane 
facts, sprinkled with first person accounts, but maintain a relatively high degree of 
integrity provided by journalistic standards.  Lastly, secondary sources in books and 
academic journals are used.  The main drawback in using these sources is that they offer 
massaged and processed facts in order to make a specific point.  However, their utility in 
this endeavor lies in the greater insight and analysis not readily found in the first two 
categories of sources.   In all cases where an author of these sources makes mention of a 
specific fact or event, I have made every effort to track down and use the same original 
source.  Additional challenges involved in this case include the fact that this research has 
been conducted in the waning days of the Iraq War, and as such has been based on the 
limited amount of information available at the time of writing.  Future interviews with the 
Iraqi population will be critical for expanding this research at a later date in order to 
discover their motivations for breaking ranks with AQI. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Because the causal chains are numerous and intertwine with each other, 
attribution of the decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency is difficult to pin down to any 
single key cause, or utilize any linear explanation.  TO overcome this hurdle and help 
organize the thesis and its analysis, I have chosen to borrow from a framework employed 
by historian Lawrence Stone.  Whereas his framework categorizes causes into 
preconditions, precipitants and triggers, in this case, I have adapted this, dividing the 
causal factors in question into the categories of preconditions, reactants and accelerants 
as depicted in Figure 1.34  Not only do these categories portray a temporal sequence, but 
they offer an attempt at magnifying the effect of some causes more than others.  An 
added benefit to this framework is that it allows an investigator to compare the weights of 
causes within each category, arguably a more useful approach than random comparison 
across categories, thus, removing the inherent difficulty of comparing such diverse causes 
 
34 “Such an approach [at understanding all the factors that lead to an complex event],” he writes, 
“raises serious problems of organization, and for analytical purposes, it seems best to unravel the tangled 
skein of the developing crisis stage by stage, examining first the long-term preconditions, nest the medium-
term precipitants, and lastly the short-term triggers.”  Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English 
Revolution, 1529-1642, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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such as the evolution of tribalism in Iraqi society with the replacement of general officers 
at the strategic and operational levels in Iraq in the Spring of 2007.35  
Preconditions are those factors that created the situation found early in the Iraq 
War and stress the perspectives and experiences that the participants brought into the 
insurgency.  Chapter II examines the Sunni and AQI as they developed prior to 2003–
2004, specifically exploring the role of existing ideological and socio-cultural factors 
amongst Iraq’s Sunnis that AQI needed to overcome in order to grow their organization 
and realize their dream of power in Iraq.  In addition, the second half of the chapter offers 
a survey of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, providing an overview of the numerous 
insurgent groups and their aims, culminating with an explanation of the origins of AQI. 
This examination provides a basis for understanding the shifting alliances between 
groups and explains the rise of AQI.   
Reactants describe the interplay between the Sunni population at large, AQI, and 
other Sunni insurgent groups.  Chapter III explores this interaction over 2003–2007, 
examining the actions of AQI and their impact on Iraq’s Sunnis.  By examining the 
historical record, we can see why the differences between the two took so long to surface.   
Accelerants are those factors that can be considered as having sped up the 
reactants, hastening the decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency.  Chapter IV provides a 
description and analysis in an attempt to indicate the relative weight that various 
factors—such as the increasing strength of the Baghdad government, the troop surge, 
counter-leadership targeting, the implementation of revised COIN doctrine, tactical 
adaptation, the JAM cease-fire and the impact of new strategic and operational 
leadership—had on the decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency. 
To apply this historical perspective, I attempt to offer an insight on how the 
Special Forces community, as practitioners of unconventional warfare (UW), might learn 
from AQI’s rejection by the Sunni population of Iraq in Chapter V.  In this chapter, I 
 
35 On this, Stone comments that “the great methodological gain from breaking the problem down into 
distinct categories of preconditions, precipitants and triggers is that the historian is relieved of the futile, 
and intellectually dishonest, task of trying to arrange all the causes in a single rank order.”  Stone, The 
Causes of the English Revolution, 58. 
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expand the hypothesis of AQI’s decline into a broader theory of insurgent/popular 
alignment, serving to place the hypothesis within an understanding rooted in the classic 
literature on insurgency and counter-insurgency.  
The final chapter offers concluding thoughts on the Iraq War and the demise of 
AQI and directions for future research.  
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II. THE PRECONDITIONS 
In order to move beyond the instigation of terrorist actions and push the Sunni 
insurgency towards the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had 
to adapt its program to include Iraq’s Sunnis.  However, over their history, the Sunnis of 
Iraq developed particular ideologies, cultural aspects, and social structures that were 
anathema to AQI’s modus vivendi.  These particular characteristics of the Sunnis can be 
viewed as preconditions, which served as the foundation for the Sunni’s break with AQI 
in 2006 and set into motion the decline of AQI.  To that end, the first portion of this 
chapter will trace the establishment of these characteristics of Sunni Iraqis from the 
Ottoman Empire through the fall of Saddam in order to describe the nature of the Sunni 
insurgency and how the Sunni defined the insurgency as a campaign of resistance rather 
than the revolution desired by AQI.36 The second half of the chapter will examine the 
formation of the Sunni insurgency and the emergence of AQI, paying particular attention 
to the group’s ideology and strategy. 
A. IRAQ’S SUNNIS UNTIL 2003 
1. The Sunnis and the State: An Ideology of Sunni Dominance 
The Sunnis of Iraq have long been a minority group within Iraq, with most 
estimates indicating that the Sunnis comprise 15–20% of the total Iraqi population.37  But 
 
36 Because history is a never-ending continuum of processes, 2003 cannot artificially be chosen as the 
starting date to examine the Iraqi insurgency—participants carried past baggage in the form of experiences 
and grievances that developed before the insurgency physically began.  By briefly reviewing the major 
events in Iraqi society prior to the U.S. invasion, we can see the rise of insurgency within its true context 
rather than imposing an artificial U.S.-centric perspective the insurgency’s rise and decline.  This method 
allows for an examination of the insurgency from the perspective of those who participated in it.  Assuming 
that primary leaders of Iraqi society were between 50–65 years of age in 2003–2007, we must turn the 
clock back to at least 1938—when they were born—to describe those events that these Iraqis either 
observed or participated in, as these events shaped and created identities in Iraqi society, thus forming an 
understanding of the motivations for which the Sunnis were fighting for.  Similarly, the rank-and file of 
insurgents were born after the Ba’ath seized power in 1968. 
37 The commonly accepted division of Iraq’s population is approximately 60% Shi’a, 15-20% Sunni 
18% Kurd and 2-7% other minority groups. Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: The Sunnis," Council on Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7678/ (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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given their small numbers, how did the Sunnis come to dominate Iraqi society?  And just 
how did Iraq’s leaders justify and maintain this dominance given Iraq’s ethnic and 
sectarian heterogeneity? Although a minority, the Sunni have dominated Iraqi society 
from the time of the Ottoman Empire until the U.S. invasion in 2003.  This historical 
dominance of state and society from a minority position has inculcated within the Sunni a 
desire for the maintenance of the status quo with a united Iraq comprised with a social 
hierarchy in which their place was at its apex.   
The Ottoman Empire absorbed the majority of what is geographically defined as 
modern-day Iraq in the mid-17th century.  Ottoman control followed the pathways of the 
Tigris and Euphrates and by 1634, they had established permanent rule over the Arab 
population from Mosul to Basra.  Ottoman interactions with the Arabs had mixed 
receptions.  While a large ethnic gap existed between the Ottoman Turk rulers and the 
Arabs of Iraq, they possessed the common religious heritage of Sunni Islam with the 
Sunni Arabs.  On the other hand, the Ottomans viewed the Shi’a Arabs as a potential 
Persian fifth column due to their shared religious ties with Iran.38  Recurrent wars 
between the Ottomans and Persian until 1818 reinforced the religious commonalities 
between the Ottomans and the Sunni Arabs while highlighting the Sunni-Shi’a divide.  
Thus, the Ottomans began to rely increasingly on urban Sunni Arabs for support, setting a 
precedent for the future of Iraq.  In 1869, a number of administrative and education 
reforms were implemented under Midhat Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, to better 
solidify Ottoman control over the province, all of which began to develop the idea of 
Sunni exceptionalism in Iraq.  
Midhat Pasha’s administrative reforms developed local councils that attempted to 
“associate the local populace with the [Ottoman] government and provide Iraqis with 
some administration experience.”39  These councils soon became dominated by Sunnis as 
both the Kurds and Shi’a largely desired to keep to themselves.  The inclusion of Sunni 
notables and tribal sheikhs into the governing councils underscored their positions within 
 
38 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), 19. 
39 Ibid., 23. 
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Iraqi society because of their influence in the Ottoman administration, which in turn 
increased Sunni ascendancy over the Kurds and Shi’a.40   
Education reforms resulted in the formation of a secular educational system to 
expand the administrative abilities of the local Iraqis and provide local leaders for the 
Ottoman Army.  Over time, the secular education system was seen by Iraqis as a means 
of upward social mobility to all classes and religious backgrounds and Sunnis took full 
advantage of the Ottoman educational system, sending their sons through the system to 
become officers in the Ottoman Army.41  The establishment of secular schooling in 1869, 
“conclusively broke the ulama’s [Sunni clerics] monopoly on education,”42 paving the 
way into Iraqi society for such secular ideologies as nationalism, communism, and 
Ba’athism.   
The overall effect of these educational and administrative reforms was to develop 
the Sunni Arab belief that they alone of Iraq’s various sects and ethnic groups should rule 
Iraqi society, as the result of the acquisition of the requisite skills to govern and the trust 
granted to them by the Ottomans.  As Ottoman schools used the Turkish language for 
instruction, those students who had knowledge of Turkish prior to schooling were more 
apt to enroll and succeed in school, later embarking on careers that placed them in 
prominent roles in society.43  Davis notes that “those who were able to study at the 
schools were usually the sons of civil servants [who spoke Turkish] and were 
overwhelmingly Arab Sunnis, which reflected the traditional Ottoman policy of 
promoting the interests of fellow Sunni Muslims within the Ottoman provincial 
 
40 Liora Lukitz, Iraq: The Search for National Identity (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 73. 
41 Reeva S. Simon, "The Education of an Iraqi Ottoman Army Officer," in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, eds. Rashid Khalidi and others (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 152-153. 
Hashim notes that 10% of the admissions to the Military Academy in Istanbul in 1903 were reserved for 
Sunni Arab and Kurd cadets from Mesopotamia.  By the end of World War I, roughly three hundred 
officers from the Iraqi middle class formed the core of Sharif Faisal’s Arab army in the Hijaz, having 
deserted from the Ottoman Army. Ahmed S. Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in 
Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power," Middle East Journal 57, no. 1 (Winter, 2003), 13; Eric Davis, 
Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 34. 
42 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's 
Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists, and Free Officers (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 169. 
43 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 26. 
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administration.”44  A second order effect of the educational reforms was that Iraqis in the 
service of the Ottoman Empire came into contact with Europe and European ideas. The 
influence of German officers serving as advisors in the Ottoman Army brought ideas of 
nationalism into Sunni Arab minds, where they were sown in fertile ground, following 
the introduction of Turkism into Ottoman schools by the Young Turks after 1908.45   
If the Ottomans were responsible for installing the Sunnis into the power 
structures of Iraq, the British should be considered as cementing the Sunni into 
permanent position, making the Sunni central to the rule of Iraq.  Although British 
involvement in Mesopotamia stemmed from the Crown’s desire to protect British 
interests in the Persian Gulf, by the end of World War I, Britain had gained control over 
the three vilayets of Mesopotamia.  By all accounts, the history of the modern state of 
Iraq properly begins as the British Army trudged through the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire in Mesopotamia.   
Favor towards the Sunnis was evident in British actions towards the Mandate of 
Iraq.  The interim government formed in November 1920 was predominantly comprised 
of Sunni Arabs.46  The re-establishment of Ottoman councils brought the trained Sunni 
administrators back into the political sphere.  The most blatant indicator of British favor 
towards the Sunni Arabs was the imposition of Sharif Faisal bin al-Hussein bin Ali al-
Hashemi, one of the key leaders of the Arab Revolt during the First World War.  With 
Faisal’s establishment on the throne, the Sunni pan-Arab nationalists who served in his 
army during the war were installed in various positions in the nascent Iraqi state.47  
While helping to cement Faisal’s rule based on ties of loyalty and prior service in the 
Arab Revolt, these pan-Arab nationalists also helped to expunge the last vestiges of 
Ottoman culture from Iraqi society and usher in a program to further Arabize the Iraqi 
 
44 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 36. 
45 Simon, The Education of an Iraqi Ottoman Army Officer, 158-160.; Marr, The Modern History of 
Iraq, 27–28..  For a more detailed explanation of the influence of German nationalism on the creation of 
Iraqi nationalism, see Reeva S. Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and 
Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 14–23.  
46 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 44. 
47 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 36–37. 
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state. Rather than destabilize Iraq to ensure long-term sustainability by developing a 
system of proportional representation in the interest of short-term stability, Britain instead 
institutionalized a system of minority rule in Iraq, which would wreak havoc on Iraq for 
the remainder of the century. 
Once granted sovereignty by the League of Nations in 1932, Iraq soon faced 36 
years of unrest, in large part over the nature of the Iraqi state.  Firmly entrenched in 
power, the Sunni ruled Iraq in all of the post-Mandate regimes until 2003.  Left without 
the presence of an outside benefactor to ensure their position atop Iraqi society, these 
regimes attempted to utilize various ideologies to help justify the status quo, with some 
looking outward and others looking inward.  Pan-Arabism served to link Arabs together 
across the false boundaries of the Arab states.  As the majority of Arabs are Sunnis, 
identification with the Pan-Arab movement serves to reinforce the Sunni Arab perception 
of their “right” to rule Iraq, even though they are a minority in the country.  In stark 
contrast, the Iraqi nationalist vision, “look[ed] for its foundational myths to Iraq’s ancient 
civilizations as well as to its Arab heritage, but without privileging the latter.”48  The 
inward focus of Iraqi nationalism served as a means to bridge Iraq’s ethno-sectarian 
divisions.   
For the majority of the monarchy, Iraq maintained a pan-Arab outlook largely due 
to the monarchy’s Hashemite origins.  These roots led the monarchy to emphasize a 
shared heritage and thus a sense of unity between the Hijaz in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and 
Jordan.  Iraq’s outlook changed with the fall of the monarchy through a coup at the hands 
of military officers in 1958.  As a means to stay in a position dominating Iraqi society and 
maintain power, an ideology that balanced both pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism to 
placate the factions in Iraqi society has evolved since the 1958 Revolution.  Iraq veered 
away from a pan-Arab ideological outlook under Qasim and embraced a form of Iraqi 
nationalism, only to veer back to pan-Arabism five years later underneath the ‘Arif 
 
48 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 13. 
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brothers.  It was not until the ascension of the Tikriti Ba’athists49 that true Iraqi 
nationalism was fully embraced, first as a means of ensuring stability of Iraqi society, and 
then as a means of ensuring regime survival under Saddam after the Iran-Iraq War and 
the 1991 Gulf War.    
The Iraqi Republic was established in 1958, when Abd al-Karim Qasim seized 
power in a coup d’état, ending the 26-year Hashemite dominance of Iraq.  Qasim’s five 
years of rule were marked by a reversal of the monarchy’s allegiance to pan-Arabism.50  
Under Qasim, Iraq’s folklore and Mesopotamian heritage were emphasized to counteract 
the forces of pan-Arabism.  Additionally, Qasim began to implement a series of social 
welfare programs to instill social and economic change using land reform, low-cost 
housing for the masses, and increased petroleum output.51  Despite these attempts to 
bridge the gaps in Iraqi society, Qasim’s regime fell in 1963, largely as a result of the 
failure to encourage widespread participation in the regime.52 
Qasim’s downfall ushered in a short-lived Ba’athist regime, which was brought 
down after eight months of infighting, and replaced by the regimes of ‘Abd al-Salam 
‘Arif and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif.  For the next five years, the ‘Arif brothers reversed 
Qasim’s movement toward wholesale Iraqi nationalism, attempting to reestablish Iraq as 
a member of the pan-Arab world in order to maintain the support of Nasserists in the 
Iraqi Army.  Moreover, Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s admiration of Egypt’s ability to dominate 
not only the region, but its own society provided additional impetus to adopt the pan-
 
49 The term Tikriti Ba’ath is used here following Eric Davis’ definition in order to “refer to the second 
Ba’athist regime, which came to power in 1968, because, as Batatu and others have shown, the party was 
dominated by Sunni Arab members drawn from the town of Tikrit.”  However, after 1979, with Saddam 
Hussein’s ascension to power, the term is less useful, as the government’s composition changed as Saddam 
replaced Ba’ath Party members with his own immediate family into positions of power.  For purposes of 
clarification here, mention of the Ba’ath after 1979 will use the term regime or Saddam to signal the 
transition. Ibid., 318. 
50 While Qasim came from a group of officers who were ardent pan-Arabists, Qasim believed that 
domestic reform and the creation of an Iraqi national community should take place before engaging the 
Arab world.  Tripp, A History of Iraq, 147. 
51 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 76–78; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 169–175. 
52 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 116. 
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Arab creed.53  Iraq even contributed forces to the Arab side in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
as a means to show solidarity with the Nasserists of the Arab World.  Although its 
contribution was meager, the resultant Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis threw 
doubts on the legitimacy of the ‘Arif regime and the pan-Arab ideology, contributing to 
their eventual downfall.   
In the aftermath of a coup on July 17, 1968, the Tikriti Ba’ath regime struggled to 
adhere with the core Ba’athist policy of pan-Arabism.  Pointing to the failures of the 
regimes in Damascus and Cairo, the new regime soon espoused the position that within 
the pan-Arab world, Iraq’s natural place should be primer inter pares and that their form 
of revolution was correct and to be emulated.  Maintaining its ultra-revolutionary rhetoric 
and the fiscal costs of keeping 25% of its military in Jordan to support Palestinian 
organizations took its toll on the nascent regime, which faced trouble with Iran and the 
Kurds.54  After attempting to stay in line with orthodox Ba’ath doctrine and practice a 
policy of pan-Arabism for the first years of its rule, post-1968 Ba’athist ideology pushed 
away from the pan-Arab ideology held sacrosanct by the monarchy, the early republic, 
and Levantine Ba’athism, instead anchoring itself firmly in an Iraqi nationalist ideology.   
The reason for this change is threefold.  First, the decline of pan-Arabism’s appeal 
was due in part to popular reaction to the Arab failures in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as 
noted earlier.55  Secondly, the dearth of Shi’a representation in the post-1968 Ba’ath 
regime spelled internal disaster for the regime if it continued the pan-Arab ideology of its 
 
53 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 171. 
54 It is ironic to note how much the Tikriti Ba’ath clung to their revolutionary ethos—rather than 
coming to power at the head of a popular revolution, the Tikriti Ba’ath came to power through the now-
standard Iraqi coup d’état. 
55 While in the wider Arab world, the 1967 Arab defeat triggered a turn towards a return to Islam, in 
Iraq, it triggered Iraqi nationalism.  In this sense, the ideological sea change in the Arab world was only not 
based upon the dichotomy of secularism versus religion as many observers point out, but also included 
ethnic unity versus inclusive nationalism.  For Iraq, its distance and minimal involvement from the core 
unifying issue within the Arab world—the Israeli occupation of Palestine—likely led to Iraq moving 
towards nationalism rather than religion. 
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previous, albeit brief, incarnation in 1963.56  Baram notes that “while pan-Arabism was 
not abandoned, it was restrained by a new stress on the local Iraqi identity, a stress that 
the party seems to have felt could improve its relations with the Shi’a.”57 Thirdly, the 
ascension of the Syrian Ba’ath party to power in 1966 necessitated the strengthening of 
Iraqi national identity to stem the calls for immediate unification between the two 
Ba’athist regimes, as Baghdad believed it would play second fiddle to the “better 
entrenched” regime in Damascus.58  Beset with potential enemies both inside and outside 
Iraq, the Tikriti Ba’athists turned towards a policy of Iraqi nationalism, while leaving the 
door open to pan-Arabism in case of unification to ensure they maintained their seat of 
power and to placate domestic pan-Arabists.59 
Having learned the lessons of the previous Ba’ath regime’s short-lived coup in 
1963, the Tikriti Ba’ath sought to embed the Sunni-specific Weltanschauung of Sunni 
dominance and Iraqi nationalism into the Iraqi psyche to ensure their rule.  This was an 
important lesson the Tikriti Ba’ath learned from the previous four decades of Iraqi 
independence.  “Without political institutionalization, politics [prior to the 1968 coup] 
reverted back to subnational groups based on tribal, ethnic, or regional identities,” writes 
Eric Davis. “These particularistic tendencies, which produced a constant reorganization 
of coalitions, provided a recipe for political instability.”60  In an attempt to develop a 
sense of nationalism, the Party commenced a campaign to utilize a number of cultural 
tools to build an Iraqi collective identity that transcended ethno-sectarian cleavages.    
 
56 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Ba’ath Party originally enjoyed a large degree of non-
sectarian leadership and was fairly representative of Iraqi society at large.  The commands (or highest 
levels) of the Ba’ath Party from 1952 to 1963 were comprised of 53.8% Shi’a, 38.5% Sunni, and 7.7% 
Kurd.  However, by 1970, the balance shifted to 5.7% Shi’a, 84.9% Sunni, and 7.5% Kurd. Batatu, The Old 
Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial 
Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists, and Free Officers, 1080. 
57 Amatzia Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba‘thist Iraq, 1968-89 (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 18. 
58 Ibid., 19. 
59 The foundation of this rekindled spirit of Iraqi nationalism was “the admission that the Arab 
peoples, or nations-in-the-making, within their present borders, were there to stay and that, should unity 
between two or more Arab states ever come about, under no circumstances should it undermine the 
cohesion of the existing nation-states.” Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’athist 
Iraq, 1968-89, 134. 
60 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 153. 
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But with this swing towards nationalism, the Tikriti Ba’ath faced an internal 
contradiction.  On one hand, the use of Iraqi nationalism would placate the Shi’a and 
Kurds, but cause the regime to distance itself from its Ba’athist doctrine and 
revolutionary credentials.  On the other hand, pan-Arabism would maintain the Party’s 
adherence to Aflaq’s Ba’athism, but would lead to further alienation of the majority of 
Iraqis.  To balance this ideological cognitive dissonance, the Tikriti Ba’ath utilized a 
process of cultural re-engineering, which developed a new national identity, placing pan-
Arabism in the backseat, and looking to its own past for inspiration rather than the Ba’ath 
Party’s Levantine origins. 
2. Iraqi Culture: Embedding the Narrative of Sunni Dominance and 
Iraqi Nationalism Under the Tikriti Ba’ath 
The purpose of Tikriti Ba’athist efforts to restructure Iraq’s understanding of itself 
was conducted with short term and long-term goals in mind.  In the short-term, 
restructuring served as a means of bridging the aforementioned internal inconsistencies in 
Tikriti Ba’athist ideology.  In the long term, the goal was to “reset” Iraq’s identity and to 
embed the Ba’athist ideology into Iraqi culture. The mechanism used by the Tikriti 
Ba’ath, and later by Saddam Hussein, was to rewrite the history of Iraq itself.  Davis 
notes that— 
more than simple political indoctrination, the project represented an 
attempt to construct a new public sphere, including the reconstruction of 
political identity, the relationship of the citizen to the state, and the public 
understandings of national heritage.  Simultaneously, it sought to negate 
Iraqi nationalism’s inclusive legacy precisely while trying to appropriate it 
to build a “new Iraqi man and society.”61 
This scheme, known as the Project for the Writing of History (Mahru’ I’adat 
Kitabat al Tarikh), sought to emphasize Iraq’s uniqueness in the Arab by linking modern 
Iraq to ancient Mesopotamian civilizations.62  Extending—or rather heavily 
 
61 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 148.  
62 A discussion of how Saddam Hussein used historical writing to reshape specific events in Iraq’s 
recent past can be found in Ofra Bengio, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 169–175. 
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emphasizing—Iraq’s ancient history served two major purposes.  First, it linked the 
Tikriti Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein as the current manifestation of a lineage of powerful 
empires that had ruled Mesopotamia over 5,000 years, serving to not only legitimate the 
regime, but also to point towards Iraq’s greatness in the Arab world.63  Second, 
extending the accepted history of Iraq to a time preceding the establishment of Islam 
served as a means to paper over the sectarian divisions between the Sunni and Shi’a by 
indicating that they were the same people, previously unified when Iraq was at its height 
of power in a
To accomplish this grand project and to appeal to the entirety of the Iraqi 
population, a number of techniques were used.  For the poor and illiterate, festivals, 
films, and the erection of statues and monuments were used to introduce Ba’athist visions 
of society, while for the intelligentsia and other educated classes, books, journals and 
debate were used.64  What gave the state the added clout to conduct this massive program 
was the result of the nationalizing of the oil industry in 1972 through the implementation 
of Public Law 69.65  The rising revenues garnered by the regime from the sale of 
 
63 Another beneficial aspect of utilizing the Mesopotamian story is that it allows the regime to follow 
the pan-Arab penchant for hostility towards Israel.   Embedded in the narrative is a story of Babylonian 
victory over Israel under Nebuchadnezzar II in 597 BC.  This served as proof that the Ba’ath had not 
forsaken their pan-Arab ideals and linked the current regime to the Arab struggle in Palestine, especially 
with Egyptian rapprochement with Israel in 1979. 
64 The large amount of monuments and the heavy reliance on festivals in the regime’s program of 
cultural production is likely due to the low levels of literacy in Iraq during the first decade of Tikriti Ba’ath 
rule.  For example, in 1978, Iraq was 44.5% illiterate in urban areas and 77.0% illiterate in rural areas.  J. S. 
Birks and C. Sinclair, "The Challenge of Human Resources Development in Iraq," in Iraq: The 
Contemporary State, ed. Tim Niblock (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 246. 
65 The effect of this law was twofold.  First, it increased revenues to fund social development and 
second, it fostered a spirit of Iraqi nationalism.  The Slugletts note that, “the nationalization of the IPC 
[Iraqi Petroleum Company] brought the country behind the Ba’ath as no other policy had done or could 
have been done, and the regime made the fullest possible use of the new mood, by encouraging the belief 
that the victory over the Company was not won by the Ba’ath Party alone but by the Iraqi people under the 
Party’s leadership, a line that was also part and parcel of the Ba’ath’s own image as the standard bearer of 
the Arab nation.”  Second, after the dramatic increase in the price of oil following the Arab oil embargo, 
Iraq was able to invest its profits from the sale of oil into economic and social programs in an attempt to 
garner further support for the state by the creation of an egalitarian society through the development of 
wide-spread patronage networks. The regime’s use of patronage networks served to atomize groups and re-
link them as individuals directly to the state to ensure maximum control of society by the regime.  This 
concept is discussed later in this chapter. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to 
Dictatorship, 155. 
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petroleum—initially at $488 million in 1968, rising to over $12 billion in 1979—were 
used to fund the cultural restructuring of the Tikriti Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein.66 
Folklore served as a means to introduce visions of Iraqi nationalism.  The regime 
introduced a number of festivals that highlighted ties to the history and soil of Iraq.  In 
Mosul, the Spring Festival was used to introduce Mesopotamian themes, all linking Iraq 
to antiquity and select themes in Islam.67  Other festivals were used to emphasize Iraqi 
poetry and Iraq’s religious history.  But as Baram points out, “the leitmotif of all the 
festivals was the affirmation—almost always implicit, and very rarely explicit—of the 
existence of an Iraqi people and an ‘Iraqi man.’”68  
For the literate and the intelligentsia, the state increased its support to the 
publication of cultural literature under the Ministry of Culture and Information.  These 
publications included not only academic journals such, but also journals for professional 
associations and labor unions as well.69  Government sponsorship and oversight allowed 
the regime to mold cultural themes within the literate population that were consistent 
with its visions of Iraqi society and directly inject that same vision in a way that would 
ensure its widest dissemination. 
So too, did the regime use archaeology to instill a sense of Iraqi nationalism.  
Official support was intended to “make the Iraqi people aware of their importance and 
relevance of the country’s ancient history—including that of the pre-Islamic era.”70  
Increased funding by the regime in the 1970s ensured that archaeological evidence could 
link the present regime with that of powerful empires of the past, most notably the 
 
66 As analyst Joe Stork points out, “The consolidation of political power under the present [Ba’ath] 
regime thus occurred in conjunction with a momentous expansion of the state’s economic functions.”Joe 
Stork, "State Power and Economic Structure: Class Determination and State Formation in Contemporary 
Iraq," in Iraq: The Contemporary State, ed. Tim Niblock (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 32–33. 
67 Baram provides a description of the first Mosul Spring Festival in 1969, soon after the Tikriti Ba’ath 
came to power, in which the regime used a procession from the present to the past, encompassing the pan-
Arab themes of the day, Iraq’s contribution to Islam, and the Arab pre-Islamic civilizations of Babylon and 
Nineveh.  In the years that followed, less emphasis was placed on pan-Arab themes and more was placed 
on Mesopotamian themes by the regime.  Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of 
Ba’athist Iraq, 1968–89, 53–58. 
68 Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba‘thist Iraq, 1968–89, 57. 
69 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 162. 
70 Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba‘thist Iraq, 1968–89, 25. 
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Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian and Chaldean Empires.71  Just as important as 
excavation was the political education and interpretation of Iraq’s archaeological past.  
One indicator of the premium placed by the Ba’ath on the archaeological narrative was a 
1969 announcement in the premier Iraqi archaeological journal, Sumer, on plans to 
construct museums in every province, sub-province and near any important 
archaeological site.72  Museum exhibits, while showcasing their regional artifacts, also 
“stressed all-Iraqi unity by exhibits from other provinces, or pictures accompanied by 
explanatory captions.”73  
All of these tools served to embed a sense of Iraqi-centric nationalism in the 
psyche of Iraq’s citizens by the political manipulation of historical memory.  For the 
Sunnis, this project to create an Iraqi national identity placed them in the starring role of 
Iraq’s history and culture.  Although the regime’s cultural narrative strove to maintain an 
egalitarian tone to accommodate the Shi’a and Kurds, it was left unspoken that the Sunni 
were on top of Iraqi society through their dominance of the government, security 
services, and armed forces.  To the Sunnis, the revitalization of an Iraqi nationalist 
identity further drove home the idea that the accepted status quo in Iraq was that under 
any governmental system, the Sunnis should be on top of the hierarchy, followed by 
Kurds and secular Shi’a, and at the bottom were the religious Shi’a.  
As a part of restructuring collective identity, the Ba’athist had to deal with the 
threat posed to it from the resurgence of Islam in the decades following the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War.  Being the progeny of a secularist ideology like Ba’athism, it is no wonder 
that very little in the early efforts of Ba’ath cultural restructuring dealt with the role of 
Islam in Iraqi society.  As mentioned earlier, the degree to which the regime emphasized  
 
 
71 Uncovering the past was only one aspect of the Tikriti Ba’athist archaeological program.  The Party 
also attempted the recreation of the past by replicating historical structures. Baram points out that one of 
the most prominent archaeological projects embarked upon by the Tikriti Ba’athists was the reconstruction 
of Babylon due to its special status in Mesopotamian history and “its location in the Shi’i region and on the 
boundaries of Baghdad [which] enabled the regime to use it as an illustration of the historical unity of 
Iraq’s people, or at least the country’s Sunni and Shi’i Arabs.” Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the 
Formation of Ba’athist Iraq, 1968–89, 45. 
72 Ibid., 44. 
73 Ibid., 45. 
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its Mesopotamian history in the early 1970s was for the express purposes of unifying 
Iraqi society, rather than emphasizing their sectarian divisions that would come about 
through the emphasis of Iraq’s Islamic history.   
Initially staying quiet and using the increased amount of social welfare programs 
brought about by the deluge of funding from oil to increase the incentives for cultural 
assimilation, the regime attempted to co-opt Islam as a means of legitimizing its rule and 
ensuring regime survival by the 1980s and 1990s after being hit with popular 
dissatisfaction with Iraq’s two Gulf Wars.  But to Saddam, Islam still remained a threat to 
the regime, “because the mosque had the potential to be a ready-made inter-tribal 
network for plotting anti-regime activities.”74   
What is important to the matter at hand is that within the regime, Saddam was the 
only one who could participate in the religious discourse of Iraq.  “As a rule, other 
officials or party figures kept silence on the issue of Islam except in Hussein’s presence 
or with his prior permission,” notes Bengio.75  Dominance of religious discourse allowed 
Saddam to attempt to regulate the amount of influence of religion in Iraqi society, 
ensuring that extreme forms of Islam would not be tolerated.  For example, the regime’s 
established the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, which:  
… monitored places of worship, appointed clerics, approved the building 
and repair of all places of worship, and monitored and censored the 
publication of religious literature.  The ministry served as a source of 
intelligence for the regime. The content of religious classes and study 
groups was monitored and evaluated by the ministry, and the ministry 
itself produced and broadcast all religious programming on the state 
television and radio stations.76 
 
74 Lin Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu 
Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe (Arlington, VA: Global Resources Group, 2006), http://turcopolier. 
typepad.com/the_athenaeum/files/iraq_tribal_study_070907.pdf (accessed April 26, 2009). 
75 Bengio, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, 182. 
76 Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal 
Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe, 3–29, 3–30. 
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Even individual clerics fell under the regime’s control.  “Clerics who strayed from the 
official line were quickly reminded that the regime was in charge of the re-Islamization 
process,” writes Hashim, with inflammatory clerics being jailed or exiled.77   
As the result of a series of regional political and military events from 1979 on, the 
increased pressure on Iraqi society under Saddam caused him to reintroduce state-
sanctioned religion in an effort to secure his rule.  Resurgent fears of Shi’a betrayal after 
the Iranian revolution, caused Saddam’s to emphasize Iraq’s Islamic heritage beginning 
as early as 1977, a far cry from earlier Ba’athist attempts to appropriate history.78  
Utilizing imagery of the Battle of Qadisiya in AD 636—where Arab forces triumphed 
over Persian Sassanid Empire and paved the way for the Islamic conquest of 
Mesopotamia—Saddam labeled the Iran-Iraq War Qadisiyat Saddam (Saddam’s 
Qadisiya) in an attempt to draw a parallel between the two.79  Later, Saddam had the 
words Allah akhbar (God is great) added to the Iraqi national flag in an attempt to 
contrast Iraq’s “true” Islamic credentials with those of the Iranians.  Following the 1991 
Gulf War, Saddam again revitalized religion in Iraqi society in order to address 
deepening public dissatisfaction after the imposition of sanctions.  Placating Iraqis who 
were turning to Islam to cope with the effects of sanctions, the regime “closed all 
nightclubs and discotheques and banned the public sale of alcohol,” in addition to 
reintroducing Islamic punishments, such as amputations for theft.80  The regime also 
began to repair old mosques and build new ones in addition to introducing compulsory 
 
77 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 110. 
78 In addition to rising Islamist fervor in neighboring Iran at the time, Saddam was posturing within 
the Ba’ath regime to ease out Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr from the Presidency.  Part of this involved 
manipulating Saddam’s image to appeal to a broader audience both in and outside of Iraq.  By playing up 
his Islamic credentials—even to the point of claiming descent from the martyred Shi’a Imam Husayn ibn 
Ali—Saddam aimed to gain wide scale acceptance of an Arab ruler who could embody political and a 
degree of religious rule.  For a description of Saddam’s use of religion in image building, see Bengio, 
Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, 79–85. 
79 It is interesting to note that the choices of Islamic history and Arab successes used by the regime 
took place prior to the Sunni-Shi’a split after the death of Imam Hussein in AD 680, revealing Saddam’s 
tendency to use history for political ends.  By choosing this battle, he not only drew parallels of victory, but 
also to Islam’s golden age of expansion, all in an attempt to gain popular support amongst Iraq’s sects for 
his external policies.  For a detailed discussion of the way that Qadisiya was actively manipulated by the 
regime, see Bengio, Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, 172–175.  
80 Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, 232. 
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Quranic studies at all levels of the educational system.81  Overall, Saddam sanctioned a 
degree of religiosity in ostensibly secular Ba’athist Iraq.  To Saddam, Islam served as a 
safety valve, allowing Iraqis—especially the Shi’a—to seek solace in religion as a way of 
coping with the crippling effect of sanctions instead of entering into collective action.  
As will be expanded upon below, material success in Ba’athist Iraq was 
contingent upon loyalty to the regime.  The large numbers of Sunnis who were linked 
through Saddam’s patronage networks were required to stay in line with Ba’athist 
policies in return for tangible and intangible support from the regime.  In examining the 
statistics of child malnutrition in the wake of UN sanctions, Amatzia Baram points out 
that in comparison with the rest of Sunni provinces, low levels of child malnutrition rates 
in certain cities in Salah-ad-Din Province are likely due to the kinship ties that Saddam 
utilized to maintain the loyalty of his security services.82  Failure to follow the Ba’athist 
line in any form, such as espousing unsanctioned religious sentiment or public criticism, 
would put individuals in jeopardy, especially if their positions depended upon the whim 
of Saddam.83  Much of Saddam’s manipulation of society through restructuring historical 
identity was designed to “coup-proof” his regime.84  An important component of this 
survival strategy is how Saddam used and manipulated the social structure of Iraqi 
society, to which we now turn. 
3. Tribes: The Structure of Sunni Society 
Tribes have been used throughout Iraqi history as a way of extending the 
influence of the center and to shore up those in power. As a form of social organization, 
 
81 Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal 
Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe, 2–26.; Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 111. 
82 Baram also notes that resistance to Saddam’s rule from tribes in Anbar may have contributed to 
higher rates of child malnutrition in that province. Amatzia Baram, "The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: 
Statistical Pitfalls and Responsibility," Middle East Journal 54, no. 2 (Spring, 2000), 208–209. 
83 Resistance to Saddam’s rule from tribes in Anbar may have contributed to higher rates in that 
province, possibly indicating their chafing under the regime’s yoke culminating with the aborted Dulaimi 
tribal rebellion in 1995. 
84 For an excellent overview of the concept of “coup-proofing” and its practice in the middle east, see 
James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," International 
Security 24, no. 2 (Autumn, 1999), 131–165. 
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tribes pre-date the arrival of Islam in the Arab world.  Tribes remain a major social 
structure in rural Sunni Iraqi society, providing “protection, representation, and a sense of 
identity for its members,”85  seeking to provide order for everyday social life.     
a.  Sunni Tribalism 
Tribes in Sunni Iraq have a structure that begin with an individual and his 
extended family and emanate outward through successive layers towards the tribe.  The 
nucleus of Sunni life is the extended family (khams), which consists of all men who share 
the same great-great-grandfather.86  Within the khams, all men owe loyalty to each other.  
Violent and dishonorable acts perpetuated on the khams by an outsider require all the 
men in the aggrieved khams to respond to not only avenge the grievance, but also to bring 
honor back to the khams.  Khams are intermeshed with houses (bayts), making them the 
lowest level of tribal organization.  Bayts are linked together to form a hamula, which 
sometimes represents a village of a given tribe.  When combined, hamulas form a clan 
(fakhd, pl. afakhd), who have their own chief, name and territory.  A group of afakhd 
forms a tribe (ashira), who also has its own leader, name and territory.  Finally, a number 
of tribes form a tribal confederation (qabila), a very loose and informal organization.87 
Amongst tribes, a hierarchy was formed, loosely based around means of 
subsistence.  The People of the Camel (ahl al-ibl) were on top, followed by the People of 
the Sheep (shawiyah), the cultivators (Harratha or filalih) and lastly, the marsh-dwellers 
(mi’dan).88  This hierarchy stems from the Bedouin tradition, which valued military valor 




85 Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal 
Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe, 2–2. 
86 Ibid, 2–42. 
87 Faleh Jabar, "Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes and Patrimonial 
Totalitariansim in Iraq, 1968-1998," in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, 
eds. Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (London: Saqi, 2001), 74.  
88 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old 
Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists, and Free Officers, 68. 
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hierarchy.  Tribes like the Shammar Jarba and Zubayd exercised their dominance of the 
lower tiers by extracting tribute from the sedentary tribes along the Tigris and 
Euphrates.89   
Tribal leaders are referred to as sheikhs, and their selection in Sunni tribes 
is not patrilineal, but instead based on the individual’s courage, leadership and luck.90  In 
Sunni tribes, sheikhs were responsible for the overall well-being of the tribe, including 
the provision of support for the weakest and poorest members.  Sheikhs often had the 
power to resolve dispute within their tribe and serve as a representative to speak on 
behalf of the tribe to outsiders.  Even with this much responsibility, however, the power 
of the sheikh was not absolute; in reality, his role was to influence the tribe rather than 
control it.  Sheikhs often had to consult with tribal elders prior to significant decisions, 
and only after collaborating and coming to consensus would the tribe follow the sheikh.91    
Hosham Dawood notes that the source of power for the sheikh stemmed 
from his ability to influence others— 
Through exercising his leadership capacity and his political ability to 
maintain the unity of his group as a whole, playing the role of arbiter 
within the tribe or the confederation, he would show his appropriateness, 
whether by the suppleness of his manoeuvers or his ability to gain the 
consent of the tribal members to the use of force in order to maintain order 
within the tribe or gain prestige in the outside world.92 
It was because of this ability to govern through consensus and influence 
that sheikhs were elected rather than the title being passed along from father to son.  
However, over time, certain bayts have tended to maintain primacy on tribal leadership. 
 
89 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old 
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90 Amongst Shi’a tribes, however, tribal leadership is based on lineage and also shares power with 
holy man who is a sayyid, or descendant of the prophet Mohammed.  Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – 
Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe, 2–41, 2–44; 
Amatzia Baram, "Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 29, no. 1 (February, 1997), 3. 
91 Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal 
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92 Hosham Dawood, "The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of 
Iraq," in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, eds. Faleh Jabar and Hosham 
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A critical component of a sheikh’s ability to exercise leadership is his 
ability to conduct acts of wasta.  Wasta is an Arabic word that means intercession or 
mediation and denotes either the act or the person conducting the act of 
intercession/mediation.  By virtue of their positions, tribal sheikhs are often called upon 
to perform both types of wasta for their tribesmen.  Intermediary wasta seeks to resolve 
conflict, and “binds families and communities for peace and well-being in a hostile 
environment.”93  Intercessory wasta on the other hand, “involves a protagonist 
intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage for the client—a job, a 
government document, a tax reduction, admission to a prestigious university.”94   
b.  Tribalism and the State 
How has this social structure weathered the changing political tides that 
have plagued Iraq’s modern history?  At times, tribalism has languished, but more 
recently, it has flourished because of political manipulation.  A brief review of the 
political manipulation of Iraq’s tribes follows to provide an understanding of how 
important tribalism was to Iraq’s Sunnis in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion. 
The Ottoman land reforms under Midhat Pasha not only encompassed 
areas such as education and administration of Mesopotamia, but also included reforms 
over land.  By implementing the 1958 Ottoman Land Law, Midhat Pasha hoped to create 
security in land tenure through land registration as a means to encourage agricultural 
production, but also to generate revenues for the treasury.  The Land Law altered the 
structure of society; the strongest tribal sheikhs of the ahl al-ibl continued to dominate 
Iraqi society, becoming landowners, while the weaker tribesmen became peasants.95  As 
such, land reforms gave more power to sheikhs, segmenting the population and forcing 
tribe members to positions of serfdom.  Sheikhs emerged as tax farmers, collecting taxes 
on behalf of the state, increasing their power not only economically, but also politically.  
 
93 Robert B. Cunningham and Yasin K. Sarayrah, "Taming Wasta to Achieve Development," Arab 
Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3 (Summer, 1994), 29. 
94 Ibid., 29. 
95 Jabar, Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes and Patrimonial 
Totalitariansim in Iraq, 1996–1998, 76. 
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Through increased wealth and local power based on land reforms, sheikhs were 
increasingly recognized on their political utility to the Ottomans rather than through tribal 
elections.96  Under the British Mandate and later the Monarchy, tribal leaders were used 
to maintain the control over Iraqi society.   
The issue of land reform under the early Republican regimes further 
segmented tribal linkages by redistributing land to peasants and linking them to the state 
through the use of agricultural aid and resources.   Qasim also removed the Tribal 
Disputes Code, causing tribesmen to be judged by the civil and criminal statutes rather 
than traditional tribal codes of behavior.  But while tribal linkages of the average Iraqi 
took on less import, for those in power the use of patronage through tribal affiliation was 
taking on a greater role in the rule of the Republic under Qasim and the ‘Arif brothers 
through their use of patronage to maintain regime stability. 
As much as the Ba’athists faced a cognitive dissonance between the 
ideologies of pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism, the party also faced a dilemma over the 
role of tribes in Iraqi society.  One of the fundamental tenants of the Ba’athist thought 
was that tribalism and all that it brought were anathema to the Ba’ath view of the modern 
Iraqi man.97  In its first proclamation after coming to power in 1968, that Ba’ath stated, 
“we are against religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism,” viewing all of these as the 
last trappings of Iraq’s colonial past.98  Yet, while uttering these words the Ba’ath under 
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr—and later Saddam Hussein—utilized tribal and kinship ties to 
control the levers of power after 1968.  “So embarrassing did these clan and local ties 
become,” writes historian Phebe Marr, “that in 1976 the regime made it an offense for 
 
96 Dawood, The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq, 117. 
97 Amatzia Baram points out that the Tikriti Ba’ath viewed tribalism as a threat to the party’s rule and 
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98 Ba’ath Party Communiqué No. 1, as quoted in Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s 
Tribal Policies: 1991–96, 1.   
 36
                                                
public figures to use a name indicating tribal, clan, or local affiliations.”99  Coupled with 
the ban on naming, the Tikriti Ba’ath barred sociological work on tribes and tribalism 
from occurring, “claiming that tribes were a ‘traditional’ pre-modern social factor, and a 
‘shameful’ aspect for ‘revolutionary’ development,” notes Keiko Sakai.100 
Under the Republic, tribalism was weakened through both indirect and 
direct methods.  Land reform policies under Qasim, the Arif brothers and the Tikriti 
Ba’ath that led to increased rural to urban migration over time, as both land reform and 
development of the welfare state—with the attendant socialist benefits of the petroleum 
based economy—caused more peasants to move to the cities.  Between 1965 and 1988, 
Iraq reported an urban growth rate of 206.1% compared to a rural growth rate of 18.6%.   
Furthermore, while more than half of the population lived in rural areas in 1965, the 
number of rural residents was reduced to 27% in 1988.101  The Tikriti Ba’ath deliberately 
worked to weaken certain Sunni tribes who either lived close to Baghdad or were a threat 
to the regime because of their size.  Land appropriation and redistribution was used to 
check the potential influence of these tribes.102 
In spite of the Ba’athist regime’s reinforcement of anti-tribal sentiments 
through policy, events of the 1980s soon caused a reversal in Ba’athist efforts.  The 
regime’s volte-face can be attributed to the realities of the Iraq’s position in the Iran-Iraq 
War.  Again worried about the potential for Iraq’s Shi’a to defect to the side of their co-
religionists in Iran, the regime turned toward a new version of tribalism for pragmatic 
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reasons.  Increasing the emphasis on Iraq’s Arab identity called for increased emphasis 
on tribal identity as tribalism has long been a part of the Arab ethos.  Additionally, after 
the 1991 Intifada, tribes were seen as a way of linking the population to the regime, with 
the tribes serving as a sort of connective tissue for the regime, as Saddam’s atomization 
policies were seen as not providing the regime enough grassroots support.103  The 
increased emphasis on tribal affinities took on a number of dimensions, including the 
reintroduction of tribal lineage, increased stature of sheikhs in Iraqi society, and material 
rewards bestowed upon cooperative tribes. 
In the 1989 elections, more than half of the candidates officially used 
tribal title (laqab) or lineage title (nisba) to indicate tribal affiliations.  In his examination 
of Sunni tribalism and the Tikriti Ba’ath, Keiko Sakai notes that the use of laqab and 
nisba by candidates was higher in Sunni provinces and lower in Kurdish and Shi’a 
provinces (even though tribalism was just as strong if not stronger in the Shi’a south), 
indicating “the regime’s political attitude towards and dependency on certain tribal 
groups in the Sunni Triangle.”104   
One of the effects of the resurgence of state-sponsored tribalism was the 
increased prominence given to sheikhs by the regime.  Saddam and other high-ranking 
Ba’ath members regularly visited sheikhs to establish ties, which ostensibly gave 
cooperative sheikhs more intercessory wasta.  One Anbari sheikh notes that “When I 
visit…state institutions as a head of a tribe they accord me much more respect than that 
which I receive as a member of Parliament.”105   Sunni sheikhs had more stature in the 
eyes of the regime than their Shi’a peers.  In tribal oaths of allegiance, they never had to 
make promises to turn in infiltrators, traitors, saboteurs and other criminals to the regime 
like Shi’a criminals were required to do.106   
 
103 Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies: 1991–96, 7. 
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106 Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991–96, 12. 
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Besides status, cooperative sheikhs were also given material rewards for 
their loyalty, becoming incorporated to the regime’s patronage networks, receiving gifts, 
and government provided jobs for their tribal members.  In the late 1980s, some of the 
mid-level Ba’ath party leadership was incorporated into Iraqi Army units to serve as 
political officers, causing the regime to utilize tribes in an economy-of-force role to 
substitute for party control in certain rural areas.  Those sheikhs who played an economy-
of-force role were given a large degree of autonomy by the regime, with privileges to 
maintain standing tribal forces to maintain security and were allowed to utilize tribal law 
instead of the state’s judicial system.107  Certain tribes and other individuals linked to the 
regime were given freedom and access to the regimes smuggling networks established 
after the imposition of sanctions.    Bypassing the effects of sanctions imposed on their 
fellow citizens, these networks of privilege allowed certain groups and individuals to 
maintain a higher standard of living.108 
4. The Effectiveness of Ba’athist Manipulation of Sunni Society 
Many historians and analysts of the Hussein regime have pointed out that the 
question remains as to how much of Ba’athist cultural restructuring, tribalization, and 
ideological adaptation actually took hold in Iraqi society.109  Field work before the U.S. 
invasion in 2003 was highly restricted and little was done to measure the effect of the 
Ba'ath re-engineering project.  Despite this restriction, one author indicates the cultural 
restructuring project failed to truly unify Iraq.  Eric Davis points out that the failure of the 
 
107 Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991–96, 12–13. 
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(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), 277-278; Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the 
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Ba’ath to “establish itself as a hegemonic force in Iraqi society ultimately failed,” as 
evidenced by the 1991 Intifada, its subsequent repression, and the exodus of the middle 
class from the country.110  As he rightly points out, there is a difference between the idea 
of regime (or state) and the idea of an Iraqi nation, which the Ba’ath failed to understand.  
Dissatisfaction came from the regime’s policies and methods of governing, rather than 
that of sectarian divisions.  For instance, there was no call during the Intifada to establish 
a separate Shi’a state or any move for the Shi’a to secede from Iraq and side with their 
co-religionists in the Iran-Iraq War.111   
However, while the Shi’a proved relatively impervious to Ba’athist efforts, the 
real indicator of the effect of the Ba’athist indoctrination and cultural restructuring 
program is borne out in the formation of the mainstream Sunni Iraqi insurgency.  It is 
well-known that the primary target of Ba’athist indoctrination were children.  If we were 
to assume that the average insurgent’s age—what the U.S. military terms “military-aged 
males”—was between 17–35 in 2003, he would have been born between 1968 and 1986, 
placing them in the Iraqi educational system from 1975 onwards.  These were the same 
years that the Ba’athist cultural restructuring efforts were taking place, exposing the 
future insurgents of the 2003 Iraq War to Ba’athist ideology and cultural manipulation.  
The nationalistic nature of the Sunni insurgency testifies to the depths to which the Iraqi 
nationalist message propagated by the Tikriti Ba’ath and Saddam took hold.  In fact, after 
the invasion, Iraqis celebrated the 45th anniversary of the 1958 coup.  During the 
celebration, nationalist symbols abounded, with participants carrying the Akkadian sun 
and images of Qasim.112   
Like the policies of cultural restructuring and ideological adaptation, Saddam’s 
tribal policies were another means to ensure regime security.  Linn and others note: 
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While the Sunni tribes were recipients of greater wealth and opportunities 
than any other ethno-religious group in Iraq, that privilege came at a cost.  
Sunni Arab prestige was a gilded cage that afforded benefits to those who 
did not speak out against the regime and kept ranks with tribe and state.  
The regime compensated the Sunnis with wealth in exchange for giving up 
democracy and political freedoms, and the Sunni tribes could opt only for 
blind political loyalty or exclusion.113 
But while the regime needed tribal policies to serve as connective tissues to further 
stabilize a weakening regime, official endorsement for rural social structures provided the 
Sunnis with a tangible source of identity from which to draw upon from a system that had 
always surrounded them.  With the reemphasis and legitimization of the tribal system 
from the end of the Iran-Iraq War until the downfall of the Ba’ath regime in 2003, AQI 
would face a difficult battle attempting to co-opt and recruit Sunni tribes wholesale.   
While intended to gain widespread allegiance to the Iraqi state—albeit under 
Sunni rule—the Ba'ath did achieve partial success with their cultural restructuring 
program.   When discussion came up to federate Iraq or even to dissolve it on sectarian 
lines, both Sunni and Shi'a largely rejected it, preferring to keep the boundaries of the 
existing Iraqi state intact.  But out of all of Iraq’s people groups, it was only the Sunni 
who held on to that portion of Ba'ath cultural indoctrination that placed them on top of 
Iraqi society.  The inculcation of an Iraqi-centric Weltanschauung by the Sunnis of Iraq 
would later spell the death of AQI and the Sunni insurgency. 
B. AL QAEDA IN IRAQ AND THE SUNNI INSURGENCY 
1. The Sunni Insurgency 
Within weeks of the fall of Hussein’s regime, a resistance movement began to 
form in Iraq.  Although reports are conflicting on whether or not Saddam Hussein 
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deliberately prepared to fight an irregular war after the U.S. invasion,114 the record does 
show that the elements of the security services did distribute “thousands of tons of arms 
and munitions in readiness for the conflict, storing them in civilian areas, mosques, 
schools and hospitals.”115   
But the presence of weapons strewn about does not create an insurgency in and of 
itself; other factors are required.  Writing in 1970, Scott and Clark hypothesize that a 
number of preconditions, combined with a precipitating event are required for an 
insurgency to begin in the case of an invading or occupying army—hostility toward the 
occupying regime; a discontented elite willing to provide organization and leadership; 
readiness to use force; and the capacity to conduct insurgent conflict.116  All four of these 
pre-conditions existed after the onset of the U.S.-led invasion, while the fall of Saddam’s 
statue on April 9, 2003 served as the precipitating event in the formation of the Sunni 
insurgency.  Hostility towards the U.S.-led Coalition reached a boil with the removal of 
the Ba’ath government, and the later imposition of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
Orders #1 (De-Ba’athification) and #2 (Dissolution of the Ba’athist Security Forces).117  
This resulted in a complete reversal of Sunni position vis-à-vis Iraqi society.  Those 
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Sunnis who found them thrown out of positions of status and power served as a 
disaffected elite who were able to turn informal networks and patronage systems into 
organizational structures needed for insurgent action.  The readiness to use force as a 
method was merely the result of a semantic transition from “repelling” coalition forces 
during the invasion to “resisting” the occupation.  Finally, the capacity to conduct 
insurgent conflict stemmed from the aforementioned presence of copious amounts of 
military hardware strewn about the country and rudimentary military skills held by the 
population at large as a result of Ba’athist conscription policies.  But what may have 
begun as a guerilla effort by remaining pockets of former regime loyalists sprang into a 
wider popular-based insurgency as the year went on due to a number of other reasons. 
a. Motivations of the Sunni Insurgency 
What then provided Iraqis with the motivation to rise up against the 
Coalition, when—viewed from the American perspective—they had been freed from the 
weight of the Ba’athist yoke?  One author provides an insight into this phenomenon: 
The process of social and psychological disruption that accompanies the 
downfall of traditional societies opens the way to a host of sharp cleavages 
within such societies.  A general sense of social insecurity may intensify 
the urge to seek the sense of identity that comes from loyalty to ethnic, 
regional, or other traditional or parochial associations.118   
With the fall of Saddam’s statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square on April 9, 
2003, the Ba’ath state of Iraq was effectively dissolved.  Iraqis then turned to those other 
symbols of their identity and, in many ways, the removal of the Ba’athist controls led to a 
resurgence of identification by religious sect.  Being lesser than a national identity, but 
broad enough to subsume lower levels of identity such as the tribe, city and province, the 
sect—as a supra-tribal and sub-national means of identity—became the one of the basic 
defining characteristics of the Iraqi insurgency.  The lion’s share of the Iraqi insurgency 
was based on the simple fact that, as the minority, the Sunni had the greatest reason to 
resist the imposition of a Shi’a-dominated central government.  Although JAM and other 
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like-minded Shi’a insurgents had reasons to reject the ostensibly secular central 
government, taking up arms to change the government was hardly necessary due to Shi’a 
dominance of the ballot box.  However, for the Sunni, the situation was drastically 
different.  Having been seen the Ba’ath regime evaporate, the Sunni had no patron to 
protect and elevate them in Iraqi society. 
At its heart, the Sunni insurgency arose out of a loss of Sunni identity.  
The Sunnis not only lost their positions in government due to marginal Ba’athist 
affiliation, but their entire way of life had been upended with the invasion.  Additionally, 
the primacy of the Sunni in governing Iraq was taken away and given to the Shi’a 
majority, further compounding the Sunni loss of prestige.  Ahmed Hashim provides a 
deeper analysis of this loss of identity and why its loss cut so deeply in the Sunni psyche:   
For the Sunni Arabs the downfall of the regime in April 2003 was not only 
or even primarily the collapse of power and privileges—indeed, many of 
them had little power and few, if any privileges—but of the entire 
nationalist edifice that has been in existence for more than eight decades 
and that had identified Iraq with them.  This was cataclysmic.  It 
constituted a grievance [emphasis in original].119   
The Bush Administration desired to implement a pluralist democratic 
society in Iraq, further compounding the loss of Sunni identity stemming from both the 
actions of the coalition and the CPA’s dictums.  Democracy would place the Sunni into a 
new position in Iraqi society—that of a permanent minority.  Without a governmental 
system that protected minority rights, the Sunni would always be on the losing end of the 
Shi’a majority.  “Groups such as actors in protracted conflict situations initiate plans, 
actions, reactions and strategies in order to accomplish the goal of satisfying individual 
and societal needs or of reducing and eliminating need deficiencies,” notes Azar.120  
Realizing the need to restore their lost identity in post-Saddam Iraq, the Sunnis took to 
arms as a way of ensuring the return to some sort of status quo ante, even though the 
restoration of Sunni dominance was anathema to U.S. policy.   
 
119 Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 68–70. 
120 Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions," in International Conflict 
Resolution: Theory and Practice, eds. Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (Sussex, UK: Wheatshelf, 
1986), 33. 
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In addition to a loss of Sunni identity, the U.S. invasion was perceived by 
the Sunnis as an illegitimate occupation of their territory by a foreign power, thus, the 
move toward armed conflict with the coalition was a natural, legitimate response for the 
Sunnis.  “Iraq is our homeland, it’s our Iraq.  If you don’t defend your land, you will not 
defend your honor.  Each square foot of Iraq is worth the soul of our lives.  Each square 
foot of Iraq is worth the breath we take,” notes an Iraqi butcher in Adhamiya in the fall of 
2003.121  The presence of an occupier in their midst meant that all means of resistance 
were on the table, from passive resistance to armed violence. “All kinds of resistance are 
‘correct,’” notes a Sunni imam, “because the nationalists are fighting for nationalism, the 
Arabs for the Arabs, and the Muslims for Islam.  They all lead to the same conclusion—
that an occupied country should resist.”122  In this environment, it was relatively easy for 
insurgents to mobilize popular support—“If a country has suffered foreign invasion, the 
population is likely to be easily reached by the appeals of the insurgents.  The 
predisposition to resist will be there, and the insurgent leadership need only activate 
latent feelings and channel the resulting action,” notes Scott and Clark.123  In some ways 
all it took was for Bush to sound like Lieutenant General Maude, who captured Baghdad 
from the Ottomans in 1917 to say, “Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will 
depart as liberators.”124  To Iraqis, Maude’s lines were familiar, and Bush’s words must 
have brought about a sense of déjà-vu. 
But as much as these two factors provided an impetus for the start of the 
Sunni insurgency, it is important to understand that insurgent objectives often change 
over time as the result of changes in the political environment.  This is especially the case 
with Iraq.  What originally started out as an anti-occupation insurgency, designed to resist 
 
121 The Butcher, as quoted in Meeting Resistance, DVD, directed by Molly Bingham and Steve 
Connors (New York: Nine Lives Documentary Productions, 2007). 
122 The Imam, as quoted in Bingham and Connors, Meeting Resistance. 
123 Scott and Clark, Insurgency, 23. 
124 Upon capturing Baghdad, British lieutenant General Sir Fredrick Stanley Maude noted in a speech 
to the residents of Baghdad that “our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or 
enemies, but as liberators.”  For Bush’s remarks, see George W. Bush, "President Addresses the Nation," 
The White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html 
(accessed January 13, 2010).  For Maude’s remarks, see Stanley Maude, "The Proclamation of Baghdad," 
Harper's Magazine 306, no. 1836 (May, 2003), 31. 
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Coalition attempts to impose rule over Iraq, eventually morphed into a civil insurgency in 
the summer of 2004 as Sunni insurgent groups recognized as fact their reduced number.  
As the U.S. support to a Shi’a-dominated Iraq continued with the installation of the 
Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), the Sunni continued to use violence as a means to extract 
political power in the post-Saddam government.  Lost Sunni influence over Iraqi society 
and the ascendance of the Shi’a to near-permanent positions of power in the elections of 
2005, led to increased efforts against those seen as contributing to the Sunni fall from 
power.  As Shi’a-dominated and U.S.-sponsored national governments were formed, 
Sunni resistance took on a defensive character, as Sunnis began to fear Shi’a retribution 
for years of Sunni rule over Iraq. 
Yet while indigenous factors—a loss of identity and the need to restore a 
sense of social balance—were critical in the development and growth of the Sunni 
insurgency, mistakes by coalition forces made at the tactical, operational and strategic 
levels contributed to increasing levels of Sunni resistance to the presence of the U.S. and 
its allies in Iraq.  At the tactical level, the lack of cultural understanding of Iraqi society 
was largely absent from coalition forces’ interaction with the population after the fall of 
the Ba’ath regime. The insensitive manner in which soldiers conducted house to house 
searches and handled detainees inflamed Iraqi sensitivities.  In addition, the occupation of 
former regime palaces and monuments likely contributed as well. In Baghdad, U.S. 
forces occupied the al-Shaheed Monument, a tribute to the Iraqi soldiers who died in the 
Iran-Iraq War, using its grounds as a motor pool.  Inside, where the names of fallen Iraqi 
soldiers are inscribed in a manner similar to the Vietnam Memorial, U.S. forces used the 
area as a parking area, posting signs for designated parking spots atop the engraved 
names.125   
At the operational and strategic levels, these mistakes can be categorized 
as heinous when viewed in hindsight.  The absence of any coherent post-invasion 
planning done in the run up to the invasion, including the failure to consider the 
possibility of an insurgency and the Bush Administration’s ill-conceived policy to impose 
 
125 Antoon and others, About Baghdad. 
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the CPA—in Iraqi eyes a governing apparatus much akin to the British Mandate of the 
previous century—also contributed to the rapid growth of the insurgency through the 
summer and fall of 2003.126  Yet, even in the midst of these grave errors, the 
ignominious actions at Abu Ghraib prison in the fall and winter of 2003, and its shoddy 
handling, stand out as a key accelerant to the growth of a nascent Sunni insu
b.  Composition of the Sunni Insurgency 
The Sunni insurgency was not as monolithic as many casual observers 
assume.  Instead, it maintained a high degree of variegation and was full of nuances.  No 
two insurgent groups—or insurgents for that matter—were exactly alike.  All had 
diverging views on what was at stake and what should be done about it in the aftermath 
of the U.S. invasion, as will be described later.  Rather than smooth uniformity, the 
topography of the insurgency was full of valleys and mountains.  Amongst the Sunni 
populace, a number of insurgent groups emerged along various lines, and many have 
drifted between categories over time.  These groups can be categorized along lines 
describing their overall objectives, as depicted in Table 2.127   
 
Type Representative Groups 
Secular & Islamist 
Nationalists 
Fida’iyin Saddam  
Jaish Muhammad (2003-2005) 
New Ba’ath Party  
Al-Awdah  
Iraqi  Salafists 
1920 Revolutionary Brigade  
 Jaish al-Rashideen Jaish al-Mujahideen 
Jaish Muhammad (2005-) 




Salafists Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (2001-2004)  Al Qaeda in Iraq (2004- ) 
Table 2.   Iraqi Insurgent Groups. 
                                                 
126 The actions of the CPA have been widely chronicled and fall outside the scope of this thesis.  For 
further information, see James Dobbins, Coalition Provisional Authority and International Security and 
Defense Policy Center, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND Corp., 2009), 364.   
127 Categorization here is a very rough way to explain an extremely complex phenomenon. Like living 
organisms depending on the evolution of events, relationships and the external environment, an insurgency 
is difficult to fully understand.  The numerous official and unofficial groups and sub-groups, especially 
when combined with their fleeting, chameleon-like character, pose problems for the understanding of an 
insurgency such as this.  While it does not accurately indicate the granular nature of the Sunni insurgency, 
for conceptual purposes I have stayed with presenting a loose categorization, as this allows for the 
understanding of the basic contours of the insurgency. 
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The majority of early Sunni insurgent groups had a nationalist aspect to 
their rhetoric. In the fall of 2003, an Iraqi political scientist noted that “in reality, the vast 
majority of this resistance is a nationalist, popular resistance by Iraqis who have no 
relationship with the former regime.”128  In Iraq, the nationalist camp has initially 
maintained two distinct approaches to nationalism—secular nationalists and Islamist 
nationalists.  The core groups of the secular nationalists are formed around those former 
Ba’athists and are known by Coalition Forces as Former Regime Elements (FRE) or 
Former Regime Loyalists (FRL). The Ba’athists were the core of the insurgency in its 
early months, as many Sunnis waited to see what would happen.  As previously noted, it 
is unknown to what extent the Ba’athist resistance was planned for by Saddam prior to 
the U.S. invasion.  But it is without doubt that many of the Ba’athist insurgent 
organizations were composed of former members of the intelligence and security services 
of the Hussein regime. Al Awdah (The Return) is an example of an insurgent group 
comprised of former security officials, coming into prominence in mid-June 2003.  But 
with the capture of Saddam in December 2003, the secular nationalists were largely 
discredited.  As they tried to cast off the ties to Ba’ath secularism, many moved toward 
the Islamist nationalist camp.   
Similarly, Islamic nationalists are comprised of those Iraqis opposing the 
Coalition on nationalistic and Islamic principles, believing that resistance is further 
justified along the lines of the defensive jihad “imposed on them by aggressive forces 
intent on dividing the country, marginalizing the Sunnis by turning power over to the 
Iranian-backed Shi’a parties and the U.S.-dependent parties, and plundering Iraq’s oil 
wealth.”129  This is likely the largest part of the Sunni insurgency and is comprised of 
those who believe in the unity of Iraq as a state rather than its devolution into sub-states 
or incorporation into the caliphate.  Hashim notes that “these organizations range from 
those that believe that they have a legitimate right to resist occupation and do not feel it is  
 
 
128 The Professor, as quoted in Bingham and Connors, Meeting Resistance. 
129 Mohammed M. Hafez and United States Institute of Peace, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy 
and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 72. 
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necessary to develop a more complex ideological formation for their resistance, to actors 
who have articulated solid nationalist and Islamist principles to justify their resistance 
activities.”130 
Iraqi Salafists are comprised of those groups who, “promote a philosophy 
of tawhid, the absolute unity of God, and excoriate any system that adopts man-made 
rules and laws and fails to rule in accordance with sharia (Islamic law).”131  Salafism is a 
form of Sunni Islam that venerates the form of Islam practiced by the first three 
generations following the Prophet Mohammed, based on a popular hadith or saying of the 
Prophet—“The best of my community [i.e., Muslims] are my generation, then those how 
come after them and then those who follow them.”132  However useful the term Salafism 
is in describing insurgent groups, it provides little insight into the expected political ends 
desired by these groups.  Hence, Salafism should be considered as a spectrum of varying 
religious concepts regarding how Islam should serve to govern the actions of man, 
through the concept of manhaj, or the practicing one’s Islamic creed.  Although Salafists 
concur that the pious forefathers practiced the pure form of Islam, there is little 
agreement on what manhaj looks like in political life in the Muslim world.133     
In spite of this, insurgents within this category seek to unify certain 
theological and political concepts.  To the majority of Iraqi Salafis, modern ideas of 
governance (e.g., democracy) and religious ideas (e.g., Sufism and Shi’ite Islam) are 
 
130 Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (Abingdon, UK: Routledge for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 19. 
131 Ibid., 19. 
132 As quoted in Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," in Global Salafism: 
Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 34. 
133 To differentiate the various camps and posture themselves as the superior variant of Salafism, the 
Jihadi Salafists have parsed Salafism into eight sub-groups in a somewhat pejorative way.  In their eyes, the 
spectrum moves from a position of “selling out” (Establishment Salafists) to that of true self-fulfillment of 
the Salafi creed (Jihadi Salafis).  Sub groups on this spectrum include Establishment Salafists, Madkhali (or 
Jami) Salafists, Albani Salafists, Scientific or Academic Salafists, Salafist Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), 
Sururis, Qutubis, and Global Jihadis.   For a detailed analysis of each of these sub-groups of Salafism and 
how they relate to Jihadi Salafists, see Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2009), 22-41.  Similarly, Bernard Haykel parses Salafists into three groups: Salafi 
Jihadis, non-violent political activists, and quietists.  Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, 
48-50.  In a like manner, Quintan Wiktorowicz divides Salafists into the categories of purists, politicos and 
jihadists.  Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, 
no. 3 (2006), 208. 
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anathema, and thus provide the rationale for their continued violent activism against the 
Iraqi government and Coalition forces.  For example, a communiqué establishing the a 
Salafist umbrella group, the Jihad and Reform Front (RJF)134 states that the group’s 
position on the political process— 
We don’t admit with any political game starting with the bad known 
Braymer [sic] council to the sectarian Maliki traitor government.  We also 
don’t admit with the sectarian elections and consequently what built on it.  
We don’t admit in any agrrement [sic] that these governments endorsed.  
We don’t admit with the constitution that wrote under the occupation 
weapons, and also we don’t admit to any constitution that opposes Allah's 
faith.135 
This view on governance has allowed certain elements of the Iraqi Salafis—Ansar al-
Sunna, Jaish Muhammad, Jaish al-Mujahideen, and the Islamic Army of Iraq—to 
maintain a degree of common cause with AQI until 2006-7, based on a rejection of the 
principles on which the post-Saddam government was established.  For the Iraqi Salafis, 
nothing short of the removal of U.S. and coalition forces and the establishment of a Sunni 
Islamic state will see a reduction of insurgent activity.  “And the front by its 
constituents—commit to continue Jihad in Iraq until accomplishing all the goals, which is 
the complete and true withdrawing of the occupation in all its figures from Iraq, 
governance in Allah's religion and supporting the truth,” notes the same RJF 
communiqué.136  
Transnational Jihadi Salafists137 under the guise of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
and its associates—the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), later the Islamic State of Iraq 
(ISI)—comprise the final category of the Iraqi insurgency.  Despite its relatively small 
size within the wider Iraqi insurgency, to many observers AQI was the most visible—and 
the most demonized—portion of the Iraqi insurgency.  From a theological perspective, 
 
134 The RJF is an alliance between the Islamic Army in Iraq, Jaish al-Mujahideen, and the Al-Fatihin 
Army.  Established in May 2007 by the IAI, to many observers, the RJF served as a true indigenous 
counterbalance to the AQI dominated Islamic State of Iraq. 
135 "JR Front Establishing Statement," Islamic Army in Iraq, http://iaisite-eng.org/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=35 (accessed January 6, 2010). 
136 JR Front Establishing Statement. 
137 Jihadi Salafist is used here in lieu of the more common Salafi-Jihadists to indicate the Salafist core 
of their beliefs, with Jihadi used to indicate a specific current amongst Salafists. 
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Jihadi Salafists have tended to take the most conservative aspects of several forms of 
Salafism and combined it into a different product.  The key ideas used in defining Jihadi 
Salafist doctrine are Aqidah (Islamic creed), Tawhid (the oneness or unity of God), Takfir 
(the practice of calling individuals an apostate), Al-Wala wal-Bara (loyalty and 
disavowal), and Jihad (struggle), and will be explained in further detail in the next 
section in regards to AQI’s ideology.138  The fusion of these five points of religious 
doctrine creates a proactive version of Salafism, which “concentrates on the analysis of 
political reality, devising strategies and practices for how to change it, and applying them 
to different situations and circumstances.”139  Whereas Iraqi Salafists tend to utilize an 
ideology of “violent irredentism” seeking to maintain a telluric edge to their platform, 
Jihadi Salafists utilize a political ideology of “global Jihadism”—a willingness to link the 
Iraqi insurgency to the broader transnationalist jihadi agenda against the far enemy.140   
2. Al Qaeda in Iraq 
Having understood the nuances in the greater Sunni Iraqi insurgency and loosely 
categorizing them by their ideology and political goals, it is to a more in-depth 
examination of AQI that we now turn, to provide an insight in to the pre-conditions that 
contributed to AQI’s falling out with Iraq’s Sunnis and the rest of the Sunni insurgency in 
2006-07. 
Unlike the rest of the Sunni insurgency, nearly all of which developed in the 
immediate aftermath of the regime’s fall, Al Qaeda in Iraq evolved along much different 
lines.  AQI originated initially from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jihadi Salafist group, 
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (TWJ), or “Unity and Jihad.”  After being released from a 
Jordanian prison in the 1999, Zarqawi formed TWJ to destroy the Jordanian monarchical 
 
138 Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, 39–51. 
139 It is because of this penchant for action through violence that the Jihadi strain of Salafism is 
denounced by the majority of Salafis.  Roel Meijer, "Introduction," in Global Salafism: Islam's New 
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 24.   
140 For a rationale based categorization system, rather than a theologically based system, in the study 
and analysis of Islamic activism, see Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On 
Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islam," in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, 
ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 259. 
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system and establish an Islamic government by “training suicide bombers in a number of 
camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”141  During his time in Afghanistan, Zarqawi and 
TWJ received financial support from Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization, 
establishing a loose affiliation between the two organizations in spite of differences over 
the strategic sequencing of Jihadi Salafist efforts.  Unlike al Qaeda’s focus on the far 
enemy, Zarqawi’s operational focus at the turn of the century remained on Jordan—the 
near enemy.142    
With the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, Zarqawi fled Afghanistan as 
terrorist camps and bases were attacked.  From that point on, the record of his activities 
remains murky until after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, with most sources indicating 
that the TWJ sought refuge in Kurdistan with Ansar al-Islam (AAI) in 2002.143  With the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, the far enemy came to Zarqawi’s neighborhood, allowing him to 
pragmatically shift TWJ’s operational focus to Iraq where he could battle both the far 
enemy while maintaining the ability to strike the near enemy.  As fortuitous as this may 
have been in the early days of the invasion, Zarqawi and TWJ faced a major setback as 
the U.S. invasion also brought with it a direct assault on the Ansar al-Islam camp in 
Kurdistan.144   
 
141 Lee Hudson Teslick, "Profile: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi," Council on Foreign Relations, http:// 
www.cfr.org/publication/9866/ (accessed March 12, 2009); Mary Anne Weaver, "Inventing Al-Zarqawi," 
The Atlantic Monthly 298, no. 1 (July/August, 2006), 92. 
142 This is one of the major issues of contention between Zarqawi and bin Laden which prevent any 
merger attempts prior to the Iraq War.  For Zarqawi, the “near enemy” was more dangerous than that of the 
“far enemy,” and thus should be the first focus for the international Salafi-jihadist movement.  Bin Laden 
on the other hand—influenced by the Egyptian experience of Ayman al Zawahiri—felt that the far enemy 
should take primacy because of its support for the near enemy of apostate Muslim regimes. 
143 In his February 2003 speech to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell accused Iraq of 
being in collusion with Zarqawi.  According to Powell, Iraq gave Zarqawi a base from which to launch 
operations in the broader Middle East and Europe, train operatives, and support in developing chemical 
weapons such as ricin.  "Full Text of Colin Powell's Speech: U.S. Secretary of State's Address to the United 
Nations Security Council," The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa (accessed 
January 6, 2010).  For Zarqawi’s connections in Kurdistan see Jonathan Schanzer and Dennis Ross, Al-
Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, D.C.: 
Specialist Press International; Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005), 136; Hafez and United 
States Institute of Peace, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, 173. 
144 For a detailed description of Operation VIKING HAMMER, the assault on the Ansar al Islam 
stronghold, see Chapter 13 of Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces, 
1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). 
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Throughout the summer of 2003, TWJ is credited with—and more importantly, 
admits—very little activity in Iraq as the group rebuilt itself in the aftermath of the loss of 
its Kurdistan base.  But by the end of the summer, the group commenced operations.  
Two major suicide attacks in August 2003 can be seen as an attempt by Zarqawi to attack 
both the far and near enemies in Iraq.  The first attack, on 19 August, destroyed the UN 
headquarters in Baghdad, killing Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN special envoy to Iraq.  
The immediate effect of this attack was that the UN closed their offices in Iraq, leaving 
the U.S. to rebuild Iraq with only its meager coalition.  Ten days later, on Friday, 29 
August 2003, a member of TWJ drove a car laden with explosives into the Imam Ali 
Mosque in Najaf, killing nearly a hundred worshipers and  Shi’a Ayatollah Mohammed 
Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Shi’a political group, the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq.145  This attack was a harbinger of things to come as Zarqawi and 
TWJ attempted to split Iraqi society apart and introduce their Jihadi Salafist age
Throughout the fall and winter of 2003, Zarqawi and TWJ conducted only 25 
operations as it prepared to prepare the organization for future operations following its 
eviction from Kurdistan earlier in the year.  Zarqawi explains his slow start— 
What has prevented us from going public is that we have been waiting 
until we have weight on the ground and finish preparing integrated 
structures capable of bearing the consequences of going public so that we 
appear in strength and do not suffer a reversal...146 
Much of Zarqawi’s preparations went toward finding the right personnel with whom they 
could collaborate with in Iraq.  “We have been striving for some time to observe the 
 
145 The attacker was later identified as Yassin Jarrad, father of Zarqawi’s second wife.  Nimrod 
Raphaeli, "MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis no. 231 - ‘The Sheikh of the Slaughterers’: Abu Mus'ab Al-
Zarqawi and the Al-Qaeda Connection," Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/ 
report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1406.htm (accessed January 7, 2010). 
146 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter, 2004, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/ 
20040212_zarqawi_full.html (accessed January 7, 2010).  This letter, which was captured by U.S. forces in 
January 2004 and publicly released the next month, shows no clear attribution to its actual author.  Written 
in highly structured Arabic, it may not actually have been written by Zarqawi himself.  It is probable that it 
could have been written by an associate, most likely by a spiritual mentor such as Sheik Abu Anas al-
Shami.  Nevertheless, it appears to have originated at the highest levels of TWJ, due to its markers of 
Jihadi-Salafist thought.  Amongst the cognoscenti, the letter is considered to bear the imprint of Zarqawi’s 
thinking and should be considered a credible indicator of the group’s thoughts about the situation in Iraq 
during the winter of 2003–4.   
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arena and sift the those [sic] who work in it in search of those who are sincere and on the 
right path, so that we can cooperate with them for the good and coordinate some actions 
with them, so as to achieve solidarity and unity after testing and trying them,” Zarqawi 
further explains.147 But, it was not until the capture and subsequent beheading of U.S. 
citizen Nicholas Berg in the spring of 2004 that the group stepped out of the shadows into 
the world press, despite conducting two major suicide attacks against Shi’a worshipers in 
Baghdad and Karbala on March 2, while they were celebrating the Shi’a holiday of 
Ashura. 
Iraq had become the latest destination for the transnational jihadist after previous 
forays into Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya and other parts of the Middle East.  
What made Zarqawi’s organization a magnet for growth was its external connections and 
timing.  “In the chaotic aftermath of Saddam’s fall Iraq became an ideal venue for 
deterritorialised [sic] nomadic jihadists to prosecute their dream of unifying the ummah 
under the banner of a universal Caliphate,” notes Phillips.148  Being comprised of non-
Iraqis, outsiders could readily join and be accepted by Zarqawi’s group more than other 
homegrown insurgent groups.  
Although not formally connected to al Qaeda, Zarqawi made moves to further 
affiliate himself with bin Laden.  After explaining his strategy for TWJ in Iraq, Zarqawi 
proposes subservience to bin Laden: 
If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you 
are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your 
readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, 
and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media, vexing 
the infidels and gladdening those who preach the oneness of God.149 
After months of discussions—likely over Zarqawi’s animosity over the Shi’a—in late 
2004 Zarqawi extended obeisance to bin Laden in late 2004, formalizing the relationship 
 
147 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
148 Phillips, How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq, 70. 
149 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
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between Zarqawi’s group in Iraq and al Qaeda writ large.150  In a response given on an 
audiotape on 27 December 2004, bin Laden introduced Zarqawi to the Iraqi people as his 
representative in Iraq—“Know that the warrior comrade Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi is the 
commander of the Al-Qa'ida organization in the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and 
the comrades in the organization there must obey him.”151   
Upon swearing loyalty to bin Laden, Zarqawi’s group took the moniker Tanzim 
Qa’idat al-Jihadi Bilad al-Rafidayan (TQJBR), or more commonly known as al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI).  The relationship of al Qaeda to AQI is similar to that of a corporation and an 
independent franchisee.  The corporation, in this case Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, 
grants an operating license to Jordanian–born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—leader of a local 
aspiring insurgent group in Iraq—to conduct operations in its name.  The corporation thus 
gains access to a region where it had little prior access and the franchisee receives the 
benefit of a ready-made, recognizable corporate image.  However, because of the 
corporate/franchisee relationship, little corporate guidance is followed as the corporation 
is not the owner of the local franchise.  The common consensus on this arrangement is 
that it helped both parties more than it hurt each of them.  AQI got access to a global 
brand, funding and recognition, but the group took its own direction regarding its 
operational strategy. 
a.  Ideology of AQI 
The political ideology of AQI is rooted in a current of Islamist discourse, 
recently evolved over the last three decades, namely Jihadi Salafism.  To fully appreciate 
AQI’s political vision, we must delve into Jihadi Salafist beliefs and unpack a number of 
doctrinal issues—Tawhid, Aqidah, Takfir, Al-Wala wal-Bara, and Jihad—on which 
Jihadi Salafists take a more extreme stance than other Salafists.   
 
150 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, "Communiqué from Al-Tawheed Wal-Jihad Movement (Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi) in Iraq," Flashpoint Intel, http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/documents/zarqawi-bayat.pdf 
(accessed January 7, 2010). 
151 Osama bin Laden, as quoted in "MEMRI: Special Dispatch no. 837 - Osama Bin Laden to the Iraqi 
People," Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1286.htm 
(accessed January 7, 2010). 
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Tawhid is a concept that refers to the oneness of God, forbidding any 
equivalent associates of God such as idols or the veneration of saints.  In the puritanical 
form of Salafism, Wahabbisim, tawhid is comprised of four divisions: tawhid rububiyaa, 
“unity of lordship and the affirmation of God’s unique qualities and powers”; tawhid al-
asma’ wal-sifat, “affirmation of the unity of his names and attributes”; tawhid uluhiyaa, 
“oneness of divinity, the oneness of the object of worship, total submission to God 
alone”; and tawhid hakimiyya , the sovereignty of God.152  Tawhid rububiyaa holds that 
God is the sole creator and provider and maintains no equal, superior, or offspring.   
Tawhid al-asma’ wal-sifat refers to God having characteristics that are unique to him and 
have no equivalent human form.  Tawhid uluhiyaa maintains that only God can be 
worshipped; prayer and worship of other objects or persons violates the unity of God. 
While the first three concepts of tawhid are commonly accepted by other Salafists, tawhid 
hakimiyya is emphasized by Jihadi Salafists, yet rejected by mainstream Salafis.  This 
form of tawhid was developed by jihadi ideologues such as Qutb and Maududi, and 
maintains that as the source of all creation; only God can provide laws delineating what is 
good and what is evil, thereby, condemning those governments who do not utilize 
Shari’a as the sole source of human law.  “Unlike the mutazila (rationalist strand in 
Islam), [Jihadi] Salafis do not believe that humans can arrive at the truth or distinguish 
between right and wrong through reasoning,” writes Hafez.  “There are limits to human 
rationality, and because one can never comprehend God’s plan beyond what he has 
revealed for us, so one has to follow the word of God as exemplified by the sayings and 
deeds of his Prophet and the pious ancestors.”153  To Jihadi Salafists, tawhid is the sine 
qua non of their belief, as evidenced by Abu Maysara, a spokesman for AQI.  He notes 





152 Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), xv. 
153 Hafez and United States Institute of Peace, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of 
Martyrdom, 67. 
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Muhammad amongst those whose monotheism was sullied by the filth of polytheistic 
elements, and the spreading of the axiom 'there is no God but Allah' in lands where Islam 
has not yet arrived.”154  
Aqidah, or the Islamic creed, is understood to be the codification of a 
Muslim’s beliefs. More than a statement acknowledging Allah as God, the aqidah sets 
forth the principles by which a Muslim lives, bringing him in alignment with the 
teachings of God, moving one closer to perfection. By laying out a system of belief, the 
aqidah serves as “a key element in learning the difference between right action and 
wrong action in the eyes of God,” writes Brachman.155  To the Jihadi Salafists, the 
central tenet in their aqidah is tawhid, serving as the point from which all other points of 
religious doctrine emanate from. 
Takfir is the act of pronouncing another person an unbeliever and placing 
him outside the Muslim community, in a manner similar to the Christian concept of 
excommunication.  Takfir allows Jihadi Salafis to pronounce those who do not abide by 
their interpretation of tawhid as apostate, whether Muslim or not.  Unlike the majority of 
Sunnis who accept takfir against individuals, Jihadi Salafists extend this point of doctrine 
to entire communities and governments.156  Thus, to Jihadi Salafists, any government 
that fails to acknowledge the sovereignty of God is to be rejected as apostate.  One final 
note is that unlike other Salafis, who believe in a strict process to declare takfir, Jihadi 
Salafists have an extremely low standard of evidence—“We believe that anyone who 
performs a statement or an act of unbelief is an unbeliever because of this [statement or 
act] even if he did not intend unbelief by this.”157 
 
154 "MEMRI: Special Dispatch no. 884 - The Iraqi Al-Qa'ida Organization: A Self-Portrait," Middle 
East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1344.htm (accessed January 7, 
2010). 
155 Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, 42. 
156 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 9. 
157 "Al-Qaeda's Creed and Path," in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel 
Meijer, trans. Bernard Haykel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 52.  Haykel, On the Nature 
of Salafi Thought and Action, 52. 
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Al-wala wal-bara, or loyalty and disavowal, is a relatively recent 
development in Islamic thought.158  Originally considered a religious innovation (bid’a) 
by the founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, it has become a mainstay 
of Jihadi Salafist thought thanks to its development by such scholars as the 13th Century 
scholar Ibn Taymiyaa and the more recently, the Palestinian-Jordanian ideologue ‘Isam 
ibn Muhammad ibn Tahir al-Barqawi, who is more widely known as Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi.159  Al-Maqdisi’s interpretation of al-wala wal-bara links loyalty to the Islamic 
statement of faith, the shahada (“There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the 
Messenger of Allah”) and tawhid to “effectively turn denunciation of political leaders in 
the Muslim world into an obligation that true believers cannot possibly avoid.  Instead of 
giving them their loyalty, al-Maqdisi insists that Muslims are obliged by the very basis of 
their faith to disavow un-Islamic rulers.”160  In effect, the doctrine of al-wala wal-bara, 
not only dictates specific obligations to Muslims, but it also divides the world into two 
distinct camps: the faithful, and the kuffar, or unbelievers.  Through this Manichean 
perspective, Jihadi Salafists like al-Maqdisi justifies that takfir can be applied to kuffar 
because the sins they commit can be classified as indicating major unbelief, or kufr 
akbar, without having to prove i’tiqad (conviction of sin), istihal (permission to sin), jahd 
(negation or denial)—all conventional standards to conduct takfir. 
To the most Jihadi Salafists, the concept of Jihad is interpreted as 
“fighting” from a Shari’a perspective, and more specifically that it is to take the form of 
the offensive jihad (Jihad al-Talab wal Ibtida’).  “Jihad is an indispensible component of 
comprehensive Islamic activism,” writes Hafez, “which begins with preaching (dawa) 
 
158 Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala' wa-l-Bara' in the Ideology 
of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi," in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 81. 
159 Amongst Western audiences, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s notoriety derives not from his 
ideological or theological writings, but by be his close relationship with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.  The two 
originally met in Afghanistan during the 1990s and shared the same opinion of the Jordanian government.  
Returning to Jordan in 1993, the two began to establish an organization to attack the Jordanian regime and 
were later arrested and convicted for their actions.  During their shared time together in Jordanian prison, it 
is widely assumed that Zarqawi soaked up the doctrinal principles of Jihadi Salafi thought from al-Maqdisi. 
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and culminates with confronting obstinate unbelievers.”161  A Jihadi-Salafi ideologue 
and Al-Qaeda commander, Yousef al Ayiri believes that Jihad al-Talab wal Ibtida’ 
“refers to the call made by Muslims to non-Muslims to convert to Islam.  If non-Muslims 
resist this call, or reject Islamic authority over them, Islamic doctrine declares that 
Muslims have a collective obligation to fight them so that they do.”162  Jihad is also a 
duty incumbent on the individual when an individual is called on to fight by a legitimate 
Muslim ruler, or if non-Muslims take a Muslim prisoner.163  Abu Maysara 
ges  
Jihad for the sake of Allah, so that His message be supreme, and in order 
to recapture all the lands of the Muslims from the hands of the infidels and 
the apostates, and to apply the Shari'a law, Allah's law, in these areas, 
without any distinction [in this respect] between ruler and ruled, and to 
free the Muslim prisoners of war, since this is a p rs
[incumbent] on every Muslim, as all the ulama agree...164  
A final aspect of jihad is that it is to continue until “all of humanity submits to Islam or 
the authority of Muslim rule.”165  Thu
ht until Judgment Day. 
These five doctrinal points serve to develop a specific Weltanschauung 
within Jihadi Salafists, which orients their actions towards the body of Muslims, or 
ummah, which they see as being under attack by apostates and infidels.  Abu Maysara 
again notes that their efforts are “not an issue of Iraq in the geographic sense; [but] rather 
it is an issue for our great Islam.”166  It is this orientation on the ummah and not the 
nation that provides the key distinction in distinguishing the political goals of Jihadi 
Salafists from Iraqi Salafists.  Rather than liberating Iraq from the occupier and returning 
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with the Prophet's example, because [according to the tradition] 'whoever dies without 
having sworn allegiance to a Muslim ruler dies as an unbeliever.'”167   
Yet, despite the seemingly divine mandate given to AQI, it is interesting to 
note that with this litany of doctrinal principles—tawhid, aqidah, takfir, al-wala wal-
bara, and jihad—how much AQI differed from not only the rest of the Sunni insurgency, 
but also the Sunnis on whose behalf the group claimed to be fighting for.  With such an 
extreme interpretation of Islamic doctrine advocating such a grand vision, AQI stood in 
stark contrast to local insurgent groups, who advocated resistance rather than wholesale 
revolution.  Secular and Islamist nationalists may agree on reclaiming the dignity of Iraq, 
while the Iraqi Salafis might agree with the principles of monotheism and jihad, but the 
re-establishment of the Caliphate was anathema to those fighting for hearth and home. 
b.  Strategy of AQI 
The earliest indication of AQI’s strategy to establish the Caliphate in Iraq 
is indicated both in the attacks of August 2003 and explained in detail in Zarqawi’s 
intercepted letter.  Viewing the ummah as having been favored by God by bringing the 
far enemy to Islamic lands, Zarqawi notes that the main front for the transnational Jihadi 
Salafi movement is now in Iraq—“We know from God’s religion that the true, decisive 
battle between infidelity and Islam is in this land, i.e., in [Greater] Syria and its 
surroundings. Therefore, we must spare no effort and strive urgently to establish a 
foothold in this land.”168  By inserting itself into post-invasion Iraq, AQI hoped to use 
the clarion call of resistance to the infidel to gather Muslims around itself and create the 
beginnings of a new Islamic caliphate.   
An analysis of Zarqawi’s letter indicates that his efforts consist primarily 
of fighting a number of enemies.   Zarqawi believed that his efforts against the U.S. were 
easily supported, calling them easy pickings.  The Kurds were merely a nuisance, whose 
small numbers could be dealt with later.  Collaborators, however, were TWJ’s biggest 
 
167 MEMRI: Special Dispatch no. 884 - The Iraqi Al-Qa'ida Organization: A Self-Portrait. 
168 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
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threat.  Their ability to ferret out members of his group and deliver them to the 
occupation forces was viewed with vehemence as they could foil his efforts before he 
could implement them—“This enemy, made up of the Shi`a filled out with Sunni agents, 
is the real danger that we face, for it is [made up of] our fellow countrymen, who know us 
inside and out.”169 
However, in spite of the challenges posed by the occupation and its 
attendant collaborators, Iraq’s large majority of Shi’a were Zarqawi’s ultimate prize.  
Instead of just focusing on the far enemy, as bin Laden and other Jihadi Salafis would 
desire, Zarqawi viewed the near enemy as the better source to bring about the changes 
wanted by transnational Jihadi Salafists.170  By provoking the Shi’a to retaliate against 
the Sunni after AQI’s attacks on Shi’a religious, political and popular targets, Zarqawi 
expected the Sunni to eliminate the Shi’a unwittingly on his behalf.  Given the small 
amounts of Jihadi Salafists in Iraq—“negligible,” he notes in his letter—he could not take 
the Shi’a head on, and had to use an indirect method.  In this sense, Zarqawi viewed 
himself and his group’s raison d’être as serving a function not unlike Lenin’s Vanguard 
Party, precipitating a revolution of the ummah against the apostates and infidels, ushering 
in the Caliphate and a new Golden age.  If brutal and indiscriminate, the Shi’a response 
was sure to arouse the ire of the ummah—“Our fighting against the Shi`a is the way to 
drag the [Islamic] nation into the battle,” says Zarqawi.  In his view, Iraq’s Sunnis were 
not so much an objective to be won over, but more of a tool to use in attacking the Shi’a.  
Zarqawi viewed the rank and file Sunni with disdain—“These masses are the silent 
majority, absent even though present…These, even if in general they hate the 
Americans…they look forward to a sunny tomorrow, a prosperous future, a carefree life, 
comfort, and favor,” he writes.171  As such, the utility of the Sunni population lay in their 
deaths, serving as a rallying call to the ummah.   
 
169 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
170 For an analysis of the theological roots of anti-Shi’a belief in Jihadi Salafism, see Guido Steinberg, 
"Jihadi-Salafism and the Shi'is: Remarks about the Intellectual Roots of Anti-Shi'ism," in Global Salafism: 
Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 107. 
171 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
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C.  CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to show the interconnectedness of 
Iraq’s past with the events unfolding in 2003–2004 as the Sunni insurgency began to 
grow.  A historical analysis of the Iraq War cannot be examined in a vacuum.  Long-term 
forces of economics, governance, and battling ideologies left Iraq’s Sunnis with a specific 
mindset on how to respond to the changes brought about as a result of the Coalition’s 
invasion.  To sum up, Iraq’s Sunnis and AQI had remarkably different formative 
experiences that they brought to the table after the fall of Saddam.  In the main, Iraq’s 
Sunnis felt the need to reestablish themselves in the framework of the new Iraq in a way 
that would ensure they were not thrown to the curb by new masters of Iraq.  Accustomed 
to a certain standard of living and place in society, the Sunnis were anchored firmly to the 
physical and ideational aspects of the Iraqi nation.  In stark contrast, Al Qaeda in Iraq, 
and its predecessor, TWJ, was more committed to revolutionary visions than the 
pragmatic concerns of the Sunnis.  Now having introduced the two primary characters in 
the Sunni insurgency, we now turn to the evolution—or more properly, the devolution—
of their relationship over the next four years. 
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III. THE REACTANTS 
If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand. If a 
house is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand.  
—Mark 3:24-25, NASB 
In attempting to explain the causes of the decline of AQI, it is important to 
emphasize the role played by individuals, examining the options available to them at the 
time, their decisions, and on the consequences of those decisions as we move closer from 
the past—with its broad social forces—to the event under examination.172  To that end, 
this chapter seeks to understand how this schism evolved.  It is based on the contention 
that the schism between AQI and Iraq’s Sunnis was precipitated by the disparities 
between their formative experiences, which, as shown in the previous chapter, manifested 
itself in the two having distinctively different ideologies and cultural differences.  
Compounding these differences, AQI faced a lack of embeddedness with the Sunni 
community at large—in effect standing on the outside looking into the tribally based 
society of Sunni Iraqis.  As the two actors joined together to combat the U.S. occupation, 
these differences became evident, forcing AQI to adopt measures even more alien to the 
Sunnis, further emphasizing the differences between them. 
The choice of actions made after 2003 by AQI, the Sunnis, the GoI and the U.S. 
shaped the path of the Iraqi insurgency from one with a broad array of potential outcomes 
to a discrete result where AQI was separated from the Sunnis, lacking popular support, 
and on the run.  Like waves harnessing the forces of currents, wind, and tide hundreds of 
miles out to sea and increasing in power as they move closer to shore, Sunni resistance to 
the excess violence and modus vivendi of AQI increased, culminating in the developing 
of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement in late 2006.   
 
172 Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529–1642, 117. 
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A. RAISING THE BARN: 2003-04 
1.  Early Collaboration 
In the year following the fall of the Ba’athist regime, AQI173 and the Sunnis 
discovered that they were fellow travelers heading down the same road, sharing a 
common destination—the eviction of the U.S.-led coalition.  A loose relationship with 
AQI brought a number of benefits to Sunni insurgents.  AQI was initially welcomed by 
the Iraqi insurgency as additional forces resisting the U.S. occupation and were able to 
make inroads into the Sunni populace through simple methods and shared interests.  This 
so-called “marriage of convenience” provided a mutually beneficial relationship in 2003-
2004, allowing each party to utilize the other’s strengths to hide their weaknesses. 
AQI provided the Sunni insurgency with three critical benefits that would help the 
fledgling resistance movement.  First, AQI offered advanced military skills in guerilla 
warfare.  As a result of sanctions against Saddam’s military establishment after the 1991 
Gulf War, many of the Sunnis had only rudimentary military training.174  Secondly, AQI 
brought with it a large amount of funding that enabled Sunni insurgents to pay for daily 
operations and to compensate for the reduced profits faced as a result of the collapse of 
the smuggling network maintained by the Ba’ath regime after the U.S. invasion.  Finally, 
AQI’s links to the transnational Jihadi Salafist movement provided additional fighters to 
help reinforce the Sunni resistance. 
The local connections provided by the Sunnis gave AQI the benefit of their native 
knowledge of conditions, factions, and safe areas, all of which were initially denied to the 
Jordanian-based nucleus of the group.  This fountain of local information would help 
 
173 I use the term AQI here for continuity and ease of reading rather than switching between TWJ and 
AQI, cognizant of the fact that AQI morphed from TWJ prior to bin Laden’s pronouncement in December 
2004.  In the latter half of this chapter, as AQI transformed into the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and 
later the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), I again will use the term AQI for the same reasons. 
174 In a dissection of the Iraqi Army defeat in the invasion, Stephen Hosmer notes that the Iraqi 
Army’s lack of training is indicated by their “inability to carry out basic military operations. Among other 
shortcomings, the Iraqi forces appeared unable to (1) coordinate supporting arms and to maneuver, (2) 
exploit cover and concealment, and (3) shoot accurately.”  Stephen T. Hosmer, Why the Iraqi Resistance to 
the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2007), 69. 
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offset their foreign origins and mitigate the risk of exposure by local collaborators.  
Zarqawi considers this a blessing for his group—“We have taken possession of growing 
numbers of locations, praise be to God, to be base sites for brothers who are kindling [the 
fire of] war and drawing the people of the country into the furnace of battle so that a real 
war will break out, God willing.”175  Anbar provided a promising home for AQI to 
operate from.  The province’s population was largely Sunni and coalition forces were few 
and far between early in the insurgency.  Another prime factor in its development into its 
central role in the Iraqi insurgency stems from its geographical features: Anbar borders 
with five other Iraqi provinces and has international borders with Syria, Jordan, and 
Saudi Arabia, providing AQI with easy access into Iraq from abroad. 
The decision to align with AQI in the early days of the Sunni insurgency bears 
evidence of the weak position vis-à-vis the Shi’a in which the Sunnis saw themselves.  
One Iraqi literati at the century-old Al-Shahbandar Café in the Rusafa District of 
Baghdad tells us: 
My brother, listen, the pressure we’ve endured for 35 years has knocked 
us off balance.  We are only human.  We are a mass of nerves.  This could 
only lead to a breakdown…you could say all Iraqis are schizophrenic.  
Why?  Because we’ve been knocked off balance.  What can we do?  
Constant pressure, so we will cling to any ray of hope even if it’s a straw 
in this sea.  We lost balance, so we’ll take anything, even if it’s from the 
devil or the enemy.  We just want something that would guarantee our 
stability and balance…There is no alternative, we have no choice.  We will 
shake the devil’s hand if we thought it would lift us a little [emphasis 
added].176 
The logic followed that of an old Arab proverb—“My brother and me against my cousin, 
my cousin and me against the stranger.”177  This notion gave the Sunnis the ability to 
achieve cognitive liberation, reconciling the differences between themselves and the 
strange bedfellow they found themselves working with. 
 
175 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
176 Antoon and others, About Baghdad. 
177 Ed Blanche, "Brothers in Arms?" Middle East, no. 340 (December 2003), 7. 
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2.  Early Friction 
However, tensions began to mount as AQI began to establish itself in the Sunni 
population. In spite of their attractive offerings to the Sunni insurgency, AQI still had a 
limited appeal to the population, which was not lost on Zarqawi— 
Many an Iraqi will honor you as a guest and give you shelter as a 
peaceable brother.  As for making his house into a base for launching 
[operations] and a place of movement and battle, this is rarer than red 
sulphur [sic].  For this reason, we have worn ourselves out on many 
occasions sheltering and protecting the brothers.178 
Zarqawi further complained to bin Laden that his organization faced a “paucity of 
supporters,” and needed to find “those who are sincere and on the right path” in which to 
embed his organization in.179   
In order to gain access and acceptance by Iraq’s Sunnis, AQI began utilizing 
elements of al Qaeda’s “best practices.”  In Afghanistan, al Qaeda married into the 
families of local tribal leaders over time, allowing them to be embedded within the 
Afghan tribes.180  But for AQI, time was in short supply.  With the U.S. having already 
displaced the Ba’ath regime, Zarqawi was forced to integrate his organization quickly 
and without the nuances of building a long-term relationship, as al Qaeda had done in 
Afghanistan.  Faced with a lack of time and popular support, AQI made the pragmatic 
decision to coerce Sunni tribal leaders to allow the leadership of AQI to marry into the 
leadership structure of the tribes.  By developing tribal ties, AQI could not only latch 
onto social networks to recruit fighters and spread their ideology, but could also gain 
protection through tribal obligation mechanisms. 
 
178 al-Zarqawi, Untitled Letter. 
179 Ibid. 
180 David Kilcullen notes one aspect of al Qaeda’s methodology to embed into the local population “is 
to marry leaders and key operatives to women from prominent tribal families.” David J. Kilcullen, 
"Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-
a-tribal-revolt/ (accessed August 13, 2009). 
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However, this was “anathema to the Anbari tribes and the tribal sheikhs,” as one 
author notes.181  This attitude of rejection stems from Sunni tribal views regarding those 
outside the tribe.  Tribes around Fallujah were “traditionally hostile to all foreigners, 
meaning anyone not from Fallujah,” and “still firmly entrenched in the tradition of the 
clan.”182  Reinforcing this initial suspicion of outsiders was the Anbari custom that stated 
that marrying off the tribes’ women only occurred to those within the tribe.183  This 
socio-cultural friction had to be overcome if AQI were to grow in Anbar, and AQI chose 
to target the tribal structure—“the only functioning civil authority in al-Anbar”184—
through intimidation and coercion viewing Iraq’s tribes as a long-term opponent to their 
plan for Iraq.  Rebuffed, AQI turned to coercion and intimidation, murdering sheikhs who 
refused to allow AQI leaders to marry into the tribe. 
Besides tribal leaders, AQI’s actions towards the population at large in Fallujah 
also serve to illustrate the stressful relationship between AQI and the Sunnis.  Describing 
the shift in attitudes between Coalition operations in Fallujah in April and November 
2004, one Anbari Sheikh explains that—   
In the first conflict, there was support for the resistance.  In the second 
Fallujah, it changed the balances.  In the first, as I said, many people 
sympathized with the resistance, and the second one changed the view and 
the vision of the people against al-Qaeda, because they started to realize 
who al-Qaeda are.  Al-Qaeda are people who kill, demolish houses, rape 
people, so the people started to change their view of the resistance.185 
After the U.S. withdrawal from Fallujah and the handover to the Fallujah Brigade 
in May 2003, the town became a hotbed of insurgent activity.  At that time, Fallujah was 
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an amalgamation of insurgent groups, from Ba’athists to Jihadi Salafists. With the 
Brigade looking the other way—and assisting in some cases—AQI and other insurgents 
began implementing elements of Sharia upon the residents of the city.  West writes,  
The imams declared the city would be governed in accord with the 
strictest interpretation of the sharia.  Those selling alcohol were stripped, 
flogged, and driven through town, bare backs bleeding, to be ridiculed and 
spat upon.  Barbers were beaten if they offered “Western-style” haircuts.  
Students with long hair were rounded up, mocked, and shorn.  Anyone 
caught drinking beer was beaten and paraded through the streets.  
Residents were whipped for petty transgressions such as talking back to a 
mujahedeen fighter.  Shop owners selling lipstick, American-style 
magazines, or pop music CDs were beaten and their meager goods 
smashed or stolen.186 
 But while the Sunni insurgency continued to grow, the first points of stress in the 
relations of the Jihadi Salafis and the population begin to show when the AQI and other 
Islamist insurgents started to impose their brand of Sharia law in Fallujah and Ramadi.   
In a communiqué released in the spring of 2005, Abu Maysara, an AQI 
spokesman, attempted to justify the presence of the non-native AQI within the Sunni 
insurgency, pleading with Iraqis for their support and justifying the lengths to which AQI 
had gone to keep the Sunnis united on their side—  
Don't you see how all the infidels in the world have united and assembled 
armies from more than 30 countries to invade Iraq and to plunder its 
resources and to humiliate you and to violate your wives' honor?  So why 
should your brothers the Jihad fighters—both foreigner and native—be 
subject to reproach?  These brothers of yours emigrated from their 
homelands, left their wives and children, and sacrificed their blood for 
your sake—to protect you, to protect your families, and to preserve your 
honor, and to drive the invaders from your land…rise up with your 
brothers who fight Jihad to conquer Iraq, and after that [to conquer] the 
rest of the Muslim lands that were conquered by the infidels. Extend a 
helping hand with whatever you can...to gain God's pleasure and to be 
saved from the fires of Hell, and in order to be worthy successors to good 
forefathers so as to free yourself from the guilt of shirking Jihad... 
[emphasis added].187 
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Here, Abu Maysara attempts to incorporate themes of transnational jihad with sentiments 
of resistance in an effort to appeal to the Sunni.   
 Although residents of Fallujah were relatively more extreme in their religious 
views in comparison to the majority of Iraqi Sunnis and could have tolerated more of 
AQI’s religious creed and laws, the condescending attitude of religious superiority 
inherent in AQI’s Jihadi Salafist ideology was viewed by the Anbaris as an affront to 
their personal and collective identity. Unlike Jihadi Salafis, who base their jurisprudence 
of directly on the Quran or in the Hanbali tradition, the majority of Iraq’s Sunnis follow 
the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, which maintains a relatively liberal 
orientation, offering a high level of tolerance between various Muslims and places a 
premium on belief over practice.188  This difference over the interpretation of a Muslim’s 
‘aqidah no doubt led to friction between the two groups.  The seeds of revolt began to 
grow in the Anbaris, supplied by fresh water and fertilizer by AQI’s nefarious acts of 
repression. 
AQI’s use of terror against the Sunnis in the early days of the insurgency bears 
further examination.  As a tactic, intimidation seeks to help an insurgent gain control over 
a population.  “It works by demonstrating that the terrorists have the power to punish 
whoever disobeys them, and that the government is powerless to stop them,” note Kydd 
and Walter.189  With the GoI rejecting the Sunni as complicit with the past sins of the 
Ba’athists and the Coalition considering them “dead-enders,” AQI was free to have their 
way with Iraq’s Sunnis, using intimidation to impose their Weltanschauung “directly on 
the population, gaining compliance through selective violence and the threat of future 
reprisals.”190  Intimidation also served as a means for AQI to emphasize the outcome for 
those who chose to collaborate with the Coalition and the Iraqi government.   
 
188 Todd and others, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal 
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As demonstrated in Chapter II, the Sunnis bore the full brunt of the Ba’athist 
cultural restructuring program, and although many insurgents in the early days were not 
fighting on behalf of Saddam, “he constituted a symbol of resistance to foreign 
occupation.  It was important that he was free, even if he was not in direct control of the 
insurgency.”191  Saddam’s capture, the declining belief in the ideology of Ba’athism by 
Iraq’s Sunnis, and the capture of nearly all of the senior leadership of the Ba’ath regime 
combined to put a quick end to Sunni support of the Ba’athist-based secular insurgency.  
But despite the rejection of the secular nationalist current following the capture and 
apparent weakness of Saddam Hussein, the Sunnis did not jump onto the transnational 
Jihadi Salafist wagon, instead preferring to turn inward. 
To fully appreciate the Sunni’s position and understand the reasons for this 
inward turn, we must look at the predicament they were in following the invasion.  In 
2003–4, the Sunni identity was shaken—their patron was gone and the last vestige of 
their identity was removed by the early actions of the CPA via CPA Order #1 and #2.  As 
the Ba’athist ideology became completely discredited after Saddam’s capture, the fear of 
Shi’a dominance and revenge began to takes root in the Sunni psyche.   
A number of indicators reinforce this perception, chief among them being the 
restructuring of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments.  Table 3 depicts the sectarian 
balance of the early post-Saddam governing bodies.  The Iraqi Governing Council—the 
Iraqi advisory arm appointed by the CPA—was 58% Shi’a and the subsequent Iraqi 
Interim Government, designed to rule in the interregnum between the CPA and the post-
Saddam government remained approximately 45% Shi’a.   To the Sunnis, both of these 
bodies failed to reflect the criticality of Sunnis in the governing of Iraq, keeping them to 
less than 30% of the total.  In addition, the majority of the Sunni representatives were 
exiles who had not stepped foot in the country in decades.  Quite simply, native Sunnis 
had no one to hear their voice and no stake in the post-Saddam government of Iraq.   
Other events contributed to a growing sense of Shi’a dominance, which raised the specter 
of potential Shi’a reprisals.  In the south of Iraq, Shi’a flooded the streets to celebrate the 
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Shi’a religious holiday of Ashura openly for the first time since the Ba’ath   seized power 
in 1968.  Also, previous members of the Sunni-dominated security forces began being 
assassinated, which many Sunnis believed were the result of Iranian (and thereby Shi’a 
Iraqi) revenge from the Iran-Iraq War.192    
 
  Sunni Shi’a Kurd Other 
      
Iraqi Governing Council  Total 5 13 5 2 
(July 13, 2003 – June 1, 2004) % 20% 58% 20% 8% 
      
      
Iraqi Interim Government  Total 10 16 8 2 
(June 30, 2004 – May 3, 2005) % 27.7% 44.4% 22.3% 5.6% 
      
Table 3.   Sectarian Composition of Post-Saddam Governing Bodies.193 
In an effort to frame his actions in a light that would resonate with the Sunnis, 
Zarqawi seized on their innate fear of Iranian domination and incorporated it into his 
plans to attack the takfir Shi’a, not only to rally the ummah to support efforts in Iraq as 
discussed in Chapter II, but also to appeal to the Sunnis as their protector.  As a technique 
of mobilizing popular support, acts of terror are used by insurgents to, “manipulate 
popular beliefs about their size and future prospects in an effort to increase the expected 
benefits of participation.”194  Although this technique may cost the insurgent a loss of 
short-term legitimacy, the insurgent is often rewarded when the state responds with 
overwhelming force, causing the population to move towards the insurgent for protection.  
Zarqawi knew this principle and utilized terror to strengthen his initial foothold with the 
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Sunni populace.  One part of his strategy was to utilize violence to elicit a strong 
response from the Shi’a, aiming to mobilize the Sunni to his side as discussed in Chapter 
II.   
In spite of AQI’s repulsive actions, the Sunni insurgency continued to grow 
throughout 2004 as the low levels of legitimacy offered by the GoI (and its U.S. backers) 
failed to offer a more attractive alternative to AQI.  Even though AQI progressively 
utilized more coercive measures against select members of the Sunni population in this 
time frame, there was no functioning governmental entity to act as an effective 
counterbalance.  This balance can be pictured utilizing elements of McCormick’s 
diamond model of insurgency as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Insurgent/Population Alignment, 2003–2004.195 
When the extreme ideology of AQI and other Islamist insurgents was revealed 
through their actions, the marriage of convenience became strained as the ideals of AQI’s 
Jihadi Salafists were miles apart far from those maintained by the majority of Iraq’s 
Sunnis.  Despite AQI’s efforts to utilize an anti-Shi’a strategy to motivate Sunnis to rally 
behind AQI—the self-proclaimed guardians of the Sunni—Iraq’s Sunnis remained firmly 
entrenched in their allegiances: tribe first, country second, and then to the Arab world.   
If AQI desired to be seen as a legitimate leader of the Sunnis, they failed to 
achieve any of the three Weberian bases of legitimacy.  The animosity toward the sheikhs 
                                                 




provided no support to AQI being viewed as legitimate on traditional grounds.  While 
Zarqawi may have been able to grasp legitimacy on charisma, his intercepted letter 
undermined this attempt by spelling out his strategy to use the Sunnis as a tool to 
motivate the ummah.  Finally, the rational-legal foundation of legitimacy was completely 
undermined by AQI’s imposition of their arbitrary version of Sharia on the Iraq’s Sunnis.   
Unbeknownst to all, the spring of 2005 became a season of transition, only 
noticeable in hindsight.  This point marked the end of the beginning in the story of AQI 
and the Sunnis.  While AQI’s assistance was sorely needed by the Sunnis in the early 
days of the insurgency, by late 2004 and early 2005, a number of factors changed for the 
Sunnis.  First, the insurgency became more organized than it had been in the chaotic 
weeks and months following Saddam’s downfall.  Though still highly acephalous, there 
was a unity of purpose that defined the mainstream Sunni insurgency, revolving around 
resistance to the Coalition occupation and progressing towards a national government 
that was more inclusive to the Sunni.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
political landscape began to solidify in Iraq.  The end of U.S. direct rule through the CPA 
and the transition to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) through the transitional 
administrative law offered a small ray of hope that things would get better for the Sunnis.  
Although a point of transition, the darkest time of night still lay before the Sunnis, as AQI 
continued to utilize repression against the Sunnis. 
B. THE ROOF COMES FALLING DOWN: 2005–09 
Following the January 2005 parliamentary elections, the Sunnis found themselves 
completely disenfranchised from the political process.  Intimidated by not only AQI, but 
also Iraqi Salafist insurgent groups, the Sunnis boycotted the vote.  With the prospect of 
the Kurds and the Shi’a writing the constitution with minimal Sunni input, the Sunnis 
realized their mistake of boycotting what they had been led to believe was an illegitimate 
process imposed on them by the occupier.  The historic fear of Shi’a dominance took 
further root after the elections and the formation of a Shi’a government in Baghdad, 
providing further impetus for Sunnis to work on political efforts.  While AQI viewed 
elections as apostasy and democracy as anathema to Islam, “in the absence of effective 
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grass-roots leaders, Sunni clerics pressed for an increased role at the national level, and 
began to build a political base in Baghdad.”196  But it would not be the clerics that would 
return the Sunni to Iraq’s political stage.  Rather, it would be through traditional tribal 
leaders. 
1.  Increasing Tremors 
Stress fractures in the Sunni-AQI relationship soon followed with the first open 
revolt against AQI occurring in the border town of al Qaim in early 2005.  There, the 
Albu Mahal tribe began waging a low-level war against AQI from late 2004 to May 
2005.  Animosity had been rising as the tribe realized that AQI wanted to destroy the 
existing social order, assassinating tribal members working in the local police force and 
those who collaborated with U.S. Marines in the town.  Additionally, AQI attempted to 
move in and “had upset members of the tribe by disturbing their control over the black 
market and infringing on their territory.”197  The tribe then began ambushing AQI 
fighters and mortaring AQI positions over the next few months, leading to a period of 
tribal rule over the city.198  In August, AQI responded by flooding the city and 
surrounding areas with fighters from locations across northern Iraq, isolating the city and 
forcing the leaders of the revolt to flee.  Visitors were greeted with the sign, “Welcome to 
the Islamic Republic of Qaim,” as AQI consolidated its grip on al Qaim and imposed 
harsh penalties on the population.199  One report notes that men were publicly executed 
and one woman was found dead in the street with the sign, "A prostitute who was 
punished," around her neck.200   
Al Qaim seems an unlikely place to start a revolt.  One other factor missed in 
much of the U.S. reporting glosses over its unique geographic position, only noting its 
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location as a nexus of smuggling.  Lying on the border with Syria, al Qaim became the 
primary entrance point on the foreign fighter infiltration network early in the war.  Al 
Qaim’s position on this infiltration route made it one of the first places in Iraq to receive 
foreign fighters on their movement into the country, and of all the locations used by 
transnational Jihadi Salafis in Iraq, al Qaim would have seen their presence the longest. 
Later, in 2006–07, tribal and coalition efforts to remove AQI’s presence caused a shift 
northwards to alternate infiltration routes—or ratlines—through the Jazeera Desert and in 
the Rabiyah-Sinjar corridor. 
Al Qaim’s location may also provide insight as to why the revolt failed to achieve 
a lasting effect.  The Albu Mahal revolt failed, quite simply, because it lacked support 
from both the U.S.-led coalition and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG).  In late 2005, 
the local Sunni tribes were still viewed with suspicion by both the U.S. and the Iraqi 
government, who failed to grasp the nuances of the Sunni insurgency.  Marines based in 
al Qaim viewed the fighting between AQI and the Albu Mahal as a tribal spat solely over 
the smuggling trade, rather than an uprising against foreign oppression.201  But from the 
perspective of the Albu Mahal, they were in between a rock and a hard place, outgunned 
by AQI and forbidden to be armed by the U.S. and the GoI.  “We didn’t have the arms to 
fight them at that time because the Coalition forces were surrounding us,” notes a tribal 
sheikh.202    Far away from the corridors of power, al Qaim and the Albu Mahal were 
considered part of the periphery of Iraq that didn’t matter to the Shi’a-led government. 
Despite the foiled efforts of the Albu Mahal, other small revolts followed 
throughout Anbar in 2005. Like the al Qaim uprising, they sputtered and then died 
quickly as AQI overwhelmed them.  In mid-to late-2005 some nationalist tribal leaders in 
 
201 Smith, Violence is 'Off the Chart' in Area on Iraq Border, 10. 
202 Sheikh Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahran al-Shurji al-Aziz, Principal Sheikh of the Albu Mahal Tribe, 
as quoted in Montgomery and McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives, From 
Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, 142.  Austin Long notes that “al-Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia was competing for control of revenue sources—such as banditry and smuggling—that had 
long been the province of the tribes. Under this interpretation, the tribes did not change sides in response to 
violence towards civilians or their Anbar kinsmen, as press accounts have suggested. While this violence 
was not irrelevant, it does not appear to have been the central motive for the shift. For example, some 
began fighting al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia at least as early as the beginning of 2005, well before most of the 
violence towards civilians and tribesmen in Anbar occurred.  The primary motive was not moral; it was 
self-interested.”  Long, The Anbar Awakening, 77. 
 76
                                                
Anbar attempted to push for political action.  Under Mohammed Mahmoud Latif, the 
Anbar People’s Council (APC) fought against AQI to ensure the Sunni would be able to 
freely participate in the December 2005 elections for the national government.203  In their 
first operation, they detained and executed 12 AQI fighters, of which nine were 
considered emirs, or leaders.204  But “undermanned and hamstrung by tribal vendettas, it 
lacked strength and cohesion,” causing the APC to become quickly targeted for 
destruction by AQI.205  Key personnel, like Sheikh Nassir al-Fahadawi, were 
assassinated or, like Latif, were forced to flee the country.  As the divide between the 
Jihadi Salafist insurgents and the Sunnis grew, AQI continued to ratchet up the levels of 
coercion to beat the two groups back into alignment.  By February 2006, the APC was 
eradicated by AQI.   
In Fallujah, Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi, of the Albu Issa tribe, stood up against 
AQI after they assassinated a number of the city’s prominent imams who had attempted 
to persuade residents that AQI and other foreign mujahideen were criminals, intent on 
interfering with Iraq’s internal politics.206  As a result of his public disavowal of AQI, 37 
of his relatives and tribal members were killed, causing his tribe’s support to erode 
underneath him.  After an assassination attempt by AQI, Sheikh Aifan fled to Jordan, 
returning in late 2006 after the Sahwa was publicly announced in neighboring Ramadi. 
Responding to these localized revolts, AQI responded with further intimidation of 
the Sunni population, leading to the murder of numerous sheikhs and ISF recruits.207  
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Attacking societal leaders tended to atomize tribal members, moving them towards a state 
of docility.  In Ramadi, often considered the most dangerous part of Anbar during 2005-
2006, one author notes: 
The assassinations had created a leadership vacuum in Ramadi and, by 
cutting tribal ties to outside tribal centers, had isolated the city.  For their 
part, the tribes had adopted a passive posture, not wishing to antagonize a 
powerful Al-Qaeda presence in and around Ramadi.208 
In a similar vein, Sheikh Aifan comments that in Fallujah, “The situation was getting 
very bad and people were going [over] to the foreign Arabs.  People wanted to live 
peacefully, so they started to follow al-Qaeda.”209  A U.S. Marine Corps intelligence 
report of the time notes that, “Although most al-Anbar Sunni dislike, resent, and distrust 
AQI, many increasingly see it as an inevitable part of daily life and, in some cases, their 
only hope for protection against a possible ethnic cleansing campaign by the central 
government.”210 
Although geographically and temporally dispersed, this series of revolts against 
AQI have a number of features in common that are worth examining in depth to 
understand why the Sunnis rose up against AQI.  First, in all these cases, there is a threat 
by AQI to consume local identity, replacing it with the more universal ideology of the 
Jihadi Salafist.  Not only did a distaste for AQI’s methods exist amongst those who chose 
to rebel against AQI, but also the view that subordination to AQI would destroy their 
existing way of life.  Here, Sheikh Sabah of al Qaim’s Albu Mahal tribe explains in 
detail— 
The reason for our conflicts and disagreements with al-Qaeda, there are 
many points that we disagree on with al-Qaeda.  The first thing was al-
Qaeda tried to isolate and to humiliate the tribals in the areas. . .The other 
thing they did was trying to stop the opinions of the tribal people, to stop 
the Iraqis themselves from having any opinions on the ground.  The only 
people that we should listen to were them—to al-Qaeda—and these people 
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were not even Iraqis.  They were foreigners who entered from Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and they called themselves emirs.  They wanted to 
have their word and their opinion over us. 
In our personal experiences with them, they dealt violently and toughly 
with all Iraqi citizens.  They accused every Iraqi of being a traitor or a spy 
for the Americans.  And if you weren’t a spy for the Americans, then you 
should listen to them and kill Iraqis, and execute them, and steal money 
from Iraqis, and then they can think you are better to them than to the 
Americans.211 
In effect, this disdain helped tribal leaders to conduct local mobilization against AQI 
within their tribal networks by framing their revolt as a necessary effort, as AQI 
dishonored the tribes and imposed modes of living contrary to tribal values.   
Second, these revolts were all initiated locally and each was precipitated by a 
local trigger.  The trigger for the Al Qaim tribal revolt was the assassination of the local 
police chief, who was a member of the Albu Mahal tribe.  In the case of Ramadi, it was 
the assassination of several prominent sheikhs.  Likewise, in Fallujah, the assassination of 
Sunni imams who spoke out against the foreign presence of AQI triggered the stand by 
Sheikh Aifan Sadun al-Issawi. 
Finally, resistance was conducted at multiple levels, from the individual level to 
the tribal level.  Early on, familial resistance to AQI’s efforts to insert itself into the tribal 
matrimonial system was met with enough resistance that AQI used coercion rather than 
persuasion in an attempt to control the population.  In Fallujah, Sheikh Aifan’s resistance 
originally began as a sub-tribal uprising, and shortly thereafter was condensed to a few 
individuals.  In al Qaim, an open revolt initially initiated by a few tribal members soon 
grew to involve the entire Albu Mahal tribe.  In Ramadi, the APC was led by several 
prominent members and leaders of local tribes.  
But as much as the immediate threat of exposure through Sunni collaboration with 
the coalition worried AQI, the long-term threat of Sunni insurrection against them posed 
the greater danger for the group.  A captured AQI document provides insight to the 
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thinking of the insurgents, and provides their reasoning behind the coercive efforts to 
maintain the ideological alignment between the group and the local population through 
force and is worth quoting at length: 
So this is the reality we’re living in al-Anbar in general, and Ramadi in 
particular, that is the head sheikhs of some tribes, and symbols of the 
Islamic Party, sat with the Americans...to fight terrorism and its people.  
The sheikhs started teaching people about these ideas...so they announced 
their war on the Mujahidin, it increased during the [October 2005] 
elections for the new constitution, their danger was so great, that hundreds 
of people volunteered in the police and the army, and thousands of people 
participated in the elections, renouncing their religion, and listening to the 
erratics [sic].  After we took a look at the situation, we found that the best 
solutions to stop thousands of people from renouncing their religion, is to 
cut the heads of the sheikhs of infidelity and erratic.212 
The author understood the ideological divergence advocated by the tribal leaders of 
Anbar’s Sunnis.  Equating “the damage caused by those erratic infidels (Tribes Sheikhs, 
The Islamic Party) [to be] more dangerous than the Shiites,” the author later justified the 
actions of the group as he knew that the more the two diverged, the greater chance the 
Jihadi Salafist insurgency would disintegrate.213   
2.  Hasty Repairs: AQI Shores Up the Foundation 
Recognizing this initial setback in Anbar, Ayman al Zawahiri—al Qaeda’s 
number-two man—sent a letter to Zarqawi in October 2005 providing guidance for AQI 
to follow in order to establish the beginnings of a caliphate in Iraq.  Zawahiri reminded 
Zarqawi that the strongest weapon in the jihadi arsenal is “popular support from the 
Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries.”214  Zawahari further 
expanded this imperative by emphasizing that popular support must be maintained and 
increased in ways that are not only undertaken in accordance with Sharia law, but also to 
“avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve.”215  Zawahari went on to 
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offer Zarqawi five separate strategies to help AQI mobilize the Iraqi population: 1) begin 
laying the political groundwork with the local populace now; 2) unify the mujahedeen 
fighters in Iraq to prevent discord; 3) stay ideologically sound and prevent the drawing of 
theological distinctions amongst the mujahedeen and the Iraqi people; 4) don’t attack the 
Shi’a populace; and  5) minimize excessive, wanton violence due to the importance of the 
media portions of their campaign.216  These five strategies would help staunch the loss of 
legitimacy that AQI was facing and help them reclaim the support of the Sunnis. 
Besides Zawahiri’s letter, Zarqawi had received other messages from his fellow 
transnational Jihadi Salafists urging a cessation to his group’s heavy-handedness towards 
the Sunni.  Found in the rubble at the site of Zarqawi’s death, one letter takes on a tone of 
gentle rebuke and admonishment.  Known as the Atiyah letter after its author, it reminds 
Zarqawi that— 
Military action is a servant to policy. We as people of Islam are people of 
policy, wisdom, reason, and are good at applying its fundamentals of 
justice, mercy, good deeds, et cetera….Therefore, unless our military 
actions are servant to our judicious Shari’a policy, and unless our short-
term goals and successes are servant to our ultimate goal and highest aims, 
then they will be akin to exhaustion, strain, and illusion.217 
Taking note of AQI’s repressive actions against the Sunnis, Atiyah reminds Zarqawi that 
adapting the movement to local nuances will benefit his efforts: 
Winning over the people, bringing them close, being cautious about 
alienating them, befriending them, helping them, accepting their foibles 
(which means [accepting] what they possess, including strength, 
weakness, propriety, impropriety, goodness, and ill; which doesn’t negate 
the continuation of guiding them towards goodness and betterment), 
molding them, gaining their sympathy at all their levels and ranks, using 
the utmost caution to not be harsh with them or degrade them or frighten 
them or be hasty in judging them or even be hasty in reforming them in a 
way that they might not comprehend, which might cause them 
provocation, wherein they would turn on us and you with hostile 
animosity. However, [you should do this] with gentleness, gradual open-
mindedness, while overlooking and being quiet about many of their 
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mistakes and flaws, and while tolerating a great deal of harm from them 
for the sake of not having them turn away and turn into enemies on any 
level.218  
We cannot completely know exactly how much Zarqawi agreed with either 
Zawahari or Atiyah, but it appears that the advice offered didn’t make it to the rank and 
file of AQI as the group continued their campaign to control the population by further 
acts of murder and intimidation throughout 2006 and igniting an ethnic civil war in the 
country.  However, it does appear that Zarqawi did heed a little of the advice offered by 
Zawahiri and Atiyah.  Attempting to prevent the hemorrhaging of legitimacy, Zarqawi 
attempted to regain some of the group’s lost clout by establishing the Mujahedeen Shura 
Council (MSC) on April 21, 2006.  The MSC was: 
… comprised [of] several Sunni groups and was presented as an umbrella 
organization that included Al-Qaeda but was not headed by it.  An Iraqi 
mujahid, Abdallah Rashud Al-Baghdadi, was appointed to head the 
council, while Al-Qaeda, and Al-Zarqawi himself, were given no special 
status, in the hope that this would enable additional Sunni Iraqi jihad 
groups to join the organization.219  
Ostensibly headed by an Iraqi, the MSC was under de facto AQI control.  Under 
the MSC, AQI attempted to use the umbrella group to control other Iraqi insurgent 
groups.  Furthermore, it established a shadow government within Anbar province, placing 
AQI agents to control the directors of the province’s Department of Education, the Health 
Department, and the Facilities Protection Service.  Using these proxies, AQI could place 
ghost employees on the provincial payroll to gain funding, prevent collaboration with the 
central government, and utilize provincial resources to support their operations.  Colonel 
Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi, the Director General Iraqi Special Weapons and 
Tactics in Anbar province notes that, 
After they [AQI] controlled the people by terrorism, by killing, they went 
back to the groups that were working with them, the jihad or mujahideen 
groups like the Islamic Army, the 20th Revolution Brigades, the Islamic 
 
218 Atiyah's Letter to Zarqawi, 6. 
219 D. Hazan, "MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis no. 336 - Sunni Jihad Groups Rise Up Against Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq," Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1829.htm 
(accessed August 11, 2009). 
 82
                                                
Movement, the Mujahideen Army, and other groups, and told them, 
“Either you give us your weapons and your vehicles, and you work under 
our control, or you will not be allowed to shoot a single bullet, even if you 
are shooting at the Americans.”220 
But unlike the little Dutch boy, Zarqawi’s effort to staunch the loss of legitimacy 
was a failure.  AQI and the MSC were viewed by the Sunni as an outside agent sent to 
control them in ways foreign to their traditions.  “They enforced some habits that we 
didn’t have before,” reflects Colonel al-Fahadawi.  “Females shouldn’t work.  Schools 
for girls were not allowed.  They changed the way we pray.  They changed the call to 
prayer in the mosques.”221  Widespread disruption of tradition in a society that highly 
valued the steadiness of tradition and a single-minded obsession with complete control 
over all aspects of society increased the already growing animosity between AQI and the 
Sunni.   
3. The Barriers of Fear Fall:  The Sahwa Begins 
By the summer of 2006, AQI had quelled numerous Sunni revolts and had 
destroyed relations so much that the two were bound together by the thinnest of threads.  
These previous attempts at removing the yoke of AQI, coupled with AQI’s subsequent 
reprisals, served to bolster the resolve of Sunni tribal leaders.  Living under AQI’s 
tyranny was more of a burden than living with a negotiated settlement with the U.S. and 
the GoI.  The AQI-Sunni relationship was so tense, that the slightest touch would release 
years of built up tension.  That knife that cut the final threads was wielded by a few 
sheikhs in Ramadi. 
Much like the previous revolts in Fallujah and al Qaim, local actions by AQI 
precipitated a Sunni uprising.  The sparks for this attempt came from three AQI-initiated 
events and all demonstrated AQI’s disrespect for local Sunnis.  An AQI suicide bombing 
against Sunni police recruits in Ramadi who were looking for work in the security forces 
at the behest of their sheikh caused increased anger at AQI.  Another spark came when 
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AQI fighters at a checkpoint dragged the daughter of the head of the Albu Jassim tribe of 
a car by her hair.222  Shortly thereafter, tribal leaders put AQI on notice that it was not 
welcome any more and began to work to split the tribes from AQI’s grip.  In a separate 
event, AQI’s kidnapping and assassination of Khalid Araq al-Ataymi—also known by his 
tribal title of Sheikh Abu Ali Jassim and a member of the Anbar People’s Council—led 
to widespread resentment of the group in the province.   
The violence unleashed by AQI against the Anbar People’s Council was used to 
create a follow-on group to resist AQI’s attempts to control the Sunnis in Ramadi.  The 
Anbar Revolutionaries were formed under the pretext of vengeance by the tribe of Khalid 
Araq al-Ataymi who was murdered by AQI in such a culturally heinous way.223  “They 
[AQI] severed his head, they left him out in the open,” notes Sheikh Wissam Abd al-
Ibrahim al-Hardan al-Aethawi, the Former First Deputy of the Anbar Salvation 
Council.224  Beyond the resentment created with the kidnapping, “Al-Qaeda further 
angered [Khalid Araq al-Ataymi’s] followers by hiding the sheik’s body in a field rather 
than returning it to the family for prompt burial, as is the custom.”225   
These three events were used by tribal leaders to incite their tribe members, 
framing AQI’s actions as the results of their acquiescence to AQI’s Weltanschauung.  
Some Anbari sheikhs attempted to persuade other sheikhs who had previously fled to 
Jordan to return and join efforts against AQI, but were rebuffed.  Sensing that they would 
receive no further help from outside, these local leaders—Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu 
Risha, Hamid al-Hayess, Sheikh Ali Hatim al-Assafi and others—came to realize they 
would “awake” on their own and rise against AQI, subsequently issuing a public 
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declaration of war on AQI on September 17, 2006.226  To add further credibility to the 
movement, in attendance that day were the local U.S. commander, and the Iraqi media.   
Broadcast on Al-Iraqiyah television, one sheikh’s offered this stern ultimatum to 
AQI— 
We all say to the terrorists, leave because you do not have a place in Al-
Anbar Governorate after now. We have discovered where you get 
financed from and who orders you to kill our Iraqi cousins. Leave now or 
you will be killed in an ugly way. We are determined to fight you face to 
face. God is great.227 
Following their declaration of war against AQI, the sheikhs formed the Anbar Salvation 
Council (ASC), a tribal/political group intended to implement their declaration.  Sheikh 
Ali Hatim al-Assafi describes the development and vision of the ASC: 
The Awakening [sahwa] was basically a conference, and we decided, 
okay, after this conference, what is it we’re going to do? What is the end 
result of this? So the end result was the Anbar Salvation Council.  I’m 
going to speak frankly. The Anbar Salvation Council was to be in the 
forefront in the fight against al-Qaeda, and to lead Anbar Province, and to 
have people from that council appointed to the governorship, and to lead 
the government.228  
The sheikhs immediately followed their open declaration with both political and military 
action.  On September 27, the sheikhs held an initial meeting with Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki and further meetings with Maliki and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in 
October on the issue of replacing Anbar’s provincial government with the ASC.229   
Each tribe was left on their own to decide how to implement this mass revolt 
against AQI within their tribal areas.  “Each tribe knew who was a terrorist, so he was 
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either killed, given to the government, to the police, banished, whatever,” notes Sheikh 
Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim, one of the founding members of the ASC.230  Anbari tribes 
began to form tribal organizations to provide local security and began to hunt down AQI 
in their neighborhoods.  The establishment of the ASC elicited AQI to declare the tribes 
heretics, and soon open fighting emerged between the two groups.231   
In Western eyes, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was widely recognized as the 
prime catalyst for change.  However, he was a lower level tribal sheikh, who whose 
primary activities dealt with smuggling and banditry.232  Not the first choice to lead the 
Awakening, Sattar’s utility to other Anbari tribes in the Awakening movement lay in the 
fact that as a “gangster,” he was used to a life of violence and could be an effective leader 
in the fight against AQI, precluding other more politically savvy sheikhs from having to 
dirty their hands.233  As the front man for the Awakening, his declaration of war against 
AQI on 14 September 2006 “touched a responsive nerve among the population and 
legitimized a hundred bottom-up partnerships among local leaders (Iraqi battalion 
commanders, police chiefs, and tribal leaders) and U.S. commanders at battalion level 
and below.”234  
4.  Grasping for Straws: The Islamic State of Iraq 
Sensing the need to achieve even more legitimacy, AQI and the MSC formed the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) on October 15, 2006, in an attempt to place an Iraqi face onto 
the transnational Jihadi Salafist movement.  Geographically, the ISI incorporated the 
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Sunni-dominated provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, Ninewah, Babil 
and Wasit. The ISI was ostensibly formed “to unite the Sunni jihad fighters and prevent 
civil war among them, so that Allah's word would reign supreme.”235  Politically and 
militarily, the ISI was alleged to have “the joint support of a host of new tribal partners 
and mujahideen factions, including the Al-Fatihin Army.”236  In an effort to combat the 
ASC, the ISI declared Ramadi as its capital. 
This latest step in the evolution of Jihadi-Salafism in Iraq went beyond previous 
innovations, converting the organization from one whose purpose was to integrate 
various insurgent military efforts to one whose sole purpose was to establish political 
control over the Sunnis.  Brian Fishman notes that this radical move by AQI can be 
attributed to two factors—an attempt to gain further control over the Sunni insurgency 
and an interpretation of current events.237  While the MSC had been a failure in its efforts 
to unite the Sunni insurgency, the establishment of an Islamic state would allow them to 
legitimately destroy those institutions who rejected its rule under the principle of takfir, 
as “rebellion against true Islamic rule is generally prohibited among Muslims.”238  
In the run up to the 2006 U.S. Congressional elections, it appeared to observers 
both inside and outside of Iraq that the U.S. could suddenly pull out of Iraq.  Based on the 
Jihadi-Salafist experience in Afghanistan, where chaos ensued amongst the mujahideen 
after the Soviet withdrawal, it appears that AQI was attempting to establish the necessary 
political infrastructure to capitalize on the ensuing chaos following a U.S. withdrawal.  
Interestingly, one of the policy options gaining clout at the time was the division of Iraq 
into three relatively autonomous regions based on ethno-sectarian lines.  By proclaiming 
the existence of the ISI, AQI made the public claim that it would rule the Sunni region.  
But, as one analyst notes, “the AQI leadership appears to have misunderstood the level of 
animosity felt by Iraqi Sunni Arabs towards any attempt to weaken the territorial integrity 
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of Iraq.”239  As evidenced earlier, the pull of Iraqi nationalism still weighed heavily on 
the Sunnis even after the removal of Saddam and the Ba’ath. 
Following its creation the ISI established a cabinet, with the previous MSC 
figurehead, Abu Abdallah Al-Rashid Al-Baghdadi as its leader, while Sheik Abu Mamza 
al-Muhajer, a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, remained the éminence grise of the organization.  
Other cabinet members included a prime minister and ministers for war, Sharia affairs, 
oil, security, information, health, public relations and even agriculture and fisheries.   
While the cabinet performed an executive function, the MSC was expanded and became 
the pseudo-legislature for the ISI.240   
On the surface, the ISI looked like a near copy of GoI’s current structure, but it 
differed in one fundamental respect.  As a self-proclaimed state, the ISI had no capability 
to actually govern.  Fishman notes that although “AQI claimed responsibility for political 
leadership over much of Iraq, but had neither the will nor the capability to actually 
provide for the population’s basic needs [emphasis added].”241 The failure to use actions 
to back up their words further contributed to the hemorrhaging of AQI’s legitimacy.  By 
being unable to establish a legitimation mechanism that produced a return of tangible 
benefits from the Sunni’s meager investment in the legitimacy of the transnational Jihadi 
Salafist cause, AQI alienated itself from the population and found itself on the outside 
looking in.  
As much as AQI believed that the ISI would take hold amongst the Sunni, it was 
rejected by the Sunnis out of hand, as it continued policies of exclusion that had long 
been a hallmark of AQI.  What soon followed was a war of communiqués, as both the ISI 
and indigenous Sunni insurgents began utilizing propaganda to condemn each other.242  
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AQI’s vitriolic propaganda attacks and statements about the local irredentist insurgent 
groups exposed the group’s hubris and arrogance.  If the average Sunni noted AQI’s 
arrogance when it came to imposing their own self-styled version of Sharia, the attacks 
against other Sunni insurgent groups further revealed the group’s true nature by attacking 
what many Sunnis considered legitimate. 
5. The Spread of the Sahwa 
Unlike previous uprisings against AQI, the Ramadi-based Sahwa movement held 
fast.  Buoyed by its effectiveness in rooting out AQI in Anbar and the proclamation of the 
ISI, the movement spread like wildfire throughout Sunni-held areas.  The Sunni split with 
AQI moved eastward across Iraq from homogenous Sunni areas in Anbar to the more 
mixed Sunni-Shi’a provinces of Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din as word spread of the 
Anbari’s success.  This diffusion is evident based on an analysis of significant activities 
(SIGACTS)243 captured by the U.S.-led coalition and represented in Figure 3.  Violence 
dropped off first in al Anbar in 2006–2007, followed by Diyala, Salah ad Din, and 
Baghdad in 2007–2008, with Ninewah seeing only a minor decrease in activity over 
2007–2008.244   
 
 
243 SIGACTs are violent actions which include IED attacks, small arms fire incidents, assassinations, 
bombings, vehicle borne IED attacks, suicide attacks, indirect fire attacks, ambushes and kidnappings.  The 
data is entered into a database based on location, time and date. 
244 This is likely due to a number of reasons.  First, al Anbar is predominantly Sunni and sectarian 
violence incited by the Shi’a against Sunnis would have led to Sunni-led reprisals taking place outside of al 
Anbar.  Second, the mixed Sunni-Shi’a provinces of Diyala and Baghdad decreased as Awakening-style 
movements spread into those provinces over the latter half of 2007, with Salah ad Din following suit over 
the same time.  Ninewah’s slight decrease in activity reflects the fact that Sunni insurgents fled Baghdad 
for Ninewah as Surge forces inundated Baghdad with their presence.    
 Figure 3.   SIGACTs by Province, 2004–2008.245 
Within the Sunni insurgency, the break between AQI and the tribal leaders was 
imitated by indigenous Sunni insurgent groups.  The propaganda war between AQI and 
the IAI soon exploded into public hostility, and on May 2, 2007, the IAI founded the 
Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF) to serve as an autochthonous counter to the foreign-
led ISI.  The RJF combined the IAI, the Mujahideen Army, a splinter group of Ansar Al 
Sunnah, and the Al-Fatihin Army.  This Iraqi Salafist conglomeration hoped to provide 
an indigenous umbrella group that would serve as an attractive ally to those Sunni 
insurgents who had become victimized by AQI’s brutality. 
Open fighting soon broke out between AQI and Sunni insurgent groups, 
contributing to 2007’s spike in SIGACTs in Baghdad, Diyala and Salah ad Din.  In the 
Sunni enclave of Ameriyah in Baghdad some of the most notable insurgent on insurgent 
activity took place between local elements of AQI and the IAI in May, precipitated by the 
kidnapping of two prominent local residents.  The level of animosity between the local 
IAI cell was so intense, they contacted the local U.S. unit to ask them to stay out of the 
way of their fight with AQI.246  Over the next few days, U.S. forces began collaborating 
with the IAI insurgents—now renamed the Baghdad Patriots—against the local AQI 
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forces.  The Baghdad Patriots were soon reinforced with members of the 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigades, who had recently turned on AQI.247 
As the Sahwa movement moved to Diyala and Salah ad Din provinces, the same 
sequence of events was repeated.  In June 2007, elements of the IAI and the 1920th 
Revolutionary Brigades had begun working with U.S. forces to clear out AQI fighters in 
Baqubah, the provincial capital of Diyala.248   In June 2007 in Tikrit, 130 tribal sheiks 
formed their own Sahwa council, working together to create police unit to protect the 
population against AQI.249  North of Balad, an AQI insurgent named Abu Tariq wrote in 
his diary on October 15, 2007, about the deleterious effects of the popular revolt of local 
tribes— 
There were almost 600 fighters in our Sector before the tribes changed 
course 360 degrees under the influence of the so-called Islamic Army 
(Deserter of Jihad) and other known believer groups.  Many of our fighters 
quit and some of the m joined the deserters…but things started getting 
worse ever since, and as a result of that the number of fighters dropped 
down to 20 or less…250 
In the wake of these combined actions between the newly formed allies of former 
insurgents and U.S. forces against AQI, local Sunni militia groups were formed to 
provide local indigenous security to prevent the return of AQI.  Throughout the summer 
of 2007, these local Neighborhood Watches and Concerned Local Citizens programs in 
Diyala were wedded with similar programs in Babil and Baghdad provinces and became 
formalized as the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program—a grass-roots local security force designed 
to foster security in Sunni-controlled areas.  By August 2008, there were approximately 
94,000 SOI on Coalition payrolls, with the intent to transfer the program to the Iraqi 
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government.  Under the GoI plan, 20% of these SOI would be transferred into the Iraqi 
Security forces (ISF) and with the remainder given some form of public or private 
employment.251  As tribal engagement grew in its effectiveness from the bottom-up, 
higher headquarters wanted to capitalize on the success.  Small reconciliation cells were 
created by Multi-National Corps–Iraq and its subordinate divisions during 2007 “to 
manage tribal engagement efforts and recruit tribal members into local provisional police 
and the Iraqi security forces.”252   
C. CONCLUSION 
If the discrediting of the Ba’athist backed secular nationalist current of the Sunni 
insurgency in 2003–04 can be considered the first split in the Sunni insurgency, then the 
split between the transnationalist Jihadi Salafis and the mainstream insurgency must be 
viewed as the second split.  As a result of this divorce, the population became liberated 
from the grip of the insurgency, repelled by the horrific violence imposed by AQI.  The 
balance, which seemed so unpromising to the GoI and the U.S.-led coalition in 2004, had 
swung the opposite way, when the Sunni population and the transnational Jihadi Salafists 
split over gross ideological and cultural disparities.  With the establishment of the ASC in 
Anbar in late 2006 and early 2007 and the spread of the Sahwa movement in 2007, we 
see the move of the Sunni population towards the state and away from the insurgent.  
Figure 4 depicts this shift utilizing elements of McCormick’s diamond model. 
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 Figure 4.   Insurgent/Population Alignment, 2006–2007.253 
What was most damaging for AQI was their lack of cultural alignment with Iraq’s 
Sunnis.  Analyzing the decline of the ISI, the author of a “lessons learned” document 
notes that one of the key problems that the ISI faced was that it faced an uphill battle 
against a number of Iraqi socio-cultural factors.254  First, the foreign fighters didn’t speak 
the Iraqi dialect of Arabic.255  This contributed to the divide by highlighting the presence 
of foreigners in the insurgency.  Non-local speakers were easy to point out by coalition 
interpreters once captured, thus becoming a liability to local Sunni insurgents.  Secondly, 
the foreign fighters had a poor knowledge of Western Iraq.  “The mujahid doesn’t know 
the cities’ entrances and exits,” and “al-mujahid’s lack of knowledge about Iraq, the Iraqi 
people and how to behave will obviously undermine him,” the author notes.256  The lack 
of familiarization with Iraqi culture often resulted in the rejection of the use of foreign 
fighters and to their subsequent sequestering in non-residential areas as a measure to keep 
the infrastructure of the Sunni insurgency from detection by government and U.S. 
security forces. 
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Compounding the cultural differences between AQI and the Sunnis was the gross 
lack of correspondence between the ideologies of the Sunni population and AQI.  “Most 
[of the mainstream insurgents and the tribes] were not interested in pursuing AQM’s [al 
Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI)] grandiose goal of a theocracy or caliphate,” notes 
Hashim.257  Long further emphasizes the point: “al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia’s 
transnational and fundamentalist goals were at odds with the local or national goals of the 
tribes.”258  Examining the ideological division between the Sunni nationalist 
Islamists/Iraqi Salafists and the transnational Jihadi Salafists, in another captured 
document an ISI member notes that the “one of the most dangerous things facing the 
Islamic State is the other Jihadi squads that are following a false path. Their leadership 
instigates the laymen against the soldiers and the leadership and also the curriculum of 
our State.”259  He further urges the recipient to kill the leaders of these groups, “due to 
their spreading into other areas with the support of the crusader,” and to do it quietly as 
not arouse a backlash by the mainstream insurgency.260   
Besides a lack of familiarity with the mainstream insurgency, AQI and the ISI 
failed to understand the prominent role of tribal structures and authority in Iraqi society.  
By attempting to subsume the tribal authority structures of Iraq’s Sunnis, AQI and the ISI 
contributed to their downfall by rejecting local centers of power.  As resurrected by 
Saddam Hussein in the years following the 1991 war, tribes were resurgent in Iraqi social 
life and occupied positions of authority within society, which were viewed and accepted 
as legitimate by the Sunni population.  By attempting to actively displace the authority 
structure of the tribes by forced intermarriage and through the murder of tribal leaders, 
AQI showed no respect for the population they were trying to gain control of, decreasing 
the balance in their legitimacy bank with every action they did in an attempt to battle 
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hundreds of years of Sunni Iraqi tradition.  Additionally, AQI tried to displace the tribes 
from traditional forms of occupation and revenue, notably banditry and smuggling.261 
Before launching an insurgent campaign, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, leader and 
strategist of al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), admonishes the would-be 
insurgent to do his homework— 
The leadership must undertake an exhaustive study of the situation, of 
conditions, variables, and trends in the region, and then determine whether 
the time for action and to begin a successful guerilla war has arrived or 
not.  It is vital to examine all the issues very carefully….It is necessary —
this being the case—for the mujahidin to pay attention to all the details 
that could affect negatively the conduct of operations.262 
Zarqawi’s TWJ and its successor AQI, failed to heed al-Muqrin’s advice.  Their failure to 
conduct this ‘intelligence preparation of the battlefield’ began to cost them as early as 
2004.  Polling data indicates a schism between the religious-nationalist message of the 
former regime-based insurgency and that of Islamist groups such as AQI.  In a poll 
conducted by ABC News, 49% of Iraqi respondents desired a democratic form of 
governance as opposed to only 21% who desired an Islamic state, “where politicians rule 
according to religious principles.”263  Similarly, the same poll noted that only 14% 
surveyed desired politicians who were religious authorities.264  Although AQI and the 
Sunni religious nature might have converged to a degree, their views on the long-term 
goals of the insurgency were miles apart.  “In Iraqi tribal society,” notes David Kilcullen, 
“custom (aadat) is at least as important as religion (deen) and its dictates, often pre-
Islamic in origin, frequently differ from those of Islam.”265  
Examining the reasons behind the Sunni tribes’ change of heart, West remarks 
that— 
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[t]he Sunnis grudgingly concluded that Americans were not soft sugar 
cake and that the Shi’ite-dominated government could not be overthrown.  
It was better to join with the strongest tribe and cut a deal with Baghdad 
than remain under the control of the murderous Al-Qaeda with its vision 
of returning to a 9th-century caliphate.266 
It was as if Sunnis in Iraq were tired of being caught in the crossfire between the coalition 
and AQI and finally had enough.  All across Iraq, at roughly the same point in time, 
Iraqis finally grew weary of having their doors kicked in by coalition forces, looking for 
the al Qaeda operative living next door.  Iraqis became tired of sending their children to 
school every day in fear they would never return because of a suicide bomber on the bus.  
In essence, Iraqis subconsciously utilized McCormick and Giordano’s formula of 
expectations and determined that the future costs and benefits of aligning with the 
government were better than those of the present costs and the expected benefits of 
aligning with AQI, thus moving the second star in line with the first. 
Although the indigenous Sahwa movement was a crucial event in contributing to 
the demise of AQI, it cannot stand alone by itself in explaining the decline of violence.  
In order for the peace between the GoI and the Sunnis to last, it requires leadership from 
the highest levels of the GoI.  The Awakening was successful in reducing the animosity 
built up between the Sunnis and the Shi’a-led GoI so that “the possibility of developing a 
future sense of unified community [was] enhanced.”267  The Sunnis always saw 
themselves as Iraqis, never believing in the notion that Iraq could only succeed by 
devolving into ethnicity-based regions under loose federal control.  By “awakening” to 
political reconciliation—long thought of as anathema to AQI and its local Islamist 
supporters—the Sunni Awakening served to provide recognizance to the GoI that the 
Sunnis were truly rejecting AQI to the fullest.  As this evolution happened, AQI’s 
influence began to wane.  While this decline started out slowly, U.S. actions in 2007 
combined to transform this decline from a growing trickle to a torrent.  Additional factors 
served to accelerate the decline of AQI and it is to those factors that we now turn. 
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IV. THE ACCELERANTS 
While the initial splits between AQI and the Sunnis served to mark the beginning 
of AQI’s demise, a number of factors served to act as levers widening the gap between 
AQI and the Sunni.  As these levers were applied, AQI’s decline accelerated over 2007.  
For the practitioner, it is important to note that the majority of these accelerants did not 
originate in 2007.  Rather they were the result of efforts undertaken by the U.S. and the 
Government of Iraq (GoI) as early as the summer of 2003.  These accelerants—such as 
the adaptation of the U.S. military to counterinsurgency operations and the increasing 
capability of the Iraqi government—took time for their effects to build to a level that 
presented itself in the causal chain of events.  Like a farmer’s crop, these accelerants bore 
fruit after being sown and tended for months and, in some cases, years.  In contrast, other 
accelerants—changes in strategy and leadership, the surge, and the Shi’a cease-fire—
were applied in the near-term to a situation already retreating from the abyss, quickly 
demonstrating their effects.  This chapter examines these factors and seeks to describe the 
magnitude of the effect each had in the decline of AQI.  
A. INCREASED IRAQI GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY 
Early in the Iraq War, the government of Iraq (GoI) lacked any shred of capacity 
or legitimacy.  Forecasts regarding its ability to assume the functions of state looked 
bleak following the year-long reign of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  Early 
forms of indigenous government institutions lacked legitimacy primarily because they 
were comprised largely of exiles, rather than Iraqis who were more autochthonous. In 
2003, one Iraqi said, “we want someone who suffered with us, who went hungry with us, 
who lived with use, who ate from the same plate as us.  This is what we lived through.  
Not someone who lived abroad for forty years, who wants to rule us and comes saying ‘I 
will rule you.’”268  This government of outsiders, when coupled with the ascension of the 
Shi’a, soon became a mechanism to settle old scores.  David Kilcullen notes that by 
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2005–06, “the [Iraqi] government was a sectarian combatant in the civil war [against the 
Sunnis]…not a politically neutral “honest broker” that governed in the interests of all 
Iraqis.”269   
In spite of these early setbacks, the ability of the Iraqi government to provide 
governance has increased dramatically since that time.  By late 2006, the GoI had 
stabilized, enabling it to focus on governing Iraq and ending the insurgency.  This 
transition from a team of quislings under Bremer to a relatively sovereign government 
offered the Sunnis an alternative to rule by AQI in a fundamentalist Islamic “state.”  
Although not a completely pristine state, free of corruption and sectarianism in a Western 
fashion, the marginal changes brought about by the Maliki government in 2006 increased 
the government’s ability to attract the Sunni rank and file.  This ability to attract the 
Sunnis can be attributed to increased governmental stability, increased Iraqi sovereignty, 
and the growing capacity of the Iraqi security forces. 
Governmental stability increased sharply after the installation of Iraq’s first 
permanent post-Saddam government in May 2006 following the December 2005 
parliamentary elections.  Prior to this, the GoI (in the form of the Interim Iraqi 
Government) was essentially a caretaker apparatus, charged with keeping things stable 
while the constitution was written ushering a new permanent government.  The period 
between the election and the formation of a government was one marked by a focus on 
political jockeying rather than governing.  In fact, it seems that the weak GoI response to 
the aftermath of the bombing of the Golden Dome mosque in Samarra in February 2006 
can be attributed to the focus on political maneuvering in Baghdad amongst Iraq’s 
political parties.   
Having been nominated as Prime Minister on April 21, 2006, Nouri al-Maliki 
“recognized that the country had been without an effective government for nearly five 
months since the elections and committed himself to forming a ‘national unity’ 
government within a three-week period.”270 Sworn into office on May 20, 2006, the GoI 
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was finally set into place after more than three years of effort.  Pressured by the U.S. to 
function as a working government, the GoI embarked under Prime Minister Maliki’s 
leadership in acting as the sovereign government of Iraq.   
One of the largest tasks facing Maliki was stemming the burgeoning sectarian and 
insurgent violence around the country.  In order to accomplish this, Maliki established a 
plan for national reconciliation as a way to bring insurgents into the political process.271  
This effort to reach out to the Sunni insurgency resonated with the Anbar Salvation 
Council.  According to Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman al-Assafi, the 
Heir Apparent to the Paramount Sheikh of the Dulaimi Tribal Confederation and a 
member of the Anbar Salvation Council, Maliki “did not look at himself as being Shiite. 
He stood with us, regardless of his sect.”272  Maliki’s stance was a far cry from earlier 
manifestations of post-Saddam Iraqi rule that had alienated the Sunnis, and it was noticed 
by the Anbaris, offering a viable alternative to AQI’s fundamentalist rule in Anbar.   
Iraqi sovereignty also increased with the installation of the Maliki government.  
With a permanent government in place in Baghdad, U.S.-led coalition could begin ceding 
aspects of sovereignty that it had maintained control over back to the central government.  
One of the key mechanisms for increasing Iraqi sovereignty was the transfer of provinces 
to the GoI.  The process of PIC (Provincial Iraqi Control) utilized four primary criteria to 
determine if a province was prepared to transition from coalition to Iraqi control: the 
threat level, the capabilities of Iraqi security forces to ensure security and local order, a 
provincial government capable of overseeing security operations, and Multi-National 
Forces–Iraq’s (MNF-I) ability to reinforce provincial security forces.273  As shown in 
Table 4, MNF-I began transitioning provinces to Iraqi control beginning in July 2006, 
with the southern Shi’a provinces, followed by the Kurdish provinces, leaving the restive 
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central provinces in coalition control until 2008.274   This gradual approach was designed 
to give the GoI greater control in a manner that they could handle, rather than 
transitioning every province at once. 
 
2006 2007 2008 
Muthanna Jul 06 Sulaymaniyah May 07 Qadisiyah Jul 08 
Dhi Qar Sep 06 Dahuk May 07 Anbar Sep 08 
Najaf Dec 06 Irbil May 07 Babil Oct 08 
Maysan Apr 07 Karbala Oct 07 Wasit Oct 08 
  Basra Dec 07   
Table 4.   Provinces under Government of Iraq Control, 2006–2008.275 
An example of Iraqi sovereignty being exercised after PIC is offered by the 
reaction to an attack on local police forces in the province of Najaf— 
When the local An Najaf police were unexpectedly fired upon, they 
assessed the situation to be beyond their means to control. The provincial 
governor then requested assistance from the National Command Center 
(NCC), which alerted and deployed additional units from outside the 
province. Once those units arrived, an additional call for support was sent. 
The NCC requested helicopter and airplane support from Coalition forces, 
which also sent a Quick Reaction Force to assist. The outcome was a 
decisive victory by the ISF.276 
This example of post-transfer security demonstrates the capability of the central Iraqi 
government to act on the behalf of local and provincial governments, ensuring Iraqi 
sovereignty is maintained prior to requesting coalition support. 
Finally, the growing capacity of the Iraqi security forces increased over time to a 
point where the Iraqi military could conduct its own operations at the tactical level with 
lesser American support.  The increase in Iraqi units in the lead for operations is indicated 
in Table 5.  In addition to growing tactical-level capability, governmental capability 
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increased at the strategic level as the GoI gained control over an increasing number of 
Iraqi Army units.  By February 2007, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command had assumed 
command and control over 6 of 10 Iraqi Army Divisions from the various Multi-National 
Divisions of MNC-I.277  Demonstrating this growing ability to control its forces, the 
MoD was able to successfully deploy five of seven battalions ordered to Baghdad in 
February 2007, in contrast to the previous August, when the MoD was unable to deploy 
military units to Baghdad to support Operation Together Forward.278 
 
 Oct. 2005 May 2006 Aug. 2006 Feb. 2007 
Division HQs 1 2 5 8 
Brigade HQs 4 14 25 31 
Battalion 23 57 85 93 
Table 5.   Iraqi Army Units in the Lead for Operations, 2005–2007.279 
Although the interaction between AQI and the Sunnis forced a separation, this did 
not automatically mean that the new Iraqi state had an irresistible attraction.  Since 2006, 
there were marginal increases in governmental legitimacy, as the GoI struggled to 
establish itself as a functioning government.  Increases in sovereignty and ability of 
security forces to act on behalf of the GoI to protect the population assisted in increasing 
the stature of the GoI in the eyes of the Sunni.  While still viewed as primarily Shi’a, by 
standing up and increasing its nationalist sentiment the GoI’s “Iraq for Iraqis” message 
resonated with the Sunnis.  Overall, the rising capability of the GoI to govern Iraq led to 
the Sunni accepting the olive branch put out by the central government, seeing it as a 
better alternative, even if Shi’a-led, than the caliphate offered by AQI. 
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B. POCKETS OF ADAPTATION: U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS IN IRAQ, 
2003–06 
The U.S. military came into the Iraq War ill-suited to conduct large-scale direct 
counterinsurgency operations with a host-nation partner.  Developed since the 1970s to 
conduct maneuver warfare on the Central European Plain and on NATO’s northern flank, 
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps had long embraced the principles of maneuver warfare 
as their core capability, developing personnel policies, budgeting, programming and 
development efforts to ensure the centrality of this method of warfare.  Although the U.S. 
military developed a “softer” side as a result of the Clinton-era forays into peace 
operations, the arrival of the Bush Administration heralded a return to using the military 
for conventional operations.  To accomplish this, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
pushed the Department of Defense (DoD) towards “transforming” the military’s 
capabilities to focus on “tak[ing] action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced 
from other areas, defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively while conducting an active 
defense of U.S. territory.”280 This effort, undertaken in the midst of waging the Global 
War on Terror, focused primarily on mitigating the costs (both political and fiscal) of 
boots-on-the-ground operations with informational and technological dominance.  Along 
with this came the promise that through information-age technology, the military would 
be able to “employ precise military means to create specific political ‘effects’,” writes 
David Ucko.281   
This trend towards conventional operations and leveraging information-age 
technology continued the preference for the U.S. military to prefer major combat 
operations rather than stability-type missions like peace keeping and counterinsurgency.  
In line with this preference, the U.S. military’s efforts to topple the Ba’ath regime were 
impeccable and showcased the capabilities of the U.S. military in major combat 
operations, toppling the regime in weeks.  However, with the rise of the Iraqi insurgency 
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over 2003–04, the U.S. military’s bias against stabilizing operations was exposed for the 
world to see, as evidenced by the failure to acknowledge the presence of an insurgency, 
instead preferring to note that “freedom's untidy”282 and that the activities in Iraq were 
merely perpetrated by “pockets of dead-enders.”283 
Amongst tactical units employed in the invasion, operations to counter the 
emerging insurgency reflected principles of overwhelming force necessary for the 
invasion.  Heavy-handed tactics were the order of the day in 2003–04 as units attempted 
to cope with rising casualties and a restive population in areas where the insurgency 
bloomed, most notably, in Sunni areas.  Units in the Sunni triangle conducted large scale 
cordon-and-sweep operations, a tactic that soon became “a staple of operations at the 
platoon, company, and battalion levels,” in the words of the U.S. Army’s official history 
of the time.284  These operations increased in both frequency and size over mid- to late-
2003, contributing to exacerbate the growing insurgency, as described in Chapter II, as 
units collected and detained males from their late-teens to their 50s and 60s.285  
Eventually through a process of trial-and-error— 
By early August, however, evidence emerged that these large-scale 
operations were in some ways counterproductive. Instead of generating 
widespread support for the capture of those connected to the Saddam 
regime, Coalition forces found that their tactics fostered resentment within 
segments of the Iraqi population, specifically among Sunni Arabs who 
were fearful of their future in Iraq after Saddam.286  
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The process of operational adaptation did not remain confined to units in Iraq.  As 
the war continued on and DoD scheduled units to redeploy to Iraq for a second tour, 
some in the military saw that counterinsurgency operations in Iraq would be the new 
norm for the short-term, requiring a fresh approach than those utilized on previous 
tours.287   
Unfortunately, there was no official guidance to draw from.  In early 2004, the 
most current official guidance on counterinsurgency was published in 1986 and reflected 
the particulars of counter-guerilla operations under the doctrine of AirLand Battle, a 
doctrine that had been replaced with full-dimension operations in 1993 and full-spectrum 
operations in 2001.288   
This lack of applicable guidance led to certain units improvising on the ground.  
Facing the future of repeated tours to Iraq, career soldiers understood that they had to get 
it right, or be faced with spending a lifetime in Iraq.  Rather than being a wide spread 
phenomenon that effected all units equally, pockets of adaptation existed within the U.S. 
Army and Marine Corps units in Iraq, as each unit grappled with the problem of 
conducting effective counterinsurgency operations with a force built largely for major 
 
287 Thomas Ricks documents this process of self-reflection in Fiasco.  “There was also a quiet and 
uncomfortable awareness that the U.S. military had committed several errors in 2003-04,” he writes. In 
stark contrast to the previous years, by 2005, “the U.S. effort was characterized by a more careful, 
purposeful style.”  Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2006), 414–416. 
288 Although the doctrinal framework offered in FM 90-8 was formulated under the overarching 
concept of AirLand Battle, the manual does offer advice for military units conducting counterinsurgency 
operations, pointing out that tactical intelligence is the key factor in defeating the guerilla, and that the 
military commander must ensure that “only the minimal firepower needed to accomplish a given mission is 
employed.”  Where FM 90-8 falls short is that it only focuses on the military component of 
counterinsurgency, reflecting the Zeitgeist of its writing when the DoD assumed that civilian agencies 
would be in the lead for COIN campaigns as its recent experience in El Salvador had shown.  United States. 
Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 90-8, Counterguerilla Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1986), 3–8. 
 105
                                                
conventional operations.289   Despite the lack of official guidance, units and individuals 
had a wealth of experience to draw on, ranging from previous tours in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to reminiscences from the stability operations in the 1990s under the Clinton 
administration. 
Two examples of tactical adaptation in Iraq that stand out are U.S. military efforts 
in Tal Afar in 2005 and Ramadi in 2006.  Although the case of Tal Afar has been widely 
touted as being the “gold standard,” tactical adaptation was widespread in Iraq as Russell 
notes.290   These two cases highlight the effect of the learning on the fly utilizing direct 
observations and past experience as guidelines in a situation without doctrinal guidance. 
In the spring of 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment returned to Iraq on their 
second deployment.  The regiment had served in Anbar under the 82nd Airborne Division 
on their first tour from April 2003 to May 2004 and was sent initially to South Baghdad 
and then to Ninewah province on their second tour.  Having been largely neglected by the 
Coalition, the Regiment’s history notes that the area “had become a highway for foreign 
fighters entering Iraq and moving into Mosul and down the Sunni Triangle towards 
Baghdad.”291  Under COL H.R. McMasters, the Regiment utilized a markedly different 
approach than that adopted on their first tour.  Prior to its deployment, the regiment under 
took a training scheme that focused on scenarios not too dissimilar than the Regiment 
 
289 Based on the case studies offered by Russell, it appears that while both the U.S. Army and Marine 
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utilized in training for its Bosnia deployment several years earlier.292  In September 
2005, the Regiment implemented a counterinsurgency plan that would soon become 
widely-known as “clear, hold, build.”  After clearing the city of insurgents, the 
Regiment’s approach utilized a number of aspects that would soon become standard: 
dialogue with local tribal leaders and key members of Tal Afar’s social network, the 
establishment of joint patrol bases around the city manned with U.S. and Iraqi forces, 
utilizing barriers to control the movement of the population and insurgents, and the use of 
targeted projects to rebuild
The experience of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division displays a similar case of 
tactical adaptation.  Having replaced 3rd ACR in Tal Afar, the Brigade served as a vector 
to spread the 3rd ACR’s best practices elsewhere in Iraq.  In June 2006, the Brigade was 
shifted to Ramadi in Anbar Province.  Having been deployed to Iraq in 2003–04, where it 
conducted operations in Southern Iraq, the unit’s pre-deployment training stressed the 
adoption of a variety of counterinsurgency tactics and procedures.294  Additionally, as a 
Germany-based unit, the Brigade’s senior non-commissioned officers had experience 
conducting stability operations in the Balkans.295  However, the transition with the 3rd 
ACR in Tal Afar in January 2006 as the 3rd ACR redeployed to the United States likely 
had the effect of showing how the “clear, hold, build” approach could succeed and were 
instrumental to the Brigade’s future success in Ramadi.  The four months spent in Tal 
Afar allowed the Brigade to “develop and refine various TTPs [tactics, techniques and 
procedures] that would be used in Ramadi…such as operating out of combat outposts, 
local leader engagement and community relations, and civil-military operations.”296  For 
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1/1 AD, their adaptation came at precisely the right moment in time.  These efforts 
bolstered Sunni confidence in their efforts against AQI operatives in their midst.  As 
mentioned in Chapter III, 1/1 AD’s new approach allowed them to offer a hand of 
assistance to the Anbar Salvation Council, allowing the Sahwa movement to take hold.   
Special operations forces assisted other Army and Marines Corps forces with 
acquiring population-centric counterinsurgency practices.  With their cultural knowledge 
and additional training in foreign internal defense, Special Operations Forces initially led 
this grass-roots strategy of tribal engagement in Iraq.297  Both the 3rd ACR and 1/1 AD 
benefited from this effort, as did other Army and Marine Corps units across Iraq.  As 
early as January 2004, the 5th Special Forces Group began conducting tribal engagement 
with the sheikhs of Anbar as an indirect economy-of-force approach to defeat Sunni 
insurgents in the province.  Through their persistent and diligent work, tribal engagement 
allowed SOF in Anbar to “creat[e] local security forces that could, with backup from U.S. 
and Iraqi forces, defend their local areas against AQI.”298   
Adaptation not only occurred at the tactical level as field commanders 
improvised, experimented and adapted, but at the strategic level as well.  In late 2005, 
MNF-I created the COIN Academy north of Baghdad at Camp Taji.  The COIN 
Academy was developed to change the way commanders in the field were conducting 
operations, in an effort to standardize practices and bring incoming units up to the level 
of success achieved by the 3rd ACR in Tal Afar.  General Casey commented that up until 
this point, “If a commander had it, the unit had it, but if the commander had it halfway, 
then the unit got it halfway.”299 Over a five day period of instruction, incoming brigade, 
battalion, and company commanders were steeped in classic counterinsurgency 
techniques and current practices in Iraq in an effort to imbue them with the knowledge on 
how to fight the insurgency in a manner markedly different than that conducted in 2003–
04.   
 
297 Searle, Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces, 63. 
298 Ibid., 65. 
299 George Casey as quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a 
New Mind-Set; Course in Iraq Stresses the Cultural, Challenges the Conventional," The Washington Post, 
sec. A, February 21, 2006. 
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Building off of pockets of successful counterinsurgency operations, this strategic-
level initiative in Iraq, contributed to a growing awareness—and hesitant acceptance—of 
COIN best practices across the country, as all officers heading to command in Iraq were 
required to attend the course.  However, because of the uneven rotation of units to and 
from theater, this initiative would take time for its effects to be felt on the battlefield.  A 
year after its founding, the vast majority of units would have been through the course, 
priming the situation for the convergence of the surge, new strategic leadership, and the 
creation and implementation of a holistic top-down counterinsurgency strategy.  The 
techniques developed and used in these pockets of adaptation would soon be de rigueur 
in 2007 with the implementation of an integrated and fully resourced counterinsurgency 
strategy grounded firmly in a fresh understanding of classical practices and codified in 
doctrine. 
This process of adaptation to the nuances of counterinsurgency operations 
occurred over months and years as U.S. forces came to grips with fighting an insurgency 
in Iraq.  One author notes that in early 2006 the military was not adapting quickly, 
indicating that only 20% of commanders in Iraq understood counterinsurgency 
operations, while the remaining 80%  were either struggling with the shift away from the 
conventional operations or still trying to fight the insurgency with a conventionally.300  
What is important for the matter at hand was the U.S. forces were able to change their 
earlier approach to the insurgency and evolve over time so that U.S. forces were able to 
accelerate the Sunni-AQI split in Anbar at the time when the Sunnis needed assistance to 
keep the schism open and prevent it from being closed as it had in previous attempts.   
C. REVISED COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY 
Going hand-in hand with the bottoms-up process of adaption was the top-down 
process of institutional change.  This process of institutional change proceeded at a 
slower pace than the process of adaptation in the field.  Further removed from daily 
operations, military institutions did not see the need to change as much as those units in 
 
300 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in 
Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 24–25. 
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the trenches.  Like tactical adaptation, strategic changes were implemented once there 
was motivation and recognition of a clear need for change.  Unfortunately for the United 
States, it took three years to recognize at the highest levels that there needed to be a 
change to the strategic approach in Iraq. 
Over the course of the war, U.S. and Coalition forces implemented a wide variety 
of strategies in Iraq to counter the insurgency.  The strategic guidance given to security 
forces ranged from a nonexistent strategy under Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez to 
an extremely integrated and robust counterinsurgency focus under General David 
Petraeus.  Under LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Combined Joint task Force 7 (CJTF-7) produced 
very little in terms of strategic guidance to subordinate commanders in regards to 
countering the insurgency.301  From mid-2004 until December 2006, the stated strategy 
of MNF-I302 could be summed up in the oft-repeated statement of President Bush during 
the time, “As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”303  As a result, U.S. forces began 
to focus on creating a capable Iraqi government and “[turning] over security to the Iraqi 
 
301 With no overarching plan to provide unity of effort, subordinates were left to apply methods and 
techniques as they saw fit, and the differences were stunning. In Mosul, the operations by the 101st 
Airborne Division were sensitive and nuanced, while in stark contrast, operations by the 4th Infantry 
Division were aggressive and fairly indiscriminant.  The 82nd Airborne’s operations in Anbar and the 1st 
Armored Division’s operations in Baghdad were somewhere in between.  Ricks notes that “the result was 
that each sector felt like a separate war, with different approaches and rules, showing a lack of coordination 
that runs against the repeated findings of theorists and practitioners of counterinsurgency.” Ricks, Fiasco: 
The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 226. 
302 Following the turnover of Iraq’s sovereignty from the CPA to the Interim Iraqi Government on 
June 28, 2004, CJTF-7 was elevated from a three-star command to a four-star field command and 
subsequently given the name of Multi-National Forces–Iraq.  As of January 1, 2010, MNF-I has been 
renamed U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) to denote the unilateral nature of the command.  This latest transition 
also merged three major commands, Multi-National Force–Iraq, Multi-National Corps –Iraq and Multi-
National Security Transition Command–Iraq to reflect the growing normalization of security relations 
between the United States and Iraq. 
303 George W. Bush, "President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror, June 28, 2005," The 
White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html 
(accessed February 20, 2009). 
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security forces as soon as possible.”304  This strategy was based on the belief held at the 
time by senior military officials that the U.S. presence was inflaming the insurgency.305 
While the services had limited impact on the overall strategic objectives of MNF-
I, in the United States, the military services were attempting to solve the dearth of 
counterinsurgency doctrine.   Following his command of the Multi-national Security 
transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), General Petraeus was assigned as the commander 
of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Armed with his 
experience as a division commander in Iraq and as the lead trainer of the Iraqi security 
forces, General Petraeus took on the challenge of updating the hastily produced interim 
field manual on counterinsurgency, FMI 3-07.22. The revised manual, FM 3–24, 
Counterinsurgency, was developed with the collaboration of not only the armed services, 
but also with the input of the interagency community and also civilian non-governmental 
organizations.306  By the summer of 2006, drafts of the manual were released to the field 
for comments, and in mid-December 2006, the manual was officially released as Army 
and Marine Corps doctrine.  Nearly four years into the war, the U.S. military began to 
formally understand that this war was different. 
The military’s efforts to update their counterinsurgency doctrine paralleled with 
the Administration’s development of a new strategy for Iraq.  Sensing that something was 
rotten in Baghdad, the administration began developing a secret strategy review 
 
304 Woodward, The War within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008, 130-1.  According to a 
Department of Defense report to Congress in mid-2005, “The development of the ISF to a level at which 
they can take over primary responsibility for their own security is the threshold condition.”  United States. 
Dept. of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress, July 2005 (Washington, 
D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2005), 11, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050721secstab.pdf 
(accessed March 4, 2009). 
305 Although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered that the U.S. would be conducting its efforts 
in Iraq with an eye toward clearing, holding and building, military efforts on the ground continued to 
operate under the transition strategy.  A staff officer in the 101st Airborne at the time reflected the thinking 
of the time—“We have to turn this over, let them do it their way.  We’re like a friggin’ organ transplant 
that’s been rejected.  We have to get the Iraqi Army to where they can hold their own in a friggin’ fire-fight 
with insurgents, and get the hell out.” Quoted in Packer, Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar, 49.   For 
the beliefs of senior military officers, see General Abizaid’s comments in Woodward, The War Within: A 
Secret White House History, 2006–2008, 5. 
306 For a detailed account of the development of FM 3-24, see Ricks, The Gamble: General David 
Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008, 394.; Robinson, Tell Me How this 
Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq 
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beginning in the summer of 2006.307   That fall, a number of reports emerged, all coming 
to the general consensus that only drastic action would prevent the failure of U.S. efforts 
in Iraq.  These reports came from a wide variety of military, legislative, and public 
venues. 
Commissioned in late September 2006 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Pentagon’s strategy review was to study U.S. strategy in Iraq and determine, 
“what decisions America must make in order to win ‘the long war.’”308  After a few 
months, this hand-picked group—which included Colonel H.R. McMasters of the 3rd 
ACR, and Colonel Pete Mansoor, who had helped to author FM 3–24—offered the 
assessment that the U.S. stood at a fork in the road and that it could either go big, go long 
or go home.309 
Wary of the statements coming from the White House, Iraq Study Group (ISG) 
was formed by Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia to “to bring 'fresh eyes' to our 
country's ongoing operations in Iraq, assess the efforts under way, and report to the 
American people…how to bring about success in Iraq…[and] explaining to the American 
public the ramifications of failure of our mission in Iraq.”310 After months of interviews 







307 The review was held in secret in order to prevent perceptions of the Bush administration’s 
dissatisfaction with the current status of the war from affecting the congressional elections in the fall of 
2006.  This sense of growing unease regarding the direction Iraq was heading and the efforts to change it 
are well documented by a number of authors, who also focus on a different perspective of the 
administration’s efforts to change course in Iraq, detailing the strategy review from a number of different 
perspectives.  For the perspective of the administration, see Woodward, The War Within.  For the 
perspective from the military in general and its senior officers, see Ricks, The Gamble, Robinson, Tell Me 
How This Ends, and West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, 488. 
308 Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008, 158–59. 
309 Ibid., 203–204. 
310 "Rep. Wolf Issues Statement on Creation of Bi-Partisan Iraq Study Group," US Fed News, March 
15, 2006. 
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combat forces from Iraq and to embed “substantially more U.S. military personnel in all 
Iraqi Army battalions and brigades…to accelerate the development of a real combat 
capability in Iraqi Army units.”311 
Likewise, in the search for a way out of a situation that was widely being 
compared to the “quagmire” of Vietnam, independent think tanks began developing 
options for the United States.  Most prominent of these was the American Enterprise 
Institute, where Fredrick Kagan assisted retired General Jack Keane in writing the report, 
“Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” which would operationalize a plan put 
forth by Kean to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that would surge ground troops into Iraq 
to stabilize the violence.312   
These reviews and the release of a new doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency 
all came to a head in late 2006, with President Bush making the final decision to shift 
U.S. strategy away from a policy of transition.  In his address to the nation on January 11, 
2007, President Bush noted that, “It is clear that we need to change our strategy in 
Iraq…So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to 
put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad.” President Bush 
further remarked that, “a successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations.”313  
As a part of President Bush’s “new way forward,” the transitional strategy was changed 
to one that reflected the principles embedded in FM 3-24.  A National Security Council 
document from the same month highlights the operational shifts of this new strategy; 
rather than focusing on transferring responsibility to Iraqis and paying little attention to 
the populace, the new strategy’s “primary mission is helping Iraqis provide security to the 
 
311 David E. Sanger, David S. Cloud and Michael R. Gordon, "Iraq Panel to Recommend Pullback of 
Combat Troops," The New York Times, sec. A, November 30, 2006; James A. Baker and others, The Iraq 
Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), http://media.usip.org/ 
reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2010). 
312 Frederick W. Kagan, Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 2006), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070111_ChoosingVictoryupdated.pdf (accessed 
March 13, 2009).  Keane’s meeting with Rumsfeld and the plan to surge ground forces is detailed in 
Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008, 130–38. 
313 George W. Bush, "President's Address to the Nation, January 11, 2007," The White House, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html (accessed July 22, 
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population.”314  With this strategy, the bottom-up efforts of the military to adapt to 
countering the Iraqi insurgency met with top-down approval.  For the first time, the U.S. 
strategy in Iraq was held together by a way of doing business that the Army and Marine 
Corps were willing to officially endorse. 
This strategy for the U.S.-led Coalition and the new doctrine on how to 
implement it assisted the decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency in a number of ways.  
First, the strategy showed the U.S. was serious and would follow the invasion through to 
its logical end—creating a viable, lasting state of Iraq.  By committing to a resource 
intensive population-centric counterinsurgency effort, the strategy corrected previous 
tactical and strategic gaffes made by the U.S.-led coalition in the years after the 2003 
invasion.   The new Presidential strategy and its inherent endorsement of the principles 
enshrined in FM 3-24 allowed senior commanders to develop a new strategic framework, 
which focused on partnering with Iraqis, rather than attempting to offload security 
responsibilities as fast as possible to the nascent Iraqi security forces.   
Second, the new strategy served to officially endorse approaches undertaken by 
the minority of tactical commanders in the field in previous years that had chosen to 
break with the kinetic-focus of military operations.  Incorporating techniques developed 
and validated by commanders in pockets of adaptation around Iraq, the “new way 
forward” mandated the application of these efforts across the country in 2007.  
Additionally, the doctrine reinforced the notion that commanders had to operate 
differently in each sector to account for the particulars of the population.  
D. STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP CHANGES, 2007 
Operating hand-in-hand with the revised strategy in Iraq was the changes 
implemented in leadership at the operational, regional, and strategic levels.  Convinced 
that the new strategy could not be implemented by those committed to the older transition 
strategy, the Bush administration launched an effort to remove the existing commanders 
 
314 United States. National Security Council., Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review: Summary 
Briefing Slides (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2007), Slide 10, http://georgewbush-whitehouse. 
archives.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf (accessed February 20, 2010). 
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and governmental officials who led the earlier transition effort.  In near simultaneous 
announcements, the leadership of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I and U.S. Central 
Command were all changed in an effort by the administration to reverse what it perceived 
as a failing effort at stabilizing Iraq.  Following months after the post-election ascension 
of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense, the Bush administration signaled a clean break 
with past practices in Iraq. 
Generals Abizaid and Casey, who felt that the U.S. presence in Iraq was 
exacerbating the insurgency, were replaced by Admiral William J. Fallon and General 
David Petraeus, respectively, indicating the administration’s complete commitment to its 
“new way forward.”  In addition to changing the military leadership in Iraq and the 
Middle East region, the Bush administration changed its governmental representation in 
Baghdad, replacing administration insider Zalmay Khalilzad with Ryan Crocker, a 
veteran State Department foreign service officer and one of the “State Department's most 
respected voices in the Middle East.”315 Commenting on the overhaul of leaders, one 
administration official noted that “the idea is to put the whole new team in at roughly the 
same time, and send some clear messages that we are trying a new approach.”316 
One of the key objectives of this effort at emplacing the right politico-military 
team in Baghdad was to remove much of the enmity that had been long present between 
the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the MNF-I headquarters, replacing it with a greater 
level of unity of effort across the U.S. governmental agencies operating in Iraq.  Previous 
politico-military interactions in Baghdad between ambassadors and generals had been 




315 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Bush is Expected to Shift U.S. Ambassador in Iraq to U.N." The New York 
Times, sec. A, January 5, 2007. 
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Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.317  By replacing the driver and 
the map, it was hoped that the destination would change from one of utter chaos to one of 
acceptable success.   
The intent behind such massive leadership changes was to achieve an effect much 
akin to Spanish football club Real Madrid’s Galácticos (superstars).  In 2000, Real 
Madrid embarked on a policy to buy the best players in the world in an attempt to make 
the club the world’s top club.318  Considered risky at the time, Real Madrid continued 
this policy for the next seven years, going on to win not only the Spanish domestic league 
title twice, but also the European title.   
Likewise, the leadership team of Crocker, Petraeus and Odierno in Iraq and Gates 
in Washington, D.C., provided the best integration of politico-military strategy seen in 
the Iraq War.  What was remarkably different between this group of leaders and previous 
cohorts was the level of personal familiarity and shared experiences amongst them.  
Testifying in the United Kingdom’s Iraq Inquiry, Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb, 
the deputy MNF-I commander in 2006-07, noted the symbiotic effect of the near 
simultaneous installation of strategic and operational leadership at MNF-I and MNC-I— 
There was a show again for the command of 2003. So it was Petraeus, 
Odierno, Martin Dempsey and myself all back in town. So there was a 
depth of experience that— and trust, which is not—which is not given. It 
can't be taken, it can only be given, a relationship of trust which I sensed 
would bear well, and it did, in what was going to be challenging times.319 
Similarly, Ambassador Crocker’s comments on the Petraeus-Odierno relationship reflect 
the amicable nature of the strategic-operational partnership between the two: 
 
317 For more on this relationship see L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The 
Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Ricardo S. Sanchez and Don T. 
Phillips, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008); and Ricks, Fiasco: The 
American Military Adventure in Iraq. 
318 Ironically, the end result was similar.  While the leadership team of Crocker, Petraeus and Odierno 
in Iraq and Gates in Washington, D.C., provided the best integration of politico-military strategy seen in the 
Iraq War, Real Madrid went on to win not only the Spanish domestic league title twice, but also the 
European title." The Galácticos Era," http://www.madridgalacticos.com/the-galacticos-era/ (accessed 
February 25, 2010). 
319 Graeme Lamb, "Testimony to Chilcott Inquiry, December 9, 2009," Iraq Inquiry, http:// 
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/41885/20091209pmlamb-final.pdf (accessed December 15, 2009). 
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I have noticed when we are doing a campaign review or something like 
that the quality relationship between the two is such that [Lieutenant 
General] Ray [Odierno] has no hesitation saying “Let me give you a 
different take on that,” and [General] Dave [Petraeus] has no problem 
saying, “Good point.”320 
Like the officers and soldiers at the tactical levels, who were able to adapt over 
time to the nuances of countering the Iraqi insurgency, the leadership team appointed to 
oversee Bush’s “new way forward,” also had a wide swath of experiences that  they too 
brought to the table.  The period of reflection in the dark days of the Iraqi War allowed 
them to mull over the strengths and weaknesses of approaches undertaken in the early 
years of the war, a luxury not afforded to the team of Casey and Khalilzad, who were 
often in the middle of complex issues on a daily basis.  The time offered to the 
counterinsurgency Galácticos was not wasted.  The reflection increased the resolve of 
these commanders to get it right, as this would likely be the United States’ last chance at 
achieving an acceptable level of stability in Iraq, now that the November congressional 
elections indicated the waning of popular support for the war. 
Having literally written the book on the subject, the counterinsurgency Galácticos 
had already mapped out their intentions to restore unity of effort in Iraq as a means of 
implementing the new strategy.  Having observed previous mistakes in Iraq, the 
counterinsurgency Galácticos strove to make unity of effort present at every level of this 
new counterinsurgency campaign.  Keeping in mind FM 3-24’s advice that, “the U.S. 
Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN [host nation]  representatives, must 
be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the 
chain of command,”321 giving Crocker equal say in the campaign plan for Iraq.322  
Additionally, Petraeus and Crocker attempted to make the maxim of unity of effort stick 
by placing their offices in the Republican Palace next to each other, intending to “foster 
coordination and communication between the top military and civilian officials in 
 
320 Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–
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321 United States. Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 1–22. 
322 Robinson, Tell Me How this Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, 
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Iraq.”323  This relationship even caused Crocker to intervene in the construction process 
of the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad to redesign the ambassador’s suite to maintain the 
relationship and foster political-military cooperation between future commanders and 
ambassadors.324 
The overall effect of these efforts to change the military leadership was that it 
assisted in changing the direction of the Iraq War by establishing a command team for the 
war that not only had a better handle on counterinsurgency than their predecessors, had 
greater familiarity and personal trust amongst each other, but also reinforced the principle 
of unity of effort, often found lacking in earlier years of the insurgency. 
E. THE “SURGE”: INCREASED GROUND FORCES AROUND BAGHDAD 
The primary hallmark of the Bush administration’s “new way forward” was that it 
provided additional resources in terms of personnel and material to MNF-I to implement 
its population-centric counterinsurgency plan.   When combined with a revised concept 
of operations rooted in a common doctrine and directed by a unified politico-military 
team, the additional resources offered by the “surge brigades” were able to convince the 
Iraqi population in and around Baghdad that the U.S. was committed to the Government 
of Iraq.  However, despite the temporal speed implicit in the term “surge,” the effect of 
increased troop strength manifested itself slowly. In actuality, troop strength in Iraq 
gradually increased over a 5-month period, rather than acting as a bolus of security 
forces.  The first troops earmarked as “surge brigades” began arriving in Iraq in late 
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Brigade Arrival Date Employment Location 
2/82 ABN Jan. 07 Baghdad 
4/1 ID Feb. 07 Baghdad 
3/3 ID Mar. 07 Southern Baghdad 
4/2 ID (SBCT) Apr. 07 Diyala 
2/3 ID May 07 Southeast Baghdad 
Table 6.   Iraq Surge Brigades.325 
The 30,000 soldiers and marines that made up the surge gave the operational 
warfighting command, MNC-I, the capability to properly allocate forces to conditions on 
the ground. The increased density of forces in a given area allowed commanders to have 
smaller, more manageable sectors than they had previously been responsible for, 
allowing them to focus on areas and lines of operations they were unable to previously do 
because of a lack of manpower.   
As a part of the new counterinsurgency strategy, Iraqi and coalition security 
forces interacted more with the population, using the best practices of their predecessors, 
which had been enshrined in FM 3-24.  By increasing the “surface area” of forces by 
moving off of major bases and dispersing themselves amongst the population in Joint 
Security Stations (JSS) more enemy contact would occur as more opportunities for attack 
by insurgents would occur.  The disposition of U.S. ground units in 2007 is depicted in 
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Figure 5.   Disposition of U.S. Units in Baghdad, 2007.326 
The focus on Baghdad was based on the levels of sectarian fighting that occurred 
there in 2006 and also as a means to counter AQI’s strategy to isolate the capital through 
the use of various “belts.”327  The remaining two brigades and two Marine Corps 
battalions were deployed to the outskirts of Baghdad.  By controlling the routes in and 
out of the city, the hope was to stem the flow of “accelerants”—military equipment, 
fighters, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED)—into Baghdad where 
they were used to support AQI’s operations in the capital to disrupt U.S. and Iraqi efforts.  
The disposition of U.S. units in the areas around Baghdad before and during the surge is 
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Figure 6.   Disposition of U.S. Units Around Baghdad, 2007.328 
As the final brigades arrived, MNC-I embarked on a number of clearing 
operations to remove AQI fighters from the population.  Operation Fardh al-Qanoon 
(Restoring the Law) took up where Operation Together Forward—the failed effort to 
stem the violence in 2006—left off.  Beginning in February 2007, the operation utilized 
the concept of “clear, control, and retain” and focused on maintaining a long-term 
security presence in cleared neighborhoods.  To that end, it incorporated a number of 
features from the recently adopted FM 3-24, and utilized techniques developed and 
successfully employed earlier in Tal Afar and Ramadi including combat outposts, joint 
security stations, forcing Iraqi and U.S. security forces to get out amongst the population 
to ensure stability. 
On the outskirts of Baghdad, MNC-I launched Operation Phantom Thunder in 
June 2007 to disrupt AQI bases and staging areas in the belts around Baghdad.  This 
                                                 
328 "Disposition of U.S. Brigades in Iraq before the Surge - January 2007," Institute for the Study of 
War, http://www.understandingwar.org/map/disposition-u-s-brigades-iraq-surge-january-2007 (accessed 
February 18, 2010); "Disposition of U.S. Brigades in Iraq - June 2007," Institute for the Study of War, 




                                                
corps-level offensive had its subordinate divisions conducting simultaneous operations in 
Baqubah, in Arab Jabour, south of Baghdad; and in the area between Baghdad, Lake Thar 
Thar and Fallujah, and area previously neglected by Coalition forces.  Following 
Phantom Thunder, MNC-I launched Operation Phantom Strike, an Iraq-wide series of 
operations designed to capitalize on the success of Phantom Thunder and pursue 
remaining insurgents, who were on the run following their expulsion from the sanctuaries 
around Baghdad.  Beginning in August 2007, Phantom Strike utilized “quick strike raids 
against remaining extremist sanctuaries and staging areas…precision targeting operations 
against extremist leadership and…missions to counter the extremists' lethal accelerants of 
choice, the IED and the vehicle-borne IED.”329  The geographical and temporal 
dimensions of Operations Phantom Strike and Phantom Thunder are depicted in Figure 7. 
The 2007 troop increase has been widely touted as the primary factor in the 
decline of AQI and the Sunni insurgency.  But as this thesis has pointed out, there were 
numerous other factors that logically played a greater role when examined in toto.  The 
surge narrative falls apart in two major ways.  First, like a shot of Novocain, the surge 
only had a localized effect.  The deployment of 30,000 additional troops was 
concentrated in and around Baghdad.  Other areas of the country received no additional 
forces.  As the surge forces were only dedicated to Baghdad and the belts, the direct 
causal argument of the 2007 troop surge is extremely weak in affecting the insurgency in 
the entire country.  Other factors must explain the demise of AQI in Sunni strongholds of 
Salah ad Din, At Tamim, and Ninewah provinces, chief among these appear to be a 
revised counterinsurgency strategy and increased GoI capacity to conduct security 
operations.   
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Operations in Iraq from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington Va., August 17, 2007," Department of 
Defense, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4023 (accessed February 25, 
2010). 
 Figure 7.   Operations Phantom Strike and Phantom Thunder.330 
Secondly, the surge theory fails to account for the degree to which its success 
depended on the Awakening.  The ability to conduct effective operations in an insurgency 
requires a great deal of precise intelligence.  The incoming surge forces did not 
incorporate a greater deal of intelligence assets beyond that which was organic.  The 
success of Operations Fardh al-Qanoon, Phantom Strike and Phantom Thunder was 
largely due to the intelligence provided by local Sunnis and former insurgents.  The 
fidelity of knowing who was who in the insurgent universe was provided by the Sunnis 
who had previously been at odds with the Coalition and the GoI.   Without having this 
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level of granularity at the lowest level, these offensives would surely have pushed the 
population further away from the U.S. and the GoI. The success of MNC-I’s summer 
offensives would likely have been much less had they not been preceded by the rejection 
of AQI by the Sunni populace.  Without the Awakening, the offensives of 2007 would 
likely have been something like those seen earlier in the war. 
Despite this, the troop surge did have an effect on the decline of AQI.  First, the 
coalition was able to actually hold terrain after clearing in order to maintain security.  
Previous offensive operations had Coalition forces following AQI around Iraq, displacing 
the group and causing it to move elsewhere, only for Coalition forces to follow into new 
areas.  Low troop levels in 2003–2006 meant that MNC-I would have to leave only 
minimum forces in an area after it was cleared.  However, with a sustained increase in 
U.S. forces coupled with larger Iraqi Security Forces, MNC-I was able to conduct 
offensive operations to clear AQI from its sanctuaries and have enough U.S. and Iraqi 
troops to hold the area afterwards. Stemming from this ability to properly clear and hold 
terrain, a second way by which the troop increase contributed to the decline of AQI was 
that it offered enough troops to pursue AQI after it had been moved out of its areas of 
operation.  Unlike previous offenses in earlier years, the MNC-I operations of 2007 could 
not have been conducted without moving forces within the country, leaving areas 
unsecured and open for AQI to move into.    
F. JAISH AL-MAHDI CEASE-FIRE 
Although this thesis deals specifically with the Sunni insurgency, the Shi’a 
insurgency cannot be removed completely from the equation.  As intimated earlier, 
Zarqawi’s strategic plan to incite sectarian violence presupposed a massive retaliation by 
the Shi’a against the Sunni.  Thus, the unilateral cease-fire announced by Muqtadah al-
Sadr on August 29, 2007, which suspended the activities of his militia, Jaish al-Mahdi, 
must factor into any explanation regarding the reduction of violence in Baghdad and 
other provinces with a Shi’a population.   
The ceasefire was instituted by Sadr to strengthen his group externally and 
internally.  Externally, the ceasefire was established to prevent an intra-Shi’a civil war 
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between JAM and ISCI (the  (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, formerly known as 
SCIRI), which had culminated in heavy fighting between the two organizations in 
Karbala in the late August 2007 during the Shabaniyah festival that marked the birth of 
the twelfth Imam.  By deescalating first, Sadr was able to establish himself as an honest 
broker amongst the Shi’a, giving his movement a broader appeal, all the while casting 
ISCI as the antagonist.  Internally, the ceasefire acted as a test to see which JAM units 
remained loyal to him and which ones were splintering away from JAM.  Over the 
previous year, JAM had been increasingly implicated in acting as death squads, in spite 
of Sadr’s dictates to only focus JAM military activity against the U.S.-led coalition.  The 
cease fire allowed him to reassert his authority and deny membership to those who defied 
the order. 
But, while the decrease of overall violence is easily explained by incorporating 
this accelerating factor, the effect on AQI’s demise is more indirect.  From the Sunni 
perspective, the unilateral JAM ceasefire removed an immediate threat that had been 
harrying them in Baghdad and in other mixed Sunni-Shi’a provinces. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the Sunni feared JAM; “the Sunni population of Iraq almost 
universally blamed Muqtadah and the Mehdi Army for any sectarian attack on them,” 
notes journalist Patrick Cockburn.331   
In a sense, Zarqawi’s gambit to use anti-Shi’a violence to bring the Sunni into his 
camp worked.  As the civil war raged in Baghdad, Sunnis had grudgingly accepted AQI 
into their midst as a hedge against Shi’a death squads.  But, with the removal of the JAM 
threat from the balance of power equation needed for Sunni survival, more incentive was 
given to the Sunnis to rearrange the security arrangements that they had developed over 
the fast four and a half years.  In effect, Sadr’s ceasefire—and its later extension—
reversed the escalation of violence that had become common place in post-Saddam Iraq 
as identity was recast along sectarian lines.  For those Sunnis on the fence in mixed 
Sunni-Shi’a areas this likely provided the additional impetus to join the revolt against 
AQI that had begun in earnest the year prior. Lacking a Shi’a threat, Anbar’s recovery 
 
331 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq (New 
York: Scribner, 2008), 184. 
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from the brink of chaos began to make headway in late 2006, serving as an example of 
what could be for those Sunnis still stuck between AQI and JAM.   
G. BURNOUT OF THE IRAQI CIVIL WAR 
It is extremely difficult to find the starting point of the ethno-sectarian violence 
that marked the Iraqi Civil War that raged in 2006, but two events serve as markers to 
delineate distinct phases.  The first marker was the suicide bombing of the Imam Ali 
Mosque in Najaf on August 29, 2003, which killed a number of Shi’a worshippers and 
the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ayatollah Mohammed 
Baqir al-Hakim.  This bombing marked the beginning phase of AQI’s attempt to instigate 
a civil war in Iraq.  The second marker was the February 22, 2006 bombing of the al-
Askari mosque in Samarra, the third holiest site of Shi’a Islam.  Widely considered to be 
conducted by AQI operatives, the bombing of the mosque set off a round of ethno-
sectarian violence that would begin to abate a year later.  Within five days of the 
bombing, the GoI reported that 379 people had been killed and 458 wounded.332  
However, AQI is not entirely to blame for the rising levels of ethno-sectarian 
violence—after all, it takes two to tango, and the Shi’a are just as culpable in inciting 
sectarian hate.  The Shi’a response to the AQI-backed sectarian campaign indirectly 
appeared with the appointment of Bayan Jabr as the Minister of the Interior.  A member 
of SCIRI and former exile, Jabr was deeply distrustful of Iraq’s Sunnis on the suspicion 
of their collective involvement with the former regime.333  Jabr’s position as a high-
ranking member of SCIRI allowed him to incorporate members of the Badr Brigade, 
SCIRI’s military wing, into the Ministry of the Interior, giving the militia de facto official 
blessing to the illicit activities of kidnapping, murder, and torture.334  Acting as “death 
squads,” these MoI-backed militias freely roamed Baghdad under the guise of official 
 
332 "Iraq Erupts into Fresh Violence," Al-Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2006/02/ 
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duties to conduct a wide range of atrocities.335  By May 2006, when Jabr was appointed 
as the Minister of Finance in the Maliki government, “Shiite militias had been broadly 
incorporated into government security units [and] Interior Ministry forces were widely 
believed to be carrying out political murders on a large scale, running a network of 
detention and torture centers.”336 
Throughout the spring and summer, ethno-sectarian violence continued to rage as 
the Shi’a responded to Sunni provocations and Sunnis responded to Shi’a actions, as each 
side saw itself as a victim.  Death squads would make forays into Sunni enclaves in 
response to AQI’s campaign of suicide bombing in Shi’a areas.337  Much of the violence 
in Baghdad occurred in mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods and also along the seams 
between existing Sunni and Shi’a enclaves.  As the violence continued, both Sunnis and 
Shi’a moved from these areas to sectarian enclaves.  In Hurriyah, a Sunni enclave in 
2003, Shi’a militias not only governed the area, but turned to real estate sales as well.  
Deborah Amos notes that, “the thugs-turned-real-estate-agents rented out apartments they 
had emptied.  Shiite families who had been expelled from other neighborhoods in 
Baghdad moved in.”338   
By the time of the Bush administration’s “New Way Forward,” the effect of the 
previous year’s ethno-sectarian violence had already been written on the map of 
Baghdad.  Much like the “white flight” that altered the ethnographic composition of 
American cities after World War II, this resettlement changed the ethnic makeup of 
Baghdad dramatically.  Where Sunnis were diffused across the city in 2003, by 2007 they 
were either established in enclaves or they had migrated to other Sunni dominated 
locations inside Iraq or displaced abroad. The civil war transitioned a once-mixed  
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metropolis into a city with sharp ethno-sectarian divides, as depicted in Figure 8.  
“Baghdad became a Shiite-dominated city for the first time in its long history,” notes 
Amos.339   
The inadvertent effect of the ethnic cleansing in the civil war was that it limited 
the duration of the civil war.  By forcing residents into sectarian enclaves, it became 
harder to get into a neighborhood to accomplish ethnic killings and violence.  While it 
may seem that enclaves became a “target-rich environment” for sectarian violence, it also 
established a line where U.S. and GoI forces could begin inserting themselves in an 
attempt to stop sectarian violence in Baghdad by establishing Joint Security Stations 
throughout the city as depicted in Figure 8.  As a consequence of establishing local 
security outposts in Baghdad, General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency strategy for Baghdad 
froze the ethnic lines within the city.  Many Sunni enclaves like Adhamiyah and Doura 
were walled off as a part of the counterinsurgency strategy in order to protect the Sunni 
population from roving Shi’a militias who were intent on encroaching into the Sunni 
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Figure 8.   Ethnic Groups in Baghdad, 2003–2007.341 
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Figure 9.   Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, August, 2007.342 
For AQI, the effect of the Sunni flight from Baghdad was that the group had 
fewer places to hide and operate in over time.  The remaining Sunni enclaves (depicted as 
red in Figure 4) became the focus of U.S. efforts to stem the sectarian violence, bringing 
more attention to the last vestiges of AQI’s safe areas.  Hardening these enclaves with 
barriers to protect the Sunni population from Shi’a death squads also isolated AQI from 
its support zones in the Baghdad belts.  Cut off and isolated, AQI’s presence in Baghdad 
greatly diminished over 2007, as local Sunnis joined neighborhood vigilante groups such 
as the Knights of Adhamiyah—the local manifestation of an Awakening-like 
movement—turning on AQI in an attempt to remove the thorn in their side. 
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H. “INDUSTRIAL COUNTERTERRORISM” 
Although the counterinsurgency strategies of Sanchez, Casey, and Petraeus varied 
widely in respect to how military forces would be utilized in the years following the U.S. 
invasion, they maintained the common component of counterterrorism.  The purpose of 
this effort was to attrite the core of the insurgency, specifically those deemed 
“irreconcilable.”  This counterterrorism strategy implemented by the U.S. ostensibly 
allows it to buy time while credible and capable Iraqi security forces could be developed.  
By cutting away at the irreconcilable core of AQI, the counterterrorist approach acted in a 
manner to reduce the ability of the AQI to conduct attacks on the population.  The 
approach undertaken by special operations forces (SOF) became known as “industrial 
counterterrorism”,343 whose sole purpose was to “to unravel Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia 
and other insurgent groups from the inside out,” by squeezing each new arrest for details 
about the chain of command.344   
This method introduced counter-network strategies advocated by John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt in their book, Networks and Netwars, namely that “it takes a 
networks to fight networks.”345   To develop their own network to counter AQI, SOF 
were not only decentralized, but also leveraged the capabilities of the U.S. interagency 
community and coalition partners.  This network of friends provided the means to counter 
the network of AQI.  By decentralizing and integrating SOF with the resources of the 
interagency community, the resultant organization was one where information was 
rapidly incorporated, analyzed and disseminated, allowing the organization to have an 
unparalleled tempo of operations.  Although the reorganization of forces played a 
significant role in developing the ability to conduct a counterterrorism campaign with 
ruthless efficiency, it was by incorporating 24/7 surveillance and utilizing covert 
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techniques that made the difference to previous manhunting efforts used in capturing 
former Ba’ath party leaders early in the war.346   
SOF conducted nightly raids on AQI cells all in an effort to destroy the group.  
Intelligence collected on each raid would be immediately analyzed by teams of experts in 
Iraq and the United States and used to portray the AQI network, illuminating new targets 
for the next night, in a cycle known as F3EA—find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze.  This 
cycle provided and synthesized information from a variety of sources to portray the entire 
AQI network.  Armed with this understanding, SOF aimed to collapse the network—“the 
aim was to go after the middle men of their network.”347  This effort was based on the 
premise that removal of critical nodes in a network would cause widespread disruption of 
the organization.  The ultimate goal was to unravel the network, member by member, 
exploiting every possible lead, to disrupt and ultimately to dismantle the network.  After 
Zarqawi’s death, SOF continued to hammer away at the AQI network. 
A number of sources have recently emerged that give some on the effectiveness 
of the industrial counterterrorism approach.  In his book The War Within: A Secret White 
House History, 2006-2008, reporter Bob Woodward claims that the biggest factor in 
contributing to the decline of violence in Iraq in 2007 were operations to “locate, target 
and kill key individuals in extremist groups such as al Qaeda, the Sunni insurgency and 
renegade Shi’a militias.”348  Woodward reports that “a number of authoritative sources 
say the covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possibly 
the biggest factor in reducing it.”349  One author notes that one SOF unit had “achieved 
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value targets [in AQI].”350  Likewise, another author makes the claim that the 
counterterrorism approach led to over 14,500–15,500 AQI operatives being killed or 
captured between 2003 and 2008.351 
However, there are issues with analyzing the relative strength of this claim on two 
grounds.  First, in the publicly available captured AQI documents in the Harmony 
database, this point is never mentioned.  Second, the authors all derive their information 
from government sources, in effect basing their claims on a single source.  For the 
researcher, the paucity of credible information needed to prevents any grounded 
judgment as to analyze the effect of this factor in the demise of AQI.   
Yet, in spite of this, it is possible to infer that this factor had a modest causal 
effect based on the assumption that leadership can have a regulating effect on an 
organization, keeping it in balance between the goals of its leaders and supporters.  If 
AQI’s rank and file were comprised of former criminals and social outcasts as offered by 
the Anbar chief of police—“I can tell you about the Iraqi people, because I know them.  
The lowlife elements, the criminals, the basest of the base, were the only ones working 
with these terrorist organizations…Society did not respect this person to begin with, 
because they were dirty, and they were lowlifes”352—we can assume that many members 
of AQI were on the fringes of the social network.  Faced with this societal rejection, 
joining AQI would offer the benefit of providing status (especially if Salafi thought was 
propagated in Saddam’s prisons) to counteract their social isolation.  With the removal of 
leaders that maintain some level of control on their subordinates through influence and 
charisma (a Weberian source of authority in non-state structures), we can safely assume 
that the regulating influence of the leader was removed from the network over time as a 
result of counter-leader/counterterrorist targeting. This would contribute to subordinates 
changing their tactics on the ground without being regulated by their superior.  In this 
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case, this may be one reason why we see more ethno-sectarian violence after the death of 
Zarqawi and why AQI failed to realize the effect of its repression on the Sunni. 
Like many of the accelerants portrayed in this chapter, the effect of industrial 
counterterrorism took time and a degree of synergy with other factors to completely 
manifest itself as a contributor to AQI’s demise.  As noted previously the effect of the 
civil war’s burnout, combined with the solidifying of ethnic lines in Baghdad prevented 
the movement of AQI in the city.  In turn, this led to an increased effectiveness of SOF as 
AQI leadership became less experienced in clandestine techniques than their older 
predecessors who had been captured.  Trapped in Sunni enclaves, AQI operatives were 
no longer able to meet directly and resorted to utilizing electronic communications to 
communicate to each other, which were exploited by SOF, providing more information 
with which to target AQI.353   
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has laid out an argument that a multitude of accelerating factors 
contributed to the decline of AQI in 2007.  For the practitioner seeking to utilize similar 
techniques elsewhere, it is critical to understand that none of these accelerants led to the 
decline of AQI on their own.  Rather, it was the combination of these widely disparate 
accelerants that contributed to AQI’s decline by entering the causal chain at the right 
moment in time, with a degree of synergy not seen if implemented individually.  As this 
chapter has shown, these factors cannot be completely isolated as they were influenced 
by other accelerants, often being strengthened, and not weakened, by the presence of 
others.  Removal of any of these factors, and the outcome would likely have been similar 
to the bleakness seen in the infamous intelligence assessment of Anbar in September 
2006.354   
Like the principle of interest, increased time made these effects more valuable to 
the U.S.-led Coalition.  Attempts to cash these various factors in at a point earlier than 
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2007 would have resulted in limited utility and their quick rejection.  It took the 
awareness of the Sunnis that their future did not lay with that offered by AQI.  Even if the 
Sunni were ready to wholeheartedly reject AQI in early 2005 after the initial murmurs of 
revolt in Al Qaim, the U.S. military would not have been able to completely capitalize on 
this development, as the institution had not yet been converted to see the benefits of a 
classical counterinsurgency strategy.  Additionally, the Iraqi Army lacked capacity to 
partner with the U.S. military the way it did in the summer of 2007.  The Iraqi 
government in 2005 was still forming and developing its constitution, focused on 
developing the political future of Iraq rather than ending the insurgency. The 
convergence of the surge, tactical innovation, increasing GoI capacity, and other 
accelerants with the small, but slowly growing divide between AQI and the Sunni served 
to widen the existing wedge, leading to the gap being split wide open in a matter of 
months rather than years. These are not isolated causes that can be simply mimicked 
elsewhere.  The implementation of these factors must be understood in their context to be 





                                                
V. INSURGENT GROWTH AND DECLINE: A THEORY 
Our military theory was born through a study of our own experiences in 
the jihadi current, as well as through enduring and living in the field 
throughout the various stages.  This is how I produce practical 
theories...these kinds of theories...are written for the battlefield.  The 
details in their ideas have been accumulated in the field and during hours 
of reflection with the Mujahidun warriors when they rested. 
—Abu Mus’ab al-Suri355 
The Iraq War has the potential to further our understanding of the dynamics of 
insurgencies.  The failure of AQI to take root within the Sunni population and mobilize 
them to create a fully-fledged Islamist state is likely the most important dynamic to study.  
The immediate policy question to be answered is whether this failed insurgency can be 
replicated elsewhere.  This thesis has suggested that a set of preexisting conditions were 
not only necessary, but were the primary causes of the rapid decrease of violence in Iraq 
in 2007, manifesting itself as a disparity between AQI and the Sunni’s vision for Iraq, 
AQI’s lack of cultural understanding regarding Iraq’s Sunnis, and poor access to the 
Sunni’s social network. 
With these three conditions in mind, the body of propositions described in this 
chapter seeks to explain basic conditions under which insurgent groups have the greatest 
potential to grow or decline, based on how they are viewed by the population—those 
whom the insurgent seeks to mobilize against the state.  Whereas social movement 
theorists like Doug McAdam have previously developed models of social mobilization, 
this theory seeks to illuminate the specific conditions under which those models can take 
place by examining the relationship between both parties involved in group 
mobilization—the insurgent and the populace.  A theory regarding insurgent mobilization 
will allow students and practitioners of insurgency and counter-insurgency to take human 
behavior observed in the past, and make a basic prediction the potential behavior of 
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actors involved in future events.356 The purpose is not to create an inviolable law of 
insurgency, but more of a guideline to help evaluate efforts to initiate or counter an 
insurgency based on pre-existing differences between the population and the 
insurgent.357 These factors—ideological alignment, cultural alignment and social 
embeddedness—assist in helping potential sponsors of insurgencies to assess the viability 
of an insurgent movement, in addition to assisting counterinsurgents to be better adept 
and cou
This chapter intends to explain how insurgencies respond to the differences 
between insurgents and a target population.  In this way, it dovetails with the work done 
in social movement theory.  Doug McAdam presents a three-part political process model 
describing the growth of social movements in his book, Political Process and the 
Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970.  He posits that social movements require 
favorable political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and strategic framing in order to 
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cases.  However, there are caveats: “The danger,” remarks Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the progenitor of 
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commonality with a given population.  Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory; Foundations, 
Development, Applications (New York: G. Braziller, 1969), 200. 
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generate mobilization.358  The political process model does much to explain collective 
behavior in terms of opportunity, means and motives, but in some ways the model is 
incomplete in explaining the rise of social movements.  McAdam assumes that the 
insurgent rises from the midst of a populace, which is not always the case.  For instance, 
what are we to make of the current view of the Global War on Terror as a “global 
Islamist insurgency,”359 and the role that transnational actors play in fomenting and 
exacerbating local grievances?360  The most pertinent question for the practitioner of 
insurgency is how do we explain the failures of social movements and insurgencies 
initiated by individuals from outside of the society?  The failures of AQI and Che 
Guevara appear to indicate that a necessary pre-condition for the political process model 
is that, at some level, the insurgents must share some common characteristics with the 
population, but which ones?  
 
358 Political opportunities, as described by McAdams, are those moments in time that “undermine the 
stability of the entire political system of by increasing the political leverage of a single insurgent group.”  
With the state weakened or through the elevation of the challenger by long-term socioeconomic changes, 
these moments serve to lower the costs associated with collective action by the challengers against the 
state.  Mobilizing structures are those resources of the challenger’s community that “enable insurgent 
groups to exploit [political] opportunities.” These organizational and community networks provide the 
means to generate long-term solidarity for the insurgent and access a broader portion of the community for 
support.  Finally, the transforming effect of strategic framing helps the insurgent denote favorable shifts in 
political opportunity to facilitate collective action.  This functions as a means for the insurgent to 
“collectively define [the population’s] situation as unjust and subject to change through group action,” 
providing impetus for mobilization.   Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930-1970, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 40–43. 
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provided by tools of globalization like the Internet, global media and satellite communications, a new class 
of regional or theater-level actors has emerged. These groups do have links to the global jihad, often act as 
regional allies or affiliates of Al Qaeda, and prey on local groups and issues to further the jihad.” These 
regional affiliates “comprise a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and movements, not 
a single unified organization. Global players link and exploit local players through regional affiliates— 
they rarely interact directly with local players, but sponsor and support them through intermediaries.  Each 
theater has operational players who are able to tap into the global jihad, and these tend to be regional Al 
Qaeda affiliates,” or other organizations such as Hezbollah. David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global 
Insurgency," Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005), 601–602.         
360 David Kilcullen posits that Al Qaeda’s military strategy is to provoke an American military 
response so as to incite the ummah (Muslim community) to rise up against apostate regimes and establish 
an Islamic caliphate.  To achieve this Kilcullen hypothesizes that AQ is using a model where “AQ moves 
into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a 
Western intervention, and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support 
for its Takfiri agenda.” Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, 
36. 
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McAdam’s variables are extremely important in defining insurgent growth, but 
what is missing is an explanation of how the insurgent is able to facilitate access to 
mobilizing structures and strategic framing.  There is little in the literature beyond the 
notion that insurgents must translate their universals into the vernacular that explains how 
they can gain and maintain a degree of popular support that enables them to carry out 
their aims.  Faced with the prospects of a group of transnational insurgents who aim to set 
the world afire, what are their chances of succeeding?  Similarly, what are the chances of 
the efforts of the U.S. to utilize Unconventional Warfare (UW)361 to achieve its foreign 
policy goals? The three variables presented in this theory serve as facilitators for the 
political process model, allowing the insurgent to leverage McAdam’s political process 
model to their fullest extent and will attempt to make some sense of these pressing 
questions. 
A. THE INSURGENT’S DILEMMA 
Insurgencies are contests over political power in a given locality and result in a 
struggle between three parties—the sovereign ruler, the would-be sovereign, and the 
ruled.  Insurgencies are not only waged over local grievances, but they are also waged by 
the local population.   The telluric nature of this contest is one that drives all factors 
involved in insurgencies.  This characteristic, which is particularly peculiar to 
insurgencies than is found in other types of conflict, is defined by the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt as, “the tie to the soil, to the autochthonous population and to the geographic 
particularity of the land—mountain-ranges, forests, jungles, or deserts.”362 
In the beginning, insurgencies involve a nucleus of a committed few, all with 
desires to challenge the status quo of the state.  Without growing from this small number 
 
361 Unconventional Warfare is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or 
with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”  Unlike previous vague definitions, in 
this sense, UW is not countering an insurgency nor conducting any military operation with indigenous 
forces, but using U.S. support to foment one. Briefing by LTC Mark Grdovic, USASOC G-3X at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California on 3 September 2009, slides in the author’s possession. 
362 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political 
[Theorie des Partisanen: Zwischnbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen], trans. G. L. Ulmen, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), 21. 
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to a united collective, there is little hope for the insurgent to seize power and replace the 
existing governmental regime.  Understanding this, the insurgent must develop a method 
to entice them to make the move to his side.   
However, the obstacles are numerous.  The stakes for the insurgent are very 
high—success will see him exercising power, whereas failure will see him hang, as an 
actor seeking to transform the system outside the limits of the law.  Because the insurgent 
seeks to transform the system from without, this approach makes every action conducted 
by the insurgent illegal according to the state.363  This initial position is daunting for the 
insurgent—“the range of collective actions open to a relatively powerless group is 
normally very small.  Its program, its form of action, its very existence are likely to be 
illegal, hence subject to violent repression,” note the Tillys.364  The would-be insurgent 
faces a perplexing dilemma—with the costs of action so high, how can the insurgent 
transition from a few people sitting around the café table to a movement that can topple 
the existing regime?   By gaining the support of the people, after all, insurgencies are not 
only political phenomena, but relational phenomena as well.  
B. INSURGENT GROWTH THROUGH ALIGNMENT: A THEORY 
I contend that the ability of McAdam’s political process model to produce growth 
in social movements and insurgencies is contingent upon three factors that must be 
aligned between the insurgent and the population he is trying to gain support from: 
ideology, culture, and social embeddedness.  These three factors provide the insurgent 
with the ability to access the two variables of McAdam’s that are in the control of the 
insurgent, namely mobilizing structures and strategic framing.  A causal mechanism for 
this theory of alignment and mobilization is depicted in Figure 10.  Trust and legitimacy 




363 Whereas a resistance movement has legal standing in the eyes of the Geneva Conventions, the 
insurgent has no legal standing in national or international law.   
364 Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard H. Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 283. 
serve as the basis for the growth of popular support.  Without trust between the insurgent 
and population, legitimacy cannot be attained.  When viewed as illegitimate, the 
insurgency will wither on the vine.   
 
Figure 10.   Alignment Theory. 
1. Ideological Alignment 
Insurgency theory tells us that an insurgent first needs a cause, which should be 
able to “attract the largest number of supporters, and repel the minimum number of 
opponents.”365  “Each classical armed struggle, indeed, arises from a core of those driven 
by a dream,” writes J. Bowyer Bell.366  “A strong underground movement, a mass 
movement, must have an appeal to the masses as well as their support,” notes Feliks 
Gross.367  The cause, then, is the sine qua non of the insurgent movement.  In order to 
maximize the appeal of the cause, it stands that the cause must be aligned as much as 
possible with the population, incorporating their grievances to the maximum extent 
possible.  Chalmers Johnson notes that the cause “needs a general ideological appeal that 
                                                 
365 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Washington, D.C.: Praeger 
Security International, 2006, 1964), 19–20. 
366 J. Bowyer Bell, Dragonwars: Armed Struggle and the Conventions of Modern War (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 127. 
367 Feliks Gross, The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1958), 337. 
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will bring the [insurgent movement] the support of the people.”368  Likewise, an 
insurgent’s ideology serves to “rally people around the movement…[and] steels and 
disciplines underground members,” writes Molnar.369   
Seeing the importance of ideology in social movements and insurgencies, in this 
theory, ideological alignment refers to the degree to which the ideology of the insurgent 
group matches with that of the population.370  In order to be considered highly aligned, 
there must be a great amount of congruence between the political aims, ideals, principles 
and doctrines of the insurgent and those of the population.  The ideal of high alignment 
would see a situation where the population and insurgent share the same worldviews on 
governance while a gross disparity exists between the population and the state; similarly, 
the ideal of low alignment would be the inverse situation.  Ideological alignment 
contributes to the development of trust by offering a political design that depicts how the 
population will be ruled in the future.  A vision that promotes a democratic vision will 
tend to beget future trust, notes Sztompka, whereas those visions that promote an 
autocratic future will likely lead to decay of the political system over time.371   
Regardless of the future political vision, it is worth noting that “trust is a 
precondition for political order.”372   In the early stages of the insurgency, the specifics 
matter little, as the cause remains a barely perceptible idea amongst the population only 
pointing to change from the existing status quo.  The message must be diffuse enough to 
capture the attention of the mass of the population; however, amongst the committed few, 
the ideology is more specific indicating a concrete designs for the future.   
 
368 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 147. 
369 Andrew R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 69. 
370 An analysis of the ideologies driving the population and those driving the insurgency serves as a 
measurement of ideological alignment.  Divergent views would represent a low evaluation of alignment 
and as such, the state and the population are likely to be highly aligned in this situation.  The population is 
likely rather happy with the ideology of the state as it fits within their view of how they should be 
governed, although other grievances may exist between the two. 
371 Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
139–150. 
372 Ibid., 139. 
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What makes ideological alignment critical in social movements and insurgencies 
is a function of the scale of the effort; where small groups may conduct a coup d’état 
with relative ease to gain control of state power, insurgencies must “throw before [the 
people] a picture of a better tomorrow, a release form the old, feudal social conditions of 
oppression and exploitation.”373  This picture of a better life is often couched in terms of 
a systematic body of concepts that guides a group of people regarding how a political 
system, party or organization should be organized, function and rule.  It is this future 
vision that contributes to the development of trust by committing the insurgent to a 
specific expectation.  As the challenger and would-be king, the insurgent must 
demonstrate that the political designs he has for the population are better than those 
offered by the existing state.  
However, for a general ideology to take root, it must be recast in a new light, 
specifying the ideology to the population.  Galula notes that, “the insurgent must, of 
course, be able to identify himself totally with the cause, or more precisely, with the 
entire majority of the population theoretically attracted by it [emphasis added].”374  
However, the adaptation of ideology to local nuances cannot take place without an 
understanding of the target audience, and with that we turn to the necessity of cultural 
alignment. 
2. Cultural Alignment 
Cultural alignment refers to the degree to which the cultural norms of behavior 
and values of the insurgent matches with that of the population.375  In many homogenous 
societies where the insurgent movement is from the same ethnic and people group of the 
 
373 Gross, The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions, 337. 
374 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 20. 
375 Cultural alignment is measured by the degree to which the insurgent is representative of the 
population in terms of sharing language, informal values and norms of behavior.  Shared language provides 
unhindered communication of the insurgent’s messages to the population, while shared values and norms of 
behavior serve to bind the insurgent and populace together in a shared community, highlighting 
commonalities.  Collective action would be impossible without maintaining shared norms and values to 
serve as the impetus for united efforts instead of haphazard, disjointed action.  In this manner, informal 
norms and values provide a sense of unity and predictability for both parties in addition to fostering mutual 
understanding.   
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population, this alignment is naturally very high.  However, in heterogeneous societies, or 
those situations where the insurgents are a third party and are not indigenous, cultural 
alignment would likely be low due to the insurgent’s inability to inherently understand 
the nuances of indigenous norms and beliefs.   
Returning to Galula’s previous statement, we can see that sharing the identity of 
the population is imperative.  Mao further emphasizes the point by warning of the 
dangers of not having cultural alignment—“The moment that [a] war of resistance 
dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates 
itself from hope of ultimate victory [emphasis added].”376  Cultural alignment is an 
important factor in the growth of popular support for the insurgent.  “In various parts of 
the world, those [insurgents] who refuse, even subconsciously, to organize in response to 
tribal factors, the national character and local practice, the existing social forms and 
values, mostly find their crusade in difficulty,” writes Bell.377   
Cultural alignment assists the insurgent by establishing the basics of trust.   
“There are normative obligations to trust,” writes Peter Sztompka, “and there are 
normative obligations to be trustworthy, credible, and reliable.  One locus of both types 
of obligations are social roles, demanding specific conduct from their incumbents.”378  
These social roles are largely defined by the cultural context of the population.  
Insurgents with greater degrees of cultural alignment with the population would have a 
higher potential to build trust by having “inside knowledge,” which acts as a proof of 
identity regarding social norms, values and roles.  
What makes this alignment so critical—and quite possibly more important than 
ideological alignment—for the insurgent is that by incorporating the identity of the 




376 Zedong Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare: Translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, 
trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 44. 
377 Bell, Dragonwars: Armed Struggle and the Conventions of Modern War, 148. 
378 Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory, 66. 
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group’s socio-cultural status quo, the insurgent has enmeshed himself so much into the 
population that the insurgent’s identity is seen as synonymous with that of the 
populace.379    
Identity building is not only crucial for the insurgent’s immediate concerns of 
mobilization, but also for his long-term goal as the would-be ruler—to stabilize the state 
after imposition of his political control over the populace, the insurgent’ must build 
communal bonds to assist in establishing political controls.  He must “develop links 
between citizens, encourage participation and use personal associations to cross societal 
divisions that may exist over such issues as ethnicity or religion.”380  Strengthening 
group identity serves to divide groups, further reinforcing in-group bonds and 
diminishing out-group bonds, thereby facilitating greater support for the culturally 
aligned insurgent and sapping the state’s popular support.  However, the development of 
linkages upon which to build identity requires a third variable—social embeddedness. 
3. Social Embeddedness 
Social embeddedness describes the insurgent’s location within the social network 
of the targeted population, and can be identified by his kinship and social ties, both 
formal and informal.  Social embeddedness allows the insurgent to build a shared identity 
by utilizing his cultural alignment with a given social network.  Without it, an insurgent 
will be unable to pull people together “by connecting prospective participants to an 




379 This cultural alignment must be perceived as real by the population, not manufactured.  This holds 
for the counter-insurgent as well.  In examining the Shi’a Intifada of 1991 in Iraq, Amatzia Baram notes 
that the Intifada “provided evidence that ideology and state-sponsored culture, even when accompanied by 
some political and economic benefits but short of real Sunni-Shi’a equality, were insufficient to create 
patriotic unity even among the Arabs of Iraq.” Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal 
Policies 1991–96, 19–20. 
380 Talentino, The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity, 563. 
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into action.”381  Furthermore, networks serve a disseminative function and allow 
insurgents to circulate information on opportunities for actions, points of contact, and the 
culturally-adapted ideological vision. 
The location of an insurgent’s position within the social network and the 
extensiveness of his ties to the social network provide him with the ability to extend 
influence within the network.  Centrality notes the relative place the insurgent has within 
society, be it on the fringes or deep in the center of the network.  The notion that prior 
social ties serve as the foundations of movement recruitment is considered a near ironclad 
rule in the study of social movements, and as such, insurgents with dense intra-network 
connections potentially have multiple opportunities to increase recruitment.  Dense ties 
allow the insurgent to provide additional impetus to gain popular support by allowing 
him to showcase the fact that his network of existing support allows for “a reduction of 
the practical costs attached to participation,”382 because the effort is spread over a wider 
amount of individuals.   
Here social embeddedness is a necessary condition for the formation of trust.  
Trust is, after all, a two-way relationship at the very least.  Without being a part of the 
social network, the insurgent will not be able to build any trust.  It is this point that often 
spells trouble for non-native insurgent movements, as evidenced by the experience of al 
Qaeda in Iraq and Che Guevara’s misadventures in the Congo.  In contrast, insurgencies, 
which are indigenously based, enjoy a greater deal of social embeddedness as they arise 
from local movements, thus giving them a greater advantage than non-indigenous based 
insurgencies. 
 
381 Florence Passy, "Social Networks Matter. But How?" in Social Movements and Networks: 
Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 24. 
382  Mario Diani, "Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions, and Social Networks: "From 
Metaphor to Substance"?" in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, 
eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8. 
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C. VARIABLE INTERACTION 
For the insurgent to have the maximum potential for growth, I maintain that all 
three of these variables must be aligned with the population.  The misalignment of any of 
these factors will lead to less potential for mobilization, and in some cases, will ensure 
the demise to the insurgent’s movement.  These three factors are permutated in a 
typology in Figure 11, and when combined in a Venn diagram each of these factors 
contributes to the growth of an insurgency in various ways.  The degree of potential 
support and further growth is indicated by the darkness of the overlapping area in each 
circle.  When all three factors align, the insurgent’s potential for growth is at its zenith. 
Type I represents a condition where the would-be insurgent has no chance at all of 
mobilizing the population, even in the face of favorable political opportunities.  In this 
situation, the insurgent is ignorant of indigenous beliefs, customs and values, has no 
informal or formal ties within the social network of the population, and has an ideology 
unpalatable with that maintained by the masses. This isolation creates a situation where 
the insurgent has no relation on which to develop trust and legitimacy between himself 
and the population.  Lacking similarities with the population at large, it easy for 
individuals to self-radicalize into “bunches of guys” as posited by Sageman383 and to 
create what Della Porta refers to as “spirals of encapsulation.”384  Here the insurgent is so 
different from the population that his ability to influence it through shared identity and 
relationships is nonexistent. 
Type II represents a situation where insurgents are located within the fabric of 
society and are representative of the population’s customs, values and norms of behavior, 
but the insurgent’s ideological vision is viewed as anathema to those held by the general 
population, resulting in low levels of legitimacy and a decline of his movement.   His 
links with the population at large and shared culture give him means to the ability to 
frame messages that culturally resonate with the population, but his ability to fully 
 
383 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 116. 
384 Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative 
Analysis of Italy and Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12. 
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influence the population is hindered by the lack of concurrence over the political vision.  
Similarly, the absence of ideological unity prevents him from developing a full measure 
of trust.  This difference serves to draw a sharp line between the insurgent and the 
population, where the population is not fully accepting of the insurgent.  This situation is 
commonly observed in domestic politics within democratic societies, where numerous 
minor political groups represent a myriad of ideologies that often fail to achieve any 
substantial share of the vote. 
Type III situations are those in which the insurgent shares cultural norms and a 
belief in a shared ideology.  This provides the insurgent with the ability to frame their 
insurgent movement in ways that provide a maximum of resonance with the population in 
effect creating a sense of innate solidarity and unity.  By properly understanding and 
incorporating the population’s ethos into his cause and political endstate, the insurgent 
creates “acceptance of, and commitment to, the processes of the [future] state [espoused 
by the insurgent]—belief in their legitimacy, a sense of ownership in their representation, 
and even pride in their development.”385   
But this potential to build a shared identity and establish trust with the population 
never presents itself to the insurgent, as the insurgent in Type III situations has no 
tangible links with the population.  This lack of personal connections prevents him from 
being able to fully maximize his ability to influence the population and build trusting 
relationships.  These situations are often manifested by outside sponsorship of exile-
based insurgent groups to bring about regime change, and as such, usually fail in their 
efforts.386   
 
 
385 Talentino, The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity, 564.. 
386 For more on the subject of the use of exiles to spearhead efforts toward regime change, see Martin 
Smith, "The United States' use of Exiles in Promoting Regime Change in Cuba, 1961 and Iraq, 2002–3," 










































































































































































































Figure 11.   Typology of Alignment 
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Type IV depicts a scenario where the insurgent is embedded in the social network 
and shares the same ideological worldview, but lacks an understanding or sharing of the 
population’s culture and codes of behavior.  The potential for growth in this situation 
would stand to be marginal due to the linkages and the shared ideology, but the lack of 
shared culture prevents full resonance for framing, leading to high levels of initial growth 
as excitement for the insurgent builds.  However, over time, growth reaches a built-in 
limit as the insurgent remains culturally different than the population.   
Type V represents a scenario where the insurgent is culturally and ideologically 
aligned with the population and is socially embedded in the population.  Here the 
insurgent can leverage his cultural and ideological alignment to develop resonance with 
the population through strategic framing and his embeddedness provides him with access 
to the population to create trust relationships at the micro-level, which assist with gaining 
access to McAdam’s mobilizing structures.  Additionally, through these relationships, the 
insurgent has a greater ability to use diffusion and brokerage to grow his movement.   
The combination of these three variables—ideological alignment, cultural alignment, and 
social embeddedness—allows the insurgent to overcome the difficulties faced in Type II 
and Type III, and Type IV, giving him access to personal relationships with the 
population with which to utilize the strengths of his ideological and cultural alignment to 
effectively build trust along those links.  
D. STRATEGIC INTERACTION: THE STATE, INSURGENT, AND 
ALIGNMENT THEORY 
Understanding the importance of alignment for the insurgent, how does this affect 
the state?  If, as previously noted, and insurgency is a battle between the state and 
insurgent over the allegiance of the population, then it holds that the alignment of the 
state and the population is important for the state as well.387  In light of varying levels of 
alignment, what is the potential for the state or the insurgent to win at the start of 
contentious politics?  Figure 12 offers a degree of insight as to how varying levels of 
 
387 This is true to a degree; because the state is already in power and ostensibly has control over the 
tools of force, alignment between the state and population can be slightly less important for the state than 
for the insurgent. 
insurgent and state alignment with the population might interact. Here, the potential 
outcome of the interaction between the state’s relationship with the population and the 
insurgent’s relationship with the population is depicted in the intersection of the vertical 
and horizontal cells.388   
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Figure 12.   State/Insurgent Interaction 
With these interactions, a major assumption is made: when both parties have the 
same degree of alignment with the population, it is assumed that the state will have the 
ultimate advantage.  This assumption is made on the fact that the state largely has a 
resource advantage over the insurgent and the fact that it is the state and not the 
                                                 
388 The result is based on each parties potential at the start.  We must remember that legitimacy is in 
constant flux after an insurgent begins his movement or the state tries to quash the insurgent. 
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challenger.  It assumed that offered a choice between two evils, the lesser evil will be 
chosen; in short for the population, the status quo is better. 
But, how does the interaction between the state and insurgent progress beyond a 
base of potential?  As suggested earlier, the degree to which the insurgent is fully aligned 
gives him a natural boost to his level of trust.  But more work must be done for the 
insurgent to defeat the state and seize power, as trust and legitimacy is a perception that is 
always in a constant state of flux.  “Faith without works is dead,”389 said the apostle 
James.  Like faith, so goes trust, we might add.  This is a helpful reminder that the 
insurgent must link his words to actions, in order to increase the perceived benefits for 
the population to reap upon joining the insurgent’s movement.  Legitimacy compromises 
a sum of perceptions of the insurgent’s actions; the population rates those seeking 
legitimacy ultimately on their performance.390  Early on, the insurgent has the advantage 
over the state as, in contrast to the state, the insurgent’s “pretensions cannot as easily be 
contrasted with their performance.”391  With telluric ties to the population, the insurgent 
receives an initial level of preferential treatment by the population, as he cannot be 
judged on his performance at first, but only by his promises.  This foothold of trust and 
legitimacy gives him an initial influx of recruits and other tangible support along with 
further acquiescence for his actions, but will not last long.  Initially all the insurgent has 
 
389 James 2:20 (New American Standard Bible). 
390 Imagine that legitimacy is a bank, where the level of legitimacy can rise or fall over time.  The 
undecided population has two of these legitimacy banks—one for the insurgent and one for the state—for 
each of the parties to invest legitimacy into.  As the insurgent and the state fight over the allegiance of the 
population, their actions lead to various credits and debits from the bank.  Naturally, the population—as the 
object of the contest—seeks to maximize its benefit and lend its support to the side that has a greater 
balance in the population’s legitimacy bank.  The insurgent is always weaker than the counterinsurgent, 
thus his need to strengthen himself through the legitimation of his cause by the population.  The insurgent 
can only make promises to the population in his opening moves, as he is still a nascent body, with a high 
degree of weakness.  On the other hand, the state has the resource advantage.  This asymmetric advantage 
maintained by the state is evident in the state’s superior resources, ability to work in the open, established 
governing mechanisms, and in international recognition of the state as the sovereign authority for its 
territory.  With this advantage, the state has the capacity, in theory, to rapidly fill up the population’s 
legitimacy bank through a shrewd application of resources to show that they have not only the ability, but 
also the will to address popular grievances.  Faced with this inherent disadvantage, it is only by gaining and 
maintaining the backing of the population, that the insurgent can have any chance of winning by reducing 
the advantages of the state. This last part is of the utmost importance, for if the insurgent does not maintain 
alignment and embeddedness with the population over time then support will begin to dwindle.  For what 
the population gives, the population can take away.  
391 Scott and Clark, Insurgency, 54. 
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is the promise of future returns on the population’s investment.  In the movie Boiler 
Room, the main character, stock broker Seth Davis, spends his days cold-calling both the 
wealthy and the mediocre, pressuring them to purchase initial public offerings exclusive 
to Davis’ firm.  When some investors get flighty and have second thoughts, Davis uses 
every technique he can to persuade them to keep their money in the company, piling on 
promise after promise in order to buttress the initial promise he made.  Like Davis, the 
insurgent leadership knows that their cause is all about seizing power and the use of the 
population is a tool to that end.  The insurgent is then forced into a position of multiple 
promises.  If he doesn’t produce some sort of legitimate actions, then he has no ability to 
offer further promises to gain continued investment by the population.  Without action on 
the part of the insurgent to build legitimate performance into his efforts to maintain trust 
with the population, the cause becomes a hollow, trite slogan lacking the ability to push 
the population to action, and the movement falters.  
E. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT 
By examining the relationship between the would-be ruler and his potential 
population, alignment theory enhances McAdam's political process model, indicating 
specific common preconditions needed between the insurgent and populace needed for 
the political process model to produce insurgent growth.  Would-be insurgents can utilize 
the theory presented here to serve as a foundational analysis to evaluate the potential for 
the population to jump to their side in the event of the right political opportunity 
structures.  Likewise, for the counterinsurgent, the model can also show the degree of 
potential support the state may receive from the population in addition to identifying 
potential fault lines needed to split the population from the insurgent.  While the common 
perception dictates that physical security is critical at its heart, an insurgency is not a 
martial endeavor, but a political one, and offering a dream (and moving towards it) will 
likely induce the population to flock to one particular side or another rather than trying to 
destroy the insurgent physically. 
Further research is needed on a number of fronts.  First, one of the challenges to 
utilizing a single case is in determining whether or not the basic mechanisms can be 
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extended beyond the case or whether they are too unique.   The theory presented here is 
based on the experience of AQI, limiting its applicability.  Although a rough survey of 
other insurgencies seem to indicate a level of validity, alignment theory should be 
extended to other cases to test it and to further refine it.  Because insurgencies rely on the 
human component in order to achieve power, we must conclude that the differences 
between people can have an effect on its outcome.  Applying alignment theory to other 
cases where the insurgents are indigenous or non-indigenous can provide greater fidelity 
in determining the weight of the variables. 
Secondly, mechanisms for inducing alignment should be examined.  Can an insurgent 
move from one type of alignment to another?  Can all types of alignment be achieved over 
time by an insurgent or state?  These questions can help us to understand the difficulties 
involved in beginning an insurgency or countering it.  Initially, it appears that the answers are 
in the affirmative in all cases, save one.  Movement from Type II alignment to Type V would 
require the insurgent to grow ties with the population.  Similarly, to move from Type III 
alignment to Type V alignment, it appears that the insurgent must restructure his ideology 
towards one that works for the population.  Transitioning from Type IV to Type V appears 
nearly impossible, but may occur over time as the insurgent and population develop a shared 
culture and identity.  The question remains, though is regarding movement from Type I 
alignment to Type V alignment—is this impossible, or does the insurgent need a specific 
detailed plan and a brilliant mind to carefully orchestrate a plan of total alignment? 
This theory speaks to the relationship between the insurgent and the population he 
wishes to mobilize.  It posits that in order to maintain the future support of the 
population, the initial cause of the insurgency must resonate with the population and the 
insurgent should be in alignment with the population to the greatest extent possible.  If he 
is slightly off, the resultant misalignment will have a long-term effect; geometrically, a 
few degrees of separation between two lines results in ever increasing distance between 
them the further from the point of origin.  One can surmise that the degree of separation 




additional wedges.  As seen in the case of Iraq, this alignment made all the difference to 
the outcome of the conflict.  No matter how much money, time and guns an insurgent 
has, without the people he is nothing.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the introduction, the study of military history is a necessary 
component of the military professional’s trade.  It serves as an adjunct to experience in 
developing an understanding of military operations and planning.  In regards to the latter, 
“The past must be studied as the basis for, and a guide to, the study of the future.  To 
make a sound prediction one must project the past into the future.  If the past is ignored, 
as many would ignore it, then there is not firm foundation for sound forecasting [and] 
sound planning.”392  The detailed study of the demise of AQI can offer vital lessons to be 
applied in Afghanistan.  Yet, there is a catch.  Every situation contains unique conditions 
to account for when applying techniques and methods from the past.  “History is an 
unforgiving laboratory,” notes historian Zachary Shore. “Its experiments can be run only 
once, and never again under precisely the same conditions.”393  Failure to understand the 
contextual factors of the past will likely result in unintended outcomes when applied to 
different conditions.  That being said, this thesis has attempted to provide not only the 
context within which AQI rose to such prominence that it was vilified by the Bush 
Administration, but also the reasons why the group fell so quickly in 2007. 
The crucial event for the reader to understand is that AQI had little in common 
with those on whose behalf it was trying to establish the Caliphate.  While the U.S.-led 
coalition was seen by many Iraqis—Sunni and Shi’a alike—as an occupier, the Sunni saw 
AQI as another occupier.  This view is perhaps rooted in the way that the Sunnis saw the 
state of things in Iraq.  Inculcated through the Tikriti Ba’ath program to develop a unique 
brand of nationalism that  placed Iraq first and the Arab world second, the Sunni viewed 
those outside the Iraqi tent with considerable suspicion.  In hindsight, it is easy to see that 
the Sunni rejection of AQI occurred because of the group’s failure to adapt their views to 
local views.  This misalignment of vision, culture, and weak ties to the Sunni population 
 
392 Charles L. Bolte, "The Role of Land Forces in Future Warfare," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 75, no. 1 (January, 1949), 21. 
393 Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions, 1st U.S ed. (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2008), 167–168. 
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at large promoted distrust between the two.  Had AQI been more familiar with the 
ideological views and cultural mores of a relatively secular and nationalist society, AQI 
might not have sown the seeds of its future destruction.   
For those seeking to impose the same result on future insurgents, the Sunni-AQI 
split cannot be understated.  Above all other factors contributing to AQI’s rapid fall in 
2007, the rift stands alone as the prime cause.  Without it, the relationship between AQI 
and the Sunni surely would have stood firm in the face of the threat posed to Sunnis by 
the Shi’a in the government and those militias seeking retribution for Ba’ath rule.  But 
while this initial tear set the tone for what was to come, the rate at which the Sunni-AQI 
schism widened was the result of additional forces helping to rip the two apart.  
Ultimately, for the United States, we must be more frank in admitting how much 
our efforts can bear on an insurgency.  Barring any future instances of armed, contentious 
domestic politics, the U.S. will always be a third party to any insurgency, attempting to 
shore up (or even create) the state, or tear it down.  While this thesis has highlighted their 
insufficiency, the multiple efforts employed by the U.S. to defeat AQI were, in fact, 
necessary components of any counterinsurgency campaign in a highly unstable state.  
The change in strategic leadership brought with it new ideas on how to conduct a wide-
ranging, holistic counterinsurgency campaign needed to combat a raging insurgency in a 
nascent state.  The “surge” in ground forces gave military commanders a force large 
enough to not only clear insurgent-held areas, but also to maintain state control after 
insurgents had fled.  The ability to implement such ideas was only possible once the 
military force convinced itself it needed to change from its time-honored traditions of 
enemy-centric combat.  The increasing state competence and capability provided the 
population with a glimpse of what was possible if they sided with the government.  A 
campaign to destroy those who could never be reconciled with the ideas of the state kept 
pressure on the insurgent, causing him to make mistakes.  Without these elements, the 
Sunni rejection of AQI would likely have seen more repression of the Sunnis in order for 
AQI to gain their compliance. 
But what made these U.S.-led initiatives work? Like the principle of interest, 
increased time magnified the investments of a number of efforts, making them more 
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valuable to the U.S.-led Coalition.  Attempts to cash these various factors in prior to 2007 
would have resulted in limited utility and their quick rejection, further inflaming the 
situation in Iraq.  It took the awareness of the Sunnis that their future did not lay with that 
offered by AQI to truly make these accelerants work to their maximum effectiveness.  
Even if the Sunni rank and file were ready to reject AQI in early 2005 after the initial 
murmurs of revolt in Al Qaim, the U.S. military would not have been able to completely 
capitalize on this development, as the institution had not yet been converted to see the 
benefits of utilizing a classical counterinsurgency strategy.  Likewise, the attrition of AQI 
by the SOF campaign of industrial counterterrorism had not yet been fully felt. 
Additionally, the Iraqi Army lacked capacity to partner with the U.S. military the way it 
did in the summer of 2007.  The Iraqi government in 2005 was still forming and 
developing its constitution, focused on developing the political future of Iraq rather than 
ending the insurgency. The convergence of the surge, tactical innovation, increasing GoI 
capacity, and other accelerants with the small, but slowly growing divide between AQI 
and the Sunni served to widen the existing wedge, leading to the gap being split wide 
open in a matter of months rather than years.  The military practitioner must see that 
these are not isolated causes that can be simply mimicked elsewhere.  The 
implementation of these factors must be understood in their context to be of future value 
to those undertaking a counterinsurgency campaign.    
Rather than looking at the past through the eyes of the victorious, we should strive 
to look at things through the eyes of the vanquished.  If we choose only to base our future 
operations on our own experiences, we inadvertently limit ourselves in the future. An 
Army guide to military history notes that “the victors reorganize on the basis of 
considerable self-esteem, attributing their success to better organization, equipment, 
training and leadership, while the vanquished reorganize on the basis of considerable 
humility, analyzing events and determining and eliminating weaknesses with the 
intention of defeating the recent enemy.”394   
 
394 United States. Dept. of the Army, The Writing of American Military History: A Guide (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 12. 
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In this manner, now that the shock has worn off, AQI has begun to look at the 
past in order to reassert its control in Iraq. In a document posted to al-Hanein (a 
prominent Jihadi Salafist internet forum) in late-February 2010, the author—allegedly an 
Iraqi who hails from Husaybah, a town near al Qaim—blames the loss of Sunni support 
on a deliberate media campaign that framed AQI as oppressors.  In A Strategy to 
Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq, he notes that “there was no 
truth to the claim by the enemy from the fact that the Awakening emerged as a result of 
so-called mistakes committed by the Mujahideen,” instead blaming the Awakening on 
nationalist insurgents such as Abu Abed of the Knights of Baghdad.395 As a part of 
learning from their setbacks, the author lays out a five-point plan on how AQI can 
recover from the losses of 2007.396   
Of these recommendations, two appear to be most germane to this thesis as they 
are efforts that address the perceived causes of AQI’s decline.  The first is the call for 
AQI and the ISI to develop a counter-movement to the Awakening.  The purpose of these 
“Jihadist Awakening Councils” is much like those of their U.S. and GoI backed 
counterparts—to to form local tribal-based security forces to protect the population from 
the GoI and the U.S. military.397  According to the author, this will allow the ISI to 
expand its influence by winning the loyalty of tribal leaders, starting a community-
building program thereby reassuring the Sunni of the ISI’s intentions.398  The Jihadist 
Awakening is designed to build up the legitimacy of the ISI by earning the trust of the 
population through Islamic exhortation rather than financial motivation or coercion.   
What this reveals is that the rift between the Sunni and AQI is truly the heart of AQI’s 
decline in 2007, as this thesis has argued.   
The second strategic recommendation that reinforces the findings of this thesis is 
that the increased effectiveness of the Iraqi Security forces dealt a blow to the loss of the 
                                                 
395 A Strategy to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq (2010), 10, http://www. 
archive.org/download/Dirasa_dawla_03/khouta.pdf (accessed March 23, 2010).  
396 Ibid., 51. 
397 Ibid., 39. 
398 Ibid., 39–41. 
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AQI’s and the ISI’s legitimacy.  In an effort to reestablish the legitimacy of the ISI 
through the erosion of the GoI’s legitimacy, the author calls on his peers to target the 
GoI’s highly trained units.399  As these units show the ability of the GoI to exert its own 
sovereignty, they pose a threat to the ISI.  With their removal, AQI and the ISI can easily 
show the world that the Iraqi security forces are propped up by the U.S.-led coalition, 
thereby pointing out the illegitimacy of the GoI.   
These efforts by AQI to eliminate their weaknesses reflect the warning posed 
earlier and further reinforces many of the conclusions in this thesis.  What should stand 
out to the military practitioner seeking to apply U.S.-centric counterinsurgency tactics to 
future campaigns is that the narratives of published jihadist strategy documents or in 
captured documents lack any mention of the accelerating factors mentioned in this 
thesis—additional troops, changes in U.S. leadership, counterinsurgency doctrine, 
counterterrorism efforts, and the lessened Shi’a threat—as contributing to AQI’s demise.  
Instead, the evidence continues to point to popular rejection of the Jihadi-Salafi project in 
Iraq. 
What then are the future prospects of the transnational Jihadi-Salafi movement 
elsewhere?  If Iraq is to be any indicator, it appears that the movement will likely 
continue to sow the seeds of its destruction wherever it goes.  The ideology of the 
movement is so limited that it lacks the ability to adapt to local variances—it alienates, 
rather than incorporates.  Any move to accommodate indigenous beliefs will likely result 
in its advocates being rejected as apostates, further marginalizing the movement from the 
local population.  In many ways, the transnational Jihadi-Salafi movement acts like 
Cervantes’ starry-eyed hidalgo, Alonso Quixote, oblivious to what is going on around 
them.  Rather than accept their rejection by the Sunni, movement instead sees what it 
wants to see—that the schism was not the result of their ideals and actions, but by the 
betrayal of the Sunni, “those people who betrayed God and our master Muhammad by 
                                                 
399 A Strategy to Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq, 36. 
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allying with the crusaders and the Jews.”400  Like Don Quixote blaming his misfortunes 
on some evil enchanter, Jihadi-Salafis routinely look outside of themselves for the source 
of their calamities.  Pushed by their worldview, Jihadi-Salafis strive to make manifest 
their ideals, insisting that they can indeed establish a utopian-like caliphate.401  But the 
like all utopias, the dreams of the Jihadi Salafis are unacceptable in a world where 
absolutist ideals rarely endure.  In addition to seeing the world in ways alien to others, the 
transnational Jihadi-Salafis lack any substantial ties to the populace of the ummah.  
Although the quests of both Don Quixote and the Jihadi-Salafis are undertaken to 
recapture an idealized lost love—Dulcinea del Toboso for one, and the ummah for the 
other—the object of their affection remains oblivious to their efforts.  As a result, both 
characters seek solace amongst their closest companions and refuge in the wilderness, 
unwelcome anywhere.  The end result is that Azzam’s caravan will continue to wander.  
While it wanders, it’s lack of tangible roots and ideological resonance with the population 
will allow it to be slowly being picked off one by one, like the British patrol in the 1934 
film, The Lost Patrol, hounded and pursued wherever it goes.   
 
 
400 Asad Misr as quoted in Will McCants, Lamenting Loss of Anbar, Apprehensive of Jihad’s Future 
in Iraq, Jihadica.com, 2008, http://www.jihadica.com/lamenting-loss-of-anbar-apprehensive-of-jihads-
future-in-iraq/ (accessed October 29, 2009).  
401 It is interesting to note that the author of A Strategy to Strengthen the Political Position of the 
Islamic State of Iraq spends an entire chapter arguing that the insurgents in Iraq should unify as the 
establishment of a caliphate in Iraq is capable of being made real.  See Chapter 1 of A Strategy to 
Strengthen the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq. 
APPENDIX 
To “map” the flow of the Sunni insurgency over time, this series of figures 
portrays the significant activities described in Chapter 3 from 2004 to 2008.  The images 
were developed using the SIGACT data set provided by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and ArcGIS 9.3 by ESRI. 
 
Figure 13.   SIGACTS, 2004 
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Figure 14.   SIGACTS, 2005 
 
Figure 15.   SIGACTS, 2006 
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Figure 16.   SIGACTS, 2007 
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